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Preface
Kata Balogh & Wiebke Petersen
This long-awaited volume on bridging Formal and Conceptual Semantics is the
nal result of the successful BRIDGE Workshop held in Düsseldorf in 2014. The
workshop gathered a number of distinguished researchers from formal semantics
and conceptual semantics. We aimed to bring semanticists from two dierent
“fashions” together and initiate a deeper conversation and collaboration between
them instead of separating the two sides as competing views. The workshop
provided a platform to further discuss parallelisms on specic semantic issues on
the one hand and on the other hand to confront opposed claims from the two
dierent perspectives. This volume contains a selected number of high-quality
papers presented at the workshop featuring various approaches to meaning from
linguistics, logic and philosophy of language.
In Live Meanings Paul Dekker argues for a collaboration between cognitive
and model-theoretic theories regarding ‘meaning’. As he claims, ‘meanings’ –
if they exist – are context or theory dependent artifacts, and the oppositions
of the two aforementioned disciplines lead back to their “unrealistic preconcep-
tion” and misunderstanding of the nature of ‘meaning’. The paper presents a
theory-independent understanding of ‘meaning’ as part of a public conceptual
space. While characterizing the various aspects of this conceptual space, dierent,
previously antagonistic theories of ‘meaning’ are rather complementing each other.
The central focus of Kinds, descriptions of kinds, concepts and distributions
by Lousie McNally is the semantics of nominals. She presents an analysis connect-
ing the distributional semantic representation with classical referential semantics
in order to overcome the limitations of previous semantic approaches to kinds
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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and common nouns. The starting point of her discussion is the two-fold view
on the semantics of common nouns: claimed to denote kinds according to one
view, and to denote descriptions of kinds according to others. An opposition that
appears in cognitive semantics approaches. McNally argues that kinds are bridging
referential and conceptual approaches and makes a substantial step towards an
analysis of this bridge.
Ralf Naumann in Dependencies, semantics constraints and conceptual close-
ness in a dynamic frame theory proposes a bridge between dynamic semantic
frameworks and cognitive semantics. He proposes an analysis for the characteriza-
tion of semantic relations between lexical items – a topic, he claims to be missing in
formal semantic theories. Naumann’s approach introduced here is based on Frame
Theory extended with formal methods from Dependency Logic and belief theories.
In their paper, What Cost Naturalism?, Martin Stokhof and Michiel van Lam-
balgen investigate a crucial question from the perspective of the philosophy of
science. The core issue of their paper is the nature of linguistics in the broader
context of (natural) sciences. They discuss notions like structural explanation,
which provided the basis of earlier discussions between dierent linguistic theories.
In their paper, Stokhof and van Lambalgen discuss various examples that illustrate
the dierences of views in philosophy of science.
In Measuring out the relation between formal and conceptual semantics,
Tillmann Pross and Antje Roßdeutscher propose an analysis that can bridge the
gap between formal and conceptual semantics, which they claim exists due to
the dierent principles that derive sentence meaning (formal semantics / com-
positionally) and word meaning (lexical / conceptual semantics). They propose
a logical form based framework, in which the above meanings are derived by the
same principles. As an illustration of their framework, they provide an analysis of
German spatial denominal prex- and particle verbs.
The joint paper, Representing Lexicon: Identifying Meaning in Use vie Over-
specification, by Henk Zeevat, Scott Grimm, Lotte Hogeweg, Sander Lestrade and
E. Allyn Smith investigates the format of a formal account of the lexicon that should
contain for each lexical items as many senses as possible. Their primary goal is to
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solve the problem of how to predict the meaning of a lexical item in use. Their
proposed approach is based on lexical decomposition with a distinctive way of
overspecication in meaning, which is reduced the meaning in use in combination
with the given context.
Natalia Zevakhina and Alex Dainiak, in Russian predicates selecting remark-
able clauses: Corpus-based approach and Gricean Perspective, present a
study on Russian predicates that select exclamatives, or in their terms ‘remarkable
clauses’. They discuss the distributional properties of such predicates from dierent
perspectives. Based on cross-linguistic evidence, they argue for four conceptual
classes of predicates that take exclamatives, and provide an explanation of the
data in terms of the Gricean maxims.
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Live Meanings
Paul Dekker*
A notion of ‘Live Meanings’ serves to relativize the ambitions of formal semantics
and to strictly maintain a principle of compositionality; this enables one to enjoy,
not deny, ndings of the contextualists—as well as those of cognitive or conceptual
semanticists. The paper can be taken to argue for a cohabitation of the distinguished
disciplines.
1 Introduction
An age old incompatibility is felt between those who advocate the philosophical
analysis of language versus those who plead for a logical one, and between those
who favour or practice cognitive versus those who adopt model-theoretic theories
of meaning. The controversies appear in various guises, in the philosophy of
language, in linguistics, and in the cognitive sciences, and show up in debates
under the headings of contextualism and compositionality, and in debates on the
benets and mists of cognitive or conceptual, and truth-conditional semantics.
It seems to me that the antagonies can be traced back to an unrealistic precon-
ception of meaning, and, paired to it, a misapprehension of the results obtained
in the area of formal semantics. The preconception and misapprehension are
shared by opponents as well as proponents of formal semantics. The basic, and
I think mistaken, or wrongly appreciated, idea is that there are such things as
meanings, and that semantics consists in the intellectual endeavour of nding out
what they are and studying them. In his overview of “Theories of Meaning” in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Je Speaks recently formulated the task of
* I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Peter Bosch, Martin Stokhof, Ken Turner and Seyed
Mohammad Yarandi for inspiring comments and discussion.
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the philosopher of language interested in semantics as follows: “her job is [to] say
what dierent sorts of meanings expressions of a given language have, and which
expressions have which meanings” (Speaks 2010/4). Martin Stokhof speaks of an
‘Availability Assumption’, “which holds that meanings are available independently
of their being expressed, in a natural language or in a formal language. Only
on that assumption does it make sense to (. . . ) use one expression as a formal
representation of the meaning of another. And especially the latter is the daily
work of the formal semanticist” (Stokhof 2013, p. 210). Actually, I don’t think these
are proper qualications of the ndings of formal semanticists, even if these are
endorsed by those themselves.
I believe it does not make any real sense to talk, out of the blue, of “the meaning of
an expression”, or believe in the existence of such things, without any very specic
context or theory appended—almost obligatorily a context or theory that denes
the term ‘meaning’. (More radically, perhaps, I also do not believe in the existence
of categories of expressions, of sentences, or names, without such qualication, but
this matter goes beyond the purposes of the present paper.) Yet, like I said, such a
conception of meaning is endorsed by proponents as well as opponents of the
formal semantic enterprise. François Recanati speaks of “context-independent
meanings of our words” which can be “contextualized” and “modulated” (Recanati
2004, p. 131); Jerry Fodor starts an argument against formal semantics by “taking
for granted that either sentences mean what they do because they express the
thoughts that they do, or vice versa (whatever, exactly, vice versa comes to here.)”
(Fodor 2001, p. 2); William Croft presents the “pairing of a complex grammatical
structure with its meaning” as a basic form and the fundamental principle behind
construction grammar (Croft 2010, p. 463).
Without the intention to oppose or ridicule, colloquial or academic, discourse
about meanings, these discourses can be taken to involve profoundly contextual and
abstract theoretical uses of the term ‘meaning’. But what are meanings, if they do
not exist? Figuratively speaking I would like to put it thus. One can, at any moment,
make any arbitrary distinction —cut the pie this way or another— and then we have
what is on the one side of the distinction, and what is on the other. The two then are
possible meanings, without any assumed characteristics other than that of being
distinct from one another. In practice, but also in theory, we continuously make,
and mask, such kinds of distinctions, and the very practice of doing so is embedded
in a publicly conceptualized environment, partly governed by conventional and
14
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intentional principles. Aligning with (Quine 1948) and (Wittgenstein 1953), we may
recognize human verbal, or linguistic, behavior as meaningful, without thereby
postulating a realm of meanings, by conceiving of it as embedded in such practices.
Typically, verbal, or linguistic, practices have all kinds of structural characteris-
tics which semanticists (and linguists, psychologists and philosophers in general)
may want to lay bare, even though unavoidably abstractly and sketchily. If need be,
we can distinguish various dimensions of meaningfulness, e.g., a realistic or repre-
sentational one, a cognitive or conceptual one, or a social and practical one. Various,
theoretically possible, notions of meaning may emerge once one focuses on one of
these dimensions of meaning, and xes or ignores others. Certain types of expres-
sions, or items recognized as of certain types of expressions, then can be taken to
stand for certain categories of beings, thus rendering beings so-characterized as the
possible meanings of expressions so-typed; or certain conventional or functional
categories of linguistic items, or items thus identied, can be associated with types
of cognitive or social acts. Whatever the typologies are, they may each induce their
own ontology, and help to uncover or state relatively systematic distinctions and
generalizations that appear signicant along that dimension of meaning. Notice,
however, that nowhere in the statement or observation of such general charac-
terizations need it be assumed that purported ‘meanings’ are, or are like, ‘real’
meanings. A good reason being that, I think, it is highly inappropriate to speak of
‘real meanings’ in the rst place. One may best think of these ‘meanings’, so-called,
as mere artefacts of theories that help one lay bare structural meaningful aspects of
the use of natural language.
In the next section I will discuss how this reserved attitude towards meaning
bears on contextualist insights, and more in particular on the conclusions that can
be drawn from them. These insights will be taken to motivate an arguably intuitive
understanding of the principle of compositionality—a principle one can take to
be Iphigenia’s heart and the Achilles’ heel of formal semantics. This moderate, here
called ‘live’, understanding of the principle initiates a fresh look at a series of cases
which seem to escape a rigid understanding of the principle. These cases can or have
been taken to support contextualist arguments against compositionality. As we
will see, however, they, instead, can be taken to favour the principle upon its proper,
live, understanding; consequently, they can be seen to speak in favour of formal
semantics more in general. The picture that results from these considerations
15
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nally provides an outlook on the semantic landscape as cohabitated by various,
preferably collaborative, disciplines.
2 Contextualism and Compositionality
The formal study of meaning in natural language is seriously devoted to the
Fregean principle of compositionality. This principle can be found at work in
Frege’s writings (e.g., Frege 1892), and although it is not stated as such by Gottlob
Frege himself, it can be formulated as follows. “The meaning of an expression is a
function of the meanings of its parts and their mode of composition.” (The Principle
of Compositionality, PoC.) The intuitive idea should be familiar. If an expression is
syntactically built up in a certain way from meaningful constituent expressions,
then the meaning of the whole can be taken to depend on, be dened by, the
meanings of these constituent expressions. (And, it needs to be added, by the
interpretation of the specic way in which these constituent expressions have been
combined into the whole.) This principle, in this or one other formulation, shows
up in the vast body of 20th century work on logic, language and computation. (For
a solid, general overview, see Janssen 1997, Partee 2004.) The principle allows
for a formal explanation of the fact that nite language users may be able to create,
use and understand a possibly innite number of expressions so as to express
a possibly innite number of meanings.
The principle can be conceived of, with reason, the heart and heel of formal
semantics. The heart, because it portrays interpretation as a most rudimentary and
principled formal mapping between two recursive structures, as a homomorphism
of a given syntactic algebra to an algebra of meanings, independently specied
(Montague 1974, Janssen 1986). The heel, precisely because it has to assume this
algebra of meanings, and, because, given its rigid formal specication, it does
not seem to allow for modulations in this mapping. An old but fairly common
conception of a so-called ‘minimalist’ formal semantics does allow for pragmatic
modications of semantic meanings, but only after these are compositionally
assigned to analyzed syntactic structures (Borg 2004, Cappelen & Lepore 2005).
As I said at the start of this paper, I do not believe in a realm of independently
existing meanings, and it is at this point that the compositionality principle can be
questioned, and revaluated, as we will see. The principle has been challenged
in the rst place, from a ‘contextualist’ angle. A natural challenge to the principle
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springs from the observation that meaning is generally determined by parameters
of interpretation, other than those provided by syntactic clues, parameters which
can probably not better be characterized than ‘contextual’. (Hence, the label ‘con-
textualism’.) In the philosophy of language it is generally observed, often following
the lead of the later Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953), that the context of the use of
language plays a pervasive role in its interpretation, and this to such an extent
that it hardly deserves the eort any longer to try and systematically characterize
meanings of natural language expressions without paying due attention to these
contextual aspects.
The contextual impact on meaning and interpretation has been subsumed under
various labels. To name a few, there is pragmatic enrichment, argument saturation,
domain restriction, predicate loosening, semantic coercion, deferred reference, and
what have you. Generalizing somewhat crudely, one may bring them all under the
label of ‘modulations’ of meaning (Recanati 2004). It can be attested that the various
types of modulation indeed aect all acknowledged types of semantic phenomena,
reference, predication, quantication, and other semantic constructions alike. It
will not do to repeat all the contextualist examples that have been presented, as
they are many and they are also probably fairly well-known.
François Recanati adequately summarizes the general ndings, and Emma Borg
resumes what seems to be a common conclusion:
Contextualism holds that what is said depends on the context of utterance. The
evidence in favor of contextualism is provided by indenitely many examples in
which the same sentence, which does not seem to be ambiguous, is used in dier-
ent contexts to say dierent things (Recanati 1994, p. 164). According to these
philosophers, sentences can never express complete propositions independent of
context, however explicit speakers try to be. In other words, content is always
under-determined by the linguistic material (Recanati 2006, p. 23). Contextualism
ascribes to modulation a form of necessity which makes it ineliminable. Without
contextual modulation, no proposition could be expressed—that is the gist of con-
textualism (Recanati 2005, p. 179–80).
These days, the natural descendent of the formal approach, known as minimal-
ism, has been consigned to the margins: not everyone rejects minimalism, but
lots of people do. Minimalism is rejected in favour of contextualism: roughly,
the idea that pragmatic eects are endemic throughout truth-evaluable semantic
content (Borg 2007, p. 339).
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There are few indeed that contest the contextualist’s observations, but there are
also those who do not consider these ndings a threat for the formal semanticist.
(E.g., Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Emma Borg, Peter Pagin and Je
Pelletier, and Peter Lasersohn.) More particularly, Pagin and Pelletier 2007 and
Lasersohn 2012 have shown the contextualist observations to be consistent with a
compositional rendering of the syntax-semantics interface. The rst develop a
classical compositional architecture of interpretation which provides room for the
outcomes of pragmatic modulations within the composition of meaning. They
propose a compositional syntax/semantics architecture which allows, for any
analyzed sentence, modulation of every constituent of its construction-tree and
of the corresponding meaning-tree. Such an architecture suits the theoretical goals
very well, but also, I think, does not reach to the heart of the matter, which is
where the principle of compositionality is both valuable and vulnerable. Pagin
and Pelletier still build on a xed semantic algebra, start o from given meanings of
atomic constituent expressions, and then allow for virtually any assignment of
meanings of compound constructions on the basis of no matter what meanings of
their constituent expressions. Now I do agree that in principle any expression,
however constructed, can be assigned any meaning. (Who could possibly be in
charge of excluding any such meaning assignment?) But in a formal logical space
of postulated set-theoretical meanings, a systematic interpretation procedure which
is so open may strike one as vacuous.
Lasersohn sketches a compositional assignment of contents which also takes
contextual, ‘radical pragmatic’, eects on the interpretation of constituent expres-
sions to heart. His proposal relates to specic occasions of use, and employs, e.g.,
what certain parts of a sentence are “used to talk about” in a given context, and
allows these to enter into a compositional meaning assignment. Lasersohn himself
is deliberately pretty open about what goes under the heading of “what you are
talking about” and mentions, e.g., speaker’s reference and semantic reference, and
“perhaps other kinds of “talking about” ”. As we will see, Lasersohn’s proposal
is actually very close in spirit to the one I am about to propose, but I hope to
formulate mine in both a more radical and a more principled manner.
To the extent that it makes sense to talk about meanings in the rst place, I
think the meaning of an expression cannot but simply be whatever meaning it
has on its occasion of use. Let us label this the ‘live meaning’ of the expression
on its occasion of use. A live meaning can, indeed, be anything, but it should
18
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obviously be tied to such an occasion of use, and be live and determined there.
Notice that this notion does not deny, or threaten, or even empty, the principle
of compositionality, as essentially also Lasersohn observed. For, the meaning of
a compound expression, on its occasion of use, can be taken to be determined
by whatever are the meanings of its constituent expressions, on that occasion
of use. We can capture these observations by slightly reformulating the principle of
compositionality as follows.
Live Principle of Compositionality (LPoC) The live meaning of a compound
expression is a function of the live meanings of its parts and their live mode
of composition.
I claim that this formulation of the principle preserves its original intent, in keeping
with how it can be meant to apply. Let me elaborate somewhat on the present
statement of the principle, in particular on the adjective ‘live’ employed here.
First, if one chooses to read the adjective as ‘real,’ the principle as stated is just
an emphatic statement of the original principle. Thus understood, assuming real
meanings and real composition of meaning, the live principle of compositionality
states what formal semanticists and logicians have been working with for years.
Second, the live meaning of an expression when used on a certain occasion may
serve to distinguish it from the live meaning of that expression when used on
another occasion. (Obviously, this raises the question of how one can identify
the two uses as uses of one and the same expression. As indicated above, this
is a very serious question, but not one I will go into in this paper.) This, as a matter
of fact, is where the contextualist ndings t in.
If one assumes or believes that expressions are associated with meanings in-
dependent of their use —ideally, so-called ‘literal’ meanings— still one needs to
acknowledge that the very same expression can be used in a whole variety of
dierent ways, with dierent meanings associated. The point here is that upon
the LPoC it is the ‘deviant’, or better, ‘instant’, meaning of the expression on
that occasion of use, that contributes to the meaning of the whole in which that
expression occurs as a constituent. Otherwise, I take it, there would be no sense in
saying that the expression had occurred with a non-literal meaning. This seems to
be fairly obvious. If, on the other hand, one does not believe in such things as literal
meanings, then, I believe, the live meanings of expressions are the only things
that are left to talk about, if, that is, one wants to make some sense of the talk
of ‘the meanings of expressions’ at all.
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This brings me to the third point, the question, of course, what these live
meanings are? The ‘live meanings’ of expressions are here understood to be
their actual interpretations in their specic contexts of use. They are what the
interlocutors, and a suitably informed observer, can agree upon as to what the
expressions mean, in those contexts of use, and they are assumed to be public,
and determinate, in the context, in principle. (The contexts, as well, are supposed to
provide the background relative to which they are determinate.) If any of this fails, if
assumptions are not warranted, or not intended, or if possible interpretations don’t
make sense, then one might judge there is no live interpretation, or another suitable
one has to be constructed. The point is that if, or once, such interpretations remain
unquestioned, they are determinate (enough) to enter, indeed, into the compositions
of (live) meanings. Obviously, this leaves no need nor room for further contextualist
qualications, because upon the present picture the meanings we are dealing with,
and which enter the composition process, are contextually completely saturated.
In the next section I will discuss some cases in which one can imagine such
construction of meanings at work. (These are fabricated cases, but not fabricated
for the present purposes.) Contextualists, or at least some of them, have taken such
examples to motivate contextualism, cast doubt on the principle of compositionality
and, thus, disqualify a formal semantic approach to meaning. But actually, as I
will argue, quite a few, if not all, examples are understood best precisely in terms of
the principle of compositionality, upon its live understanding, and thus supply
support for compositionality, and, by implication, for formal semantics.
3 The Performance of Meaning
Upon the live understanding of the principle of compositionality, the building
blocks in the composition of live meaning on a certain occasion of use are the
live meanings of the participating constituent expressions—not any other meanings
that these constituent expressions may have on other occasions. This may look like
a trivial observation, but actually it is not, as it goes against the ways in which the
principle of compositionality has been assumed to apply in the analysis of natural
language. Our discussion of the following ve cases is meant to show that, not
only live meanings are actively ‘present’ on the relevant occasions of use, but also
that ‘past’ meanings are not. The cases, together with a few others, are discussed
somewhat more extensively in (Dekker 2014). [Whatever are ‘past meanings’ is left
20
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to the reader. She may think of them as ‘literal meanings’ —if she can make sense of
that term— once these have been superseded by live interpretations; or, otherwise,
as just whatever other live meaning the relevant expressions have been associated
with before their present use. Choosing the latter option would of course come
close to agreeing with the conception of interpretation advocated in this paper.]
Case 1 (The Jones’s) [The rst case arises in a reaction from Saul Kripke on an
ambiguity that Keith Donnellan seems to have propagated.]
Two people see Smith in the distance and mistake him for Jones. They have a
brief colloquy:
(1) “What is Jones doing?”
“Raking the leaves.”
“Jones,” in the common language of both, is a name of Jones; it never names Smith.
Yet, in some sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have
referred to Smith, and the second participant has said something true about the
man he referred to if and only if Smith was raking the leaves (whether or not Jones
was). In the example above, Jones, the man named by the name, is the semantic
referent. Smith is the speaker’s referent, the correct answer to the question, “To
whom were you referring?” (Kripke 1979, p. 14/15)
Kripke acts in this case as a suitably informed observer, and we can imagine him
intruding into the colloquy saying:
(2) That is true, but he is not Jones.
He would, thus, indicate, that he picked up an understanding of (1) as being about
Smith, refer back to him with his own use of the pronoun ‘he’, and re-establish the
past, ‘ocial’, interpretation of ‘Jones’ by reusing the name ‘Jones’. Alternatively,
assuming that the real Jones is as a matter of fact not raking the leaves, Kripke
might have interjected with:
(3) That is false, he is not Jones.
What would be false, then, is that Jones is raking the leaves, so the statement
that gets corrected is not that Smith is raking the leaves, which is obvious, but
the statement that Jones is raking the leaves. With (3) Kripke would thus show that
he actually construes (1) as about Jones, at the same time realizing, of course, that
the interlocutors are discussing Smith. This is apparent from his use of the pronoun
‘he’ in (3), which demonstratively refers to the guy who is raking the leaves, Smith.
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Upon this understanding, Kripke might as well have pointed out, slightly wittily:
(4) That is false, he is not him.
If replying thus, ‘he’ would again have been used as a demonstrative referring to
Smith, actually present, and the pronoun ‘him’ could be conceived to be coref-
erential with the term ‘Jones’ used by the rst speaker, and according to Kripke’s
own picture of the common language. So there is an amalgam of referents here: the
person actually present, Smith, who gures as the so-called speaker’s referent,
and Jones himself, which can be supposed to be called by his name.
Interestingly, it appears to be very dicult, if not impossible, to construe (1)
as a true statement—about Smith, that is— while at the same taking ‘Jones’ to
involve Jones.
(5) ?True, but he is not him.
The conrmation indicates that Kripke construes (1) as being about Smith, which
then is his live understanding of ‘Jones’, and somehow he cannot then pick up
on this as involving the real Jones, in order to select him, Jones, as a referent for the
second pronoun ‘him’ in (5). I take it that a reply with (5) indeed sounds quite
bizarre. This is to say, I take it, that ‘Jones’ may have a semantic referent, and
a speaker’s referent, which can be distinct, but when the two are dierent, only one
meaning can be live.
Case 2 (The Ham Sandwiches) [This is also a famous case, brought to us by
Georey Nunberg.]
For example, a restaurant waiter going o duty might remind his replacement:
(6) The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20.
(Nunberg 1979, p. 149)
It is clear to most of us that the restaurant waiter, by uttering (6), refers to a person,
not a ham sandwich, so that in our terms the live meaning of ‘the ham sandwich’
is someone who, e.g., orders, or has been served, a ham sandwich; it is not the
ham sandwich. Thus, later in the scenario, one can imagine the waiter, still there, to
follow up with, for instance, (7):
(7) The ham sandwich wants to pay. He is in a hurry.
Once the phrase ‘the ham sandwich’ is understood thus, as referring to a person,
it seems awkward to suppose that it still is about ham sandwiches. A statement like
the following therefore appears to be too overly underspecied.
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(8) ?The ham sandwich wants to pay for it.
Of course, the pronoun ‘it’ can, as always, be used to point at anything that makes
sense, for instance, at whatever was served to him, or at whatever was done to
him. I do not, however, succeed in taking it to refer to—that is what it would
be—the ham sandwich by means of which the waiter just focused the hearer’s
attention to the person who ordered it.
The replacement in the restaurant might of course be unfamiliar with the deferred
use of ‘ham sandwich’ in (7). After asking (9), it can thus be illuminating if the
waiter replies with (10):
(9) Who wants to pay?
(10) The ham sandwich. The ham sandwich is the person who ordered the ham
sandwich.
It seems pretty unilluminating, on the other hand, if (9) were countered by (11):
(11) The ham sandwich. The ham sandwich is the person who ordered it.
Upon hearing (11) the replacement probably wonders ‘the person who ordered
what?’ He may be able to figure out, upon reflection, that it should be the person who
ordered the ham sandwich. But this ham sandwich [digestible] is not as lively present
as the ham sandwich [person] referred to by means of ‘the ham sandwich’ in (7).
Nunberg later observes that it may not so much be the whole (referential) noun
phrase that gets a ‘deferred meaning’, or whose live meaning is at stake, but, rather,
the (predicative) noun. “(. . . ) there are a number of reasons for concluding that
the transfer here takes place on the common noun meaning–that is, that this is
a case of meaning transfer, rather than reference transfer. (. . . ) the transfer actually
takes place at the level of the common noun, which contributes only a property
of persons (. . . )” (Nunberg 1995, p. 115–6). If the restaurant’s replacement appears to
be familiar with the indicated use, he might also wonder about (7) and reply with (12):
(7) The ham sandwich wants to pay. He is in a hurry.
(12) There are three of them. Which one wants to pay?
It, then, seems perfectly appropriate to answer his question with (13), but a reply
with (14) appears to be pretty odd again.
(13) The one that stumbled in the toilet.
(14) ?The one that fell on the oor in the kitchen.
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Apparently, in the cases above the noun ‘ham sandwich’ is interpreted as a predicate
applying to persons, not digestibles. And it is the rst, not the second, interpretation
that is most likely alive. And the one that is live is present, and the other one is not.
Case 3 (The Philosophers) [The third case is as a matter of fact a whole array of
cases.] Consider the following sentence.
(15) Few philosophers are linguists.
It seems to be common opinion in the semantics literature that quantied structures
of the form DET(A,B)—where DET is a determiner phrase, and A a nominal or
set denoting expression, and B a verbal one— presuppose a domain of A’s and
contribute discourse referents A’s who are B, and possibly A’s who are not B.
There is also quite some consensus that quantied noun phrases generally serve to
quantify over contextually restricted domains of quantication, and, of course, that
nouns like ‘philosophers’ can be used to classify philosophers in various ways:
as professional philosophers, as persons displaying a certain kind of philosophical
behavior, persons otherwise distinguished as philosopher-like, etc.
Independent of any analysis of presupposition, contextually restricted quan-
tication, and discourse reference, one thing seems to be entirely clear. If the
term ‘philosopher’ is used to characterize or distinguish individuals in one of
these ways, relative to some contextually given domain of quantication, then
the presupposition is that there is a domain of philosophers classied precisely that
way in that domain of quantication; also, if a discourse referent is introduced
for the philosophers who are linguists, then this discourse referent involves all
those who classify as philosophers in the way in which the term ‘philosopher’
was understood, or intended in the rst place, and in the contextually given domain
of quantication. (And, likewise, for them being ‘linguists’ in the way in which few
of them were said to be linguists.)
Actually, it seems very hard to explain how this could not be the case. Let me give
it a try. No sense can be made of an, almost inconceivable, use of (15), according to
which few of a contextually salient group of philosophically behaving children
practice linguistics, while it presupposes a domain of professional philosophers, and
sets up a discourse referent for a world-wide group of professional philosophers and
linguists. Like I said, it is very dicult to explain what I think is excluded, which
is that a statement made by (15), its presupposition, and its discourse anaphoric
potential, relate to dierent possible interpretations of the term. Upon any sensible
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understanding of a use of (15) only one interpretation is the live one, although
many other interpretations are possible, yet these are claimed to simply be not
present. Not alternative ones, not even, literal ones—if any.
The very point is perhaps illustrated more concisely by the following two examples.
Everybody, except maybe certain formal semanticists, can make sense of (16).
(16) You have philosophers and philosophers.
Two uses of one and the same term easily invoke—here invite—a dierent live
interpretation. One use of it doesn’t do so, or so it seems. At least I am unable
to state what (16) can be taken to say, by using (17):
(17) ?You have philosophers and them (they themselves).
If a live, ‘secondary’, interpretation of the first use of ‘philosophers’ in (16) were
derivative on a ‘primary’, ‘literary’, meaning of the term, then one should be able to
say what (16) says by using (17). But, like I said, I do not succeed in making this work.
Case 4 (The Presidential Elections) [This case involves a factual state of affairs.]
In 1969, January 20-th, Richard Nixon succeeded Lyndon B. Johnson as the pres-
ident of the United States, so that after eight years of Democratic rule (with John
F. Kennedy and Johnson), an eight year period of Republican rule started (with
Nixon and Gerald Ford).
One could have described this situation, correctly, if one had uttered, in 1969:
(18) For the last eight years the president was a Democrat and the next eight
years he will be a Republican.
Example (18) could have been used, in 1969, to state something true, if the noun
phrase ‘the president’ was rendered, or read, as whoever has been residing in
the Oval Oce over a certain stretch of time. On this reading it would merely
serve to sum up the outcomes of the presidential elections over some sixteen years.
Alternatively, example (18) could have been rendered as being about the actual
president, in 1969, Johnson. On this reading it would state that Johnson had been
Democrat the past eight years, and, surprisingly, and falsely I assume, would have
turned out Republican the next eight years.
Theoretically one might want to try and use (18) to state that we had had 8
years of Democratic rule, and that Johnson now will be Republican the next 8
years, for the president [whoever it was] was democratic the last 8 years, and
the president [the actual one now] will be republican the next 8 years. Formally
25
Paul Dekker
there is no problem in stating such an interpretation. However, it is an extremely
unlikely—many will say impossible–way of construing an understanding of ‘the
president’ in example (18).
It is assumed that the pronoun ‘he’ in the second sentence of example (18) picks
up the president from the rst sentence, and it should intuitively do so under
the interpretation that ‘the president’ had there—i.e., its live meaning. Thus, if
‘the president’ would have been read as Johnson, then so would ‘he’, and if ‘the
president’ would have been read as whoever, in any of these sixteen years, had won
and would win the elections, then so would ‘he’ be read. A ‘mixed’ interpretation
which would enable the interpretation of the phrase ‘the president’ to work out
referential on its use relative to the coming eight years, while it applied in an
attributive way relative to the previous eight years, does not appear to be a viable
live interpretation at all—it has no chance of survival.
Case 5 (The Brothers Karamazov) [The last case involves the writing and read-
ing of The Brothers Karamazov.]
Although Dostoyevsky began his rst notes for The Brothers Karamazov in April
1878, he had written several unnished works years earlier. Dostoyevsky spent
nearly two years writing The Brothers Karamazov, which was published as a serial
in The Russian Messenger and completed in November 1880.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Brothers_Karamazov)
One may conclude:
(19) Dostoyevsky began The Brothers Karamazov in 1878. He finished it in 1880.
As a matter of fact, I got a copy of The Brothers Karamazov from my grandmother
early in the winter of 1977, and I read it over the Christmas break. It is true to
say that:
(20) I began the book by the end of 1977, and nished it ten days later.
Books are written, published, read, started, and completed. As can be seen from the
examples (19) and (20), the noun phrase ‘The Brothers Karamazov’ can be used to
denote the event of writing the book, which Dostoyevsky started in 1878, and
an event of reading it, which I for instance completed in 1978. Interestingly, it
cannot be used to denote both events at the same time. It appears to be particularly
odd to conclude, from (19) and (20) that.
(21) ?Dostoyevsky began The Brothers Karamazov in 1878. I nished it in 1978.
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What I read is what Dostoyevsky wrote, The Brothers Karamazov. So what he
began in 1878 is what I nished in 1978. Or not? What he began was writing
The Brothers Karamazov, and what I nished was reading it, so not the writing of it.
So what Dostoyevsky began in 1878 is not what I nished in 1978, and upon the
most likely understanding of (19) and (20), it does not allow one to conclude to (21).
We see that once the book is ‘coerced’ into an event, it is the event, and no
longer the book, that is present. Stated thus, this might actually be surprising. Not
so, however, upon our formulation of what goes on. When the live interpretation of
‘The Brothers Karamazov’ is an event, it is not a book, and this is a very trivial
observation, of course.
These ve cases are meant to illustrate, not so much the fact (taken as obvious) that
the interpretation of constituent expressions of compound constructions can be
heavily context dependent, but that these live interpretations contribute to, or
determine, the (live) meanings of the whole of these expressions. As a matter of
fact, once we drop the assumption that meanings are non-contextually givens,
and allow live meanings to enter the interpretative architecture, one can clearly see
the principle of compositionality at work in our actual understanding of natural
language. The ndings of the present section are, thus, in complete agreement with
Lasersohn’s conclusion: “(. . . ) far from being problematic for compositionality,
contextual variation in interpretation is precisely what rescues the claim that inter-
pretation is compositionally assigned from apparent counterexamples” (Lasersohn
2012, p. 188).
In the statement of the LPoC mention was made also of the ‘live mode of composition’
and I want to conclude this section with some tentative reflections on this.
Linguists and philosophers with a proper interest in language alike share an
interest in so-called “structural ambiguities”, apparently or potentially present in
almost every natural language sentence. The phenomenon of a structural ambiguity
can be tuned down, in the present terminology, to the possibility of having one,
rather than another, live mode of composition of a given utterance. We intend and
interpret a string like, e.g., “old men and women”, as if it were constructed by
rst modifying the noun “men” by the adjective “old”, and then conjoining the
result with the noun “women”, or, alternatively, as if it were obtained by modifying
the conjunction of the two nouns by the adjective. The string itself, however,
is appropriately characterized as consisting of three linearly ordered words, and
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does not itself display any structure. It is a matter of theoretical idealisation
(mythication, or metaphor, if one wants), when we speak of the string of three
words having two or more readings, out of which we pick one. Instead, there is only
one, according to the rules currently in charge. Not the string, but its occurrence,
is associated with an analysis, and then the LPoC tends to dictate only one analysis,
reading, interpretation.
Analogous observations, and more subtle distinctions, can be made regarding the
ways in which nouns and noun phrases are combined in possessive constructions
such as “Michelle’s portrait”, “Derek’s omelet”, “Tony’s roots”, “the back of the
car”, “the construction of the city” and “the start of the play”. Given the many
various ways in which nouns can be, thus, taken to be combined, it appears hard,
even unrealistic, to imagine a grammar handing out the theoretical combinatory
possibilities, from which a context should help us pick one. Instead, we assume a fe-
licitous use of such combinations to yield the proper one, which, if not contextually
questioned, decides on the interpretation, or meaning of the whole. If the ensuing
conceptual construction, or the associated truth conditions, conict with other
indicators in the context, then, apparently, we have misconstrued the complex.
Such, however, would not mean that the grammar has failed.
Proper, live, compositions also seem to be required when we employ or face noun-
noun compounds, such as “book shelf”, “bicycle pump”, “kitchen knife”, “university
hospital” and “machine learning”. Here, even more, we face a theoretical wealth of
combinatory possibilities, while on their regular, that is unproblematic, occurrences,
we only use one. There is of course the obvious, decontextualized question, “which
one–or which of the ones?” And, again, the only, theoretically uninformative,
but correct, answer is “the right one”.
The possible modes of composition, and the distinctions that can be made among
them, are theoretically intriguing, but they are mentioned here only to point out
what the live principle of compositionality apparently implies: that we employ
modes of composition according to the rules assumed currently in charge, that is,
‘live’. Again, if one chooses to assume, or live by, one rigid, stipulative, grammar,
the live principle of compositionality only dictates compositions of (live) meanings
according to the rules of grammar, as it is usually taken to dictate. Allowing,
more exibly, for, theoretically unconstrained, but contextually induced modes of
composition, it seems we can naturally accommodate the heterogeneity of natural
language generation and interpretation. I will not go into the implications of this
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notion of live modes of composition any further here, and leave it as a subject
for further exploration and discussion elsewhere.
4 Context and Conceptual Space
I take it that the principle of compositionality can be maintained with regard to any
contextualist ndings, and possibly contrary to some contextualist conclusions.
It may have occurred to the reader that the preceding discussion has been stated in
all kinds of semantic terms, like meanings, interpretations, speaker’s reference,
presupposition, coercion, etc. Obviously, the principle of compositionality, also on
its ‘live’ formulation or understanding, does invoke the concept of (live) meanings
of constituent expressions, and refers to or quanties over them. The discussion,
however, should not be taken to build on a given category of meanings, as re-
pudiated by Quine and ourselves. “I remain free to maintain that the fact that
a given linguistic utterance is meaningful (or signicant, as I prefer to say so as not
to invite hypostasis of meanings as entities) is an ultimate and irreducible matter of
fact; or, I may undertake to analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the
presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to
it” (Quine 1948, p. 30-1). All semantic vocabulary is intended to reect our intuitive
and everyday understanding of ‘signicant’ verbal behavior. All we suppose is that,
relative to the envisaged contexts, the semantically relevant distinctions can be
made, intelligible to us, here, and to the envisaged participants.
It must be submitted that indeed, if one wants to give a formal characterization
of observations of the kind indicated above, which after all constitutes an aim
of the formal semantic enterprise, this implies that such relevant distinctions get
formalized, too. If dierent occurrences of one and the same term are associated
with dierent live meanings, they have to be formally distinguished. Such is
expedient in order to keep the compositional architecture formally transparent,
but it does delegate quite some work to the mapping from concrete utterances
to ‘logical forms’, however understood. E.g., an utterance, sensibly interpreted,
of ‘All philosophers are philosophers’ will presumably have to be mapped to
something like the formally transparent ‘∀x(Px→ P ′x)’. We can, however, leave
the required mappings to the formal linguists, and to those who seek to apply
the formal semantic insights and results. Such is not our main concern here though.
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More relevant to the present discussion is the observation, directly taken from the
contextualists, that live meanings are determined in a context of use. We have to be
careful when using the term ‘determined’ here though. I emphatically want to abstain
from the idea that this involves the existence of meanings, which get subsequently
‘determined’ (‘specified’, . . . ) in a context of use. I think that on any successful or
unproblematic occasion of use, these so-called meanings are there, completely, and as
determinate as required and defined by the context. The idea is that, in principle,
we can all engage in an assessment of the relevant distinctions, in the context, and
of the relevant distinctions imported by a specific utterance in that context. The
only formal, or philosophical, requirement is that these distinctions are public.
Such a context can be conceived of as a public space, publicly accessible, and we
evaluate (interpret, . . . ) utterances as acts in such a space. This may seem like a
vacuous truism, but it does, or should, help in qualifying the semantic abstractions
made from those contexts. At the end of the day, the ‘live meanings’ that we
talk about are eventually not the instantiations of (suitable) abstractions, but the
abstractions are artefacts of a theory modeling interesting, structural, features of
specic acts in the rst place meaningfully performed in a public space. One ought
to just realize that all of the discussion in the preceding section—and probably
all sensible work discussed under the heading of semantics, only makes sense
if the reader interprets or assesses it against the background of any context of
use—most often an imaginary one, but at least an (imagined) publicly accessible
context of use.
It may be noticed that there is nothing that prevents us from thinking of this
public space as a conceptual space. On the contrary: much discussion in linguistics
and semantics is apparently conceptual. After all, there does not seem to be any
ground for anyone to make a fundamental or categorical distinction between
the real and the conceptual, or, better, between things that we know only really,
but not conceptually, and those that are by their nature only conceptual, but not
real. But then it is only a small step to recognize that the public space where we
locate live meanings, can be very much of the kinds proposed in various systems
of conceptual or cognitive semantics. Mental spaces, frames, conceptual space,
discourse representation structures if one wants, can all be taken to present their
own ways of formulating or modeling cognitively signicant aspects of the very
same public space.
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That a public space is considered a conceptual space may not come as a surprise to
many. That the kind of conceptual space we are interested in here is public, may also
need no argument, but it may have to be emphasized. Mental spaces, frames, their
constituents, conceptual categories, prototypes, semantic features and relations, are
postulated in a public, theoretical, language, and described as generally accessible
and publicly available objects, sets, or other constructs with a consensual status
in the various theories. They are general coin and a common good.
I propose that frames provide the fundamental representation of knowledge in
human cognition. I assume that frames represent all types of categories, includ-
ing categories for animates, objects, locations, physical events, mental events,
and so forth (Barsalou 1992, p. 21/9). Mental spaces are very partial assemblies
constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding (Fauconnier
2010, p. 351). [T]he notion of a construction (. . . ) is a uniform model for the repre-
sentation of all grammatical knowledge—syntax, morphology, and lexicon (Croft
2010, p. 463). An expression’s content consists in a set of cognitive domains. (. . . )
These are not themselves concepts but irreducible realms of experience within
which conception can emerge (Langacker 2010, p. 98).
Such public conceptions may of course serve as a challenge, but only rarely picked
up, it seems.
Prima facie, this appears to be an enigma for the cognitive approach to semantics:
meanings are things that are common to the language users. (. . . ) The idea is that
the conceptual structures of dierent individuals will become attuned to each
other, otherwise linguistic communication will break down. Thus, for practical
purposes, cognitive linguists often write as if every (adult) speaker of a language
is enodowed with the same conceptual structure (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 155).
It seems that proceeding on that, practical, assumption, and assuming that linguistic
communication factually does not break down, we do well in declaring conceptual
space public. Gärdenfors’ conception of conceptual spaces is presented as an
attempt to make sense, after all, of the cognitive structures as purely individual
cognitive structures. “One advantage, in contrast to cognitive semantics, is that
we need not assume that the interlocutors share identical mental spaces” (Warglien
& Gärdenfors 2013, p. 2189). This paper indeed provides a mathematically sophisti-
cated and scientically motivated explanation of how purely individual conceptual
spaces can be seen at work. Yet, the authors do also acknowledge that “[w]hat
makes communication possible is the capacity to establish similarity-preserving
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mappings between the conceptual spaces of the participants” (Warglien & Gär-
denfors 2013, p. 2181). It seems that this capacity of preserving similarity is still
presented, also here, as a necessary or constitutive condition of communication.
We have by now reached an interesting point in our contemplations. Starting
from supposed contextual and conceptual worries about formal semantics, formal
semantic reection on a notion of meaning has led to a notion of context, which is
a public space, suitably conceived of as a conceptual space—not orthogonal to,
but actually and inherently inviting contextual and conceptual exploration. We
may then, once again, reect on the question what it is that we are doing in (formal)
semantics? Well, what are we doing with signicant verbal behavior? We are
inhabiting logical space, or more adequately in the present context, meaning space.
As indicated above, such a meaning space can be charted along various dimensions.
Charting the realist or representational dimension of meaning, we observe truth-
conditional structure, which has been tracked and still is mapped out extensively in
the work carried out under the heading of truth conditional semantics.
What formal semantics delivers is a systematic account of broadly ‘referential’
aspects of meaning. [Under ‘referential’ we include all those aspects that are
analysed in terms of a determinate relationship between expressions and extra-
linguistic reality (. . . ).] As such that is an essential ingredient of an overall ac-
count, since in certain circumstances, as part of certain practices, these are the
relevant features that our use of language turns around. (. . . ) From this perspec-
tive, then, formal semantics is one methodology that deals with one particular
aspect of the heterogeneous phenomenon of meaning. Its contribution to our un-
derstanding consists of systematic, conceptual reconstructions of certain aspects
of meaning at the idealised level of competence (Stokhof 2013, p. 229).
It has also proven more than worthwhile, of course, to chart the cognitive or
conceptual dimension of meaning, the results and insights from which are also
very impressive indeed. There is this vast body of work on cognitive grammar and
semantics, frames, mental spaces and conceptual spaces. Cf., e.g., (Barsalou 1992,
Croft & Cruse 2004, Fauconnier 2010, Gärdenfors 2000, Lakoff 1987, Langacker 2010).
One can of course also track the social, normative, dimension of meaning, which,
however, has not been mapped out elaborately yet in formal systems. The main
point of all this is that uncovering structure in one dimension of meaning should not
need one to exclude any of the others. Of course, I am inclined to add. The insights
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from the various strands of work can be, and better be, brought together as far
as is feasible. Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013 provides for an eminent bridge.
Traditional formal semanticists may be worried about the present ‘surrenderings’
to the contextualist and conceptualist challenges, but this would be unseemly. The
assignment of meanings to constituent expressions, and to composite wholes, is not
taken to be arbitrary, and the impact of the LPoC itself is built on that assumption.
The live meaning of a compound is determined by means of the live meanings of its
constituents, and such an argument rests on the assumption that one can make
sense of such live meanings of such constituents in the rst place. Moreover, the
simple idea that, in the interpretation of natural language anything might go, but
doesn’t go in practice, can be put to work in an assessment of proposals for things
that don’t go, but, for as far as the LPoC suggests, might have worked out well after
all. An example of this can already be distilled from a case discussed above.
In my discussion of the case of the Karamazovs, I qualied example (21) with
a ‘?’, yet, in passing I denied the claim that what Dostoyevsky began in 1878 is
what I nished in 1978. Indeed example (21) should not be deemed infelicitous,
but probably false, upon the live interpretation suggested by the description of
the case. But this assumes a reading of the example as possibly true, but actually
false. False, if, for instance, we can conceive what Dostoyevsky started and what
I nished as the onset and completion of one big event. Thus, a literary critic,
who thinks very highly of himself, may think of the whole The Brothers Karamazov
as one big hoax that he is now concluding by writing the ultimate, killing, review
of it—after which nobody is supposed to ever want to read it any more. How
unlikely this is, it is not impossible, and if the critic were to state something to that
eect using (21), one could very well argue that he said something false —not
infelicitous— if one nds out that the discussion about the book still continues.
Proper, maybe unlikely, live interpretations of certain constituents may thus render
examples which seem to be infelicitous on a rst encounter to be felicitous after all.
The case just discussed nicely illustrates a more general, methodological, moral.
It is good and customary practice in semantics to investigate certain structural
phenomena, by opposing completely unproblematic samples of language with
slight variants deemed unacceptable, infelicitous, or ‘marked’. It is solid practice to
next propose a semantic explanation of the dierence, for instance, by blaming
the presence or absence of a particular semantic feature or characteristic. The
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concept of live meanings can be called upon to test such explanations. For, a most
obvious test of the proposed explanation would consist in setting up a case in
which the constituents held responsible for the infelicity in the original examples,
are read as having, or lacking, the responsible semantic property. If the proposed
explanation runs well, the infelicity disappears in such a case.
Interference Principle If (the absence of) a semantic property pi of an expression
X is to explain the fact that X does not felicitously gure in conguration
∗φ(X), then in a context in which the live meaning ofX fails (has) pi, it should,
all else being equal, render X felicitous in 6∗φ(X) again.
As a matter of fact, such a test can be and has been applied successfully in specic
semantic discussions. (See Dekker 2014 for some more discussion.) If such an
interference test is performed, a sceptic might be inclined to see it serve as the
disconrmation of a proposed hypothesis, and the whole test could be considered
to ridicule formal semantics. But such a move would be very wrong indeed. As a
matter of fact the test may serve to possibly conrm the hypothesis proposed,
by, instead, providing the proverbial ‘exception that proves the rule.’
Notice that the whole conception of an interference test makes sense only when
one allows for a notion of live meanings. For if expressions are assumed to have
one literal or linguistic meaning only, then infelicity would be systematic, and
ought to be exception free. It may be clear, from the position adopted in this paper,
and from the contextualist ndings, that such a rigid notion of interpretation had
better be given up. Otherwise, as a matter of fact, the principle oers a recipe
to disconrm any semantic hypothesis, rigidly, understood. And that really is
a threat for traditional formal semantics.
5 Conclusion
I hope I have demonstrated in this paper that a modestly realist, not (yet) theoretically
infected, conception of meaning enables one to conceive of meaning as featuring in
a public conceptual space. The various (realist, cognitive, social, . . . ) dimensions
of the space can be conceived to be structurally characterized by diverging, possibly
orthogonal, theoretical disciplines devoted to that exercise—disciplines which are
nonetheless consistent and ideally complementing each other.
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Kinds, descriptions of kinds, concepts,
and distributions
Louise McNally*
Within referential approaches to meaning, Carlson’s (1977) notion of kind as an
entity has played an inuential role not only in the analysis of generic sentences,
but also in the analysis of common noun semantics within so-called “layered”
approaches to the syntax and semantics of nominals (e.g. Zamparelli 2000). Within
the latter approaches, two competing views of the role of kinds in the semantics
of nominals have developed, neither of which is entirely satisfactory. In this paper I
argue that by modeling the semantics of common nouns using distributional se-
mantic representations and connecting them in a very specic way to an otherwise
standard referential semantics, we overcome the limitations of these kind-based
accounts of the semantics of common nouns while preserving their insights. In-
sofar as distributional representations have been proposed as ersatz conceptual
representations (Lenci 2008b), the analysis also exemplies a concrete proposal
about how conceptual and referential approaches to meaning might be integrated.
1 Introduction
Carlson (1977) defended the hypothesis that natural language ontology includes
not only “ordinary” (token) object-level entities such as people or artefacts but
also kind-level entities, which are of the same semantic type but of a dierent
* I am grateful to the members of the FLoSS virtual reading group and the participants in the 2013
Daghstuhl Seminar on Computational Models of Meaning in Context, especially Gemma Boleda,
Marco Baroni, Katrin Erk and Roberto Zamparelli, for helping me learn about and develop my thinking
on distributional semantics. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work has been supported by Spanish Ministry of
Innovation and Science grants FFI2010-15006, FFI2010-09464, FFI2013-41301, grant 2014SGR698 from
the Catalan government, and an ICREA Academia award.
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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sort.1 He argued that bare plurals in English (as in (1a)), as well as some uses
of denite singulars, (as in (1b)) are rigid designators that denote kind-level entities.
In other words, they could be thought of as proper names for kinds.
(1) a. Snakes are reptiles.
b. The snake is a reptile.
This hypothesis led to signicant advances in the study of genericity, and though
the specics of Carlson’s account of reference to kinds have subsequently been
the subject of much debate (see e.g. Carlson & Pelletier 1995; Mari et al. 2013), kinds
themselves have persisted in natural language ontology and have been used in the
analysis of other semantic phenomena that do not involve genericity, notably in the
internal semantics of nominals (e.g. Zamparelli 2000, Chierchia 1998, McNally
& Boleda 2004, Déprez 2005, Espinal 2010).2 Within this latter line of research,
which will be our primary focus in this paper, all analyses start from the basic idea
developed in Zamparelli 2000 that nominal expressions have a “layered” structure,
as will be described in section 2, and that kinds are somehow involved in the
semantics of the innermost or deepest layer. However, they divide into two main
groups based on the way in which kinds are appealed to in the syntax-semantics
interface: One line of analysis posits that common nouns denote kinds themselves
(i.e. a subsort of entity), while the other argues that they denote descriptions of
kinds (i.e. sets of (sub)kinds in an extensional set-theoretical semantics).
While this work as a whole has yielded considerable insights into natural
language data, the modeling of kinds as atomic entities is rather uninformative,
telling us little about what a kind actually is. Krifka (1995) suggests that kinds
correspond to sortal concepts but says little about what these are. Müller-Reichau
(2011), p. 46, suggests that kinds are reications of concepts, where he understands
a concept as “information in the mind that allows us to discriminate entities of
[one] kind from entities of other kinds” (citing Löbner 2002:20) or “accumulated
knowledge about a type of thing in the world” (citing Barsalou 2000). Note that the
1 Carlson’s ontology also included a third sort of entity, so-called stages of individuals, but these
will not be relevant in the following discussion and I will say no more about them here. Hereafter
I use the term “token entity” to refer to Carlson’s object-level entities, but I retain Carlson’s use of the
marker o (mnemonic for “object-level”) as a subscript to distinguish variables over token-level entities
from variables over kind-level entities.
2 I use the term ‘nominal’ as the most general label for expressions whose main descriptive content is
provided by a noun. More specic terms such as NP (noun phrase) and DP (determiner phrase)
will be used when relevant.
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formal distinction between kinds and descriptions of kinds thus has a counterpart
in the cognitively oriented literature. Both Löbner and Barsalou consider concepts
and kinds as distinct: Concepts are the descriptive basis for kinds (which Löbner
equates with categories, and which we might assume to be equivalent to Barslou’s
“type” in the quote above). However, this distinction is arguably not exactly the
same one that Müller-Reichau makes: intuitively, the reication of a concept is
not the same thing as a category, a point to which I return below.
Kinds thus serve as a bridge to connect referential and cognitive or conceptual
approaches to meaning, and the goal of this paper is to take a very modest step
onto this bridge. I will do so by proposing a way to resolve the debate about what
exactly common nouns denote by appealing to recent developments in so-called
distributional semantics (see Turney & Pantel 2010 and references in Section 3). This
appeal is in line with recent work that seeks to use distributional representations as
ersatz conceptual representations (see e.g. the papers in Lenci 2008b). The specic
features of these representations and the method I sketch for connecting them
to a relatively standard referential semantic analysis will overcome the limitations
of previous analyses of common nouns in layered approaches to the syntax of
nominals. More generally, the analysis also constitutes a concrete proposal for
combining insights from referential and conceptual approaches to meaning that,
while still very preliminary, I hope will promote further synergies between the two
traditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briey review the two main
uses of kinds within nominals. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to distri-
butional semantic representations. Finally, in section 4 I develop the idea that
such representations could serve as models of common noun denotations and,
very briey, I discuss the implications for kind reference.
2 Carlsonian kinds and determiner phrase semantics
As mentioned in the introduction, Carlson’s (1977) ontology included kind-level
and token-level entities as primitives. He related these kinds and tokens via a
realization relation, R: If a token entity xo realizes a kind yk, then R(xo, yk). By
hypothesis, all token-level entities are realizations of some kind-level entity.
Carlson took common nouns to denote sets of what he called individual-level
entities (the union of kind- and token-level entities, as opposed to stage-level
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entities), and used plurality (in the case of English bare plurals) to convert this
set-type denotation into a kind-referring expression. For example, snake was
assigned a logical translation that can be represented as in (2a), and snakes, as
in (2b). This latter translation says that snakes denotes that kind-level entity all of
whose token instances are snakes (see Carlson 1977:145,3 non-essential details
modied from the original; xi is a variable over the union of kinds and tokens).
(2) a. snake: λxi[snake(xi)]
b. snakes: ιxk[∀zo[R(zo, xk)→ snake(zo)]
The reader is referred to Carlson’s work for the details of how this basic proposal
was incorporated into a broader analysis of English.
Carlsonian kinds were given a different application in Zamparelli 2000. Zampar-
elli argued that full determiner phrases (DPs) have a 3-layered structure consisting of
a kind phrase (KIP), a predicative determiner phrase (PDP), and a strong determiner
phrase (SDP). The goal was to account for a complex array of facts involving the
relation between the internal syntax and semantics of nominals and their external
syntax and semantics, such as the fact that certain kinds of apparent “determiner
stacking” (e.g. the/every/demonstratives + numeral) are possible. (3) provides an
example of a Zamparelli-style syntactic analysis for the DP that one child.
(3) [SDP that [PDP one [KIP child ]]]
We will not go into the details of Zamparelli’s analysis of the SDP and PDP here.
What is relevant for our purposes is his claim that all common nouns project into
nominals as kind phrases and “denote individual ‘kinds of objects’ in the domain.”
(2000: ex. (436)). He then used the type-shifting operations KO and KSK to convert
the kind phrase into an expression that denotes a set of token entities or subkinds,
respectively (see (4) and Zamparelli 2000: ex. (461)-(462), where KIP stands for
the logical translation of the kind phrase; other irrelevant details modied from
Zamparelli’s original).
(4) a. KO(KIP) : λxo[R(xo,KIP)]
b. KSK(KIP) : λxk∀z[R(z, xk)→ R(z,KIP)]
3 Page numbers correspond to the version of this work published in 1980.
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The output of these operations can then be the input to a higher determiner, as in
(5a) and (5b), respectively: two books in (5a) is understood as referring to two token
books (which could be of the same (sub)kind), while two wines in (5b) necessarily
refers to two dierent subkinds of wine.
(5) a. Max read two books.
b. Max produces two wines.
Curiously, Carlson’s and Zamparelli’s analyses of common nouns are essentially
inverses of each other. Carlson takes common nouns to be fundamentally descrip-
tions or predicates and uses syntax to convert them into referring expressions.
Zamparelli takes them to be fundamentally referring expressions and uses syntax
to convert them into descriptions or predicates.
One phenomenon that might be thought to distinguish between these two
analyses is modication. McNally & Boleda 2004 argued that relational adjectives
such as legal in (6a), in contrast to other adjectives, such as clever in (6b), denote
descriptions of kinds, rather than of token entities.
(6) a. a legal adviser
b. a clever adviser
On this analysis, legal and similar adjectives serve to restrict kind descriptions,
thus forming subkind descriptions, which are later converted to descriptions of
token entities that can be further restricted with token-entity modiers such as
clever. Though McNally and Boleda did not use the layered DP structure, their
proposal can easily be adapted to the layered analysis, as shown in (7). The noun
denotes a set of (sub)kinds (including not only the maximally general adviser kind
but also legal advisers, political advisers, economic advisers, etc.), represented as
in (7a). The relational adjective also denotes a set of kinds, those that stand in some
relation to the law: for example, (legal) system, (legal) document, (legal) issue,
as in (7b).4 These combine at the KIP level (7c), and the result can serve as the input
to a variant of the KO type-shifter (call it KO′) that, instead of taking kinds, takes
4 McNally and Boleda treated the adjective as a rst order property that combined with the noun
intersectively via an ad hoc composition rule; here I treat it as a second order property for the sake of
simplicity. The dierence is not crucial.
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descriptions of kinds and saturates the kind variable (7d,e).5 The resulting property
of tokens can combine (e.g. via predicate conjunction) with other token modiers,
such as clever, to yield descriptions such as clever legal adviser ; see (7f,g).
(7) a. adviser: λxk[adviser(xk)]
b. legal: λPkλxk[Pk(xk) ∧ legal(xk)]
c. [KIP legal adviser]: λxk[adviser(xk) ∧ legal(xk)]
d. KO′: λPkλxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ Pk(yki)]
e. KO′([KIP legal adviser]):
λxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ λxk[adviser(xk) ∧ legal(xk)](yki)]
= λxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ adviser(yki) ∧ legal(yki)]
f. clever: λPoλxo[Po(xo) ∧ clever(xo)]
g. clever legal adviser:
λxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ adviser(yki) ∧ legal(yki) ∧ clever(xo)]
Note that once the type-shifter KO′ applies, we no longer have a property of
kinds; rather, we have a property of token entities. This entails that any kind-level
modiers will have to combine with the noun before the type-shifter. The layered
structure also guarantees that any token entity modiers will have to apply after
the type-shifter. These constraints, as McNally and Boleda observed, lead to a
natural account of the fact that relational adjectives must appear closer to the
noun than other sorts of adjectives, as shown in (8):
(8) a. a clever legal adviser
b. ??a legal clever adviser
Now let us return to the main issue, which is the distinction between treating
the contents of KIP as a kind-level entity vs. a description of such entities. Neither
analysis is completely satisfactory. Treating nouns as kind-denoting leaves the
mechanics of modication involving relational adjectives and related phenomena6
imperfectly explained. On this hypothesis, the contents of KIP denotes an entity,
which is then fed into the KO or KSK type shifter to yield a property that can
5 This is done here indexically, following McNally and Boleda. However, it could be done by other
means, such as existential closure. Another variant on this analysis involves using the functional
projection Number for the purpose eected here by KO; see Espinal 2010, Arsenijević et al. 2014 for
details of this latter alternative.
6 See e.g. Espinal 2010 for additional examples.
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eventually combine with a determiner. Let’s assume, following McNally and Boleda,
that the adjective in (6a) denotes a property of kinds, and let’s represent the kind
denoted by adviser as a. If we combine the adjective and the entity-denoting noun
directly, the result is a proposition:
(9) legal(a)
A proposition is not the right sort of semantic object to feed the rest of the semantic
composition of the DP.
Alternatively, we could rst apply the type shifter KSK to the kind denoted
by adviser:
(10) KSK(a) : λxk∀z[R(z, xk)→ R(z, a)]
However, this output denotes a set of kinds, not a kind, and therefore cannot serve
as input to the KO type shifter for purposes of creating a description of token
entities. While we could of course posit both KO and a counterpart KO′ like that
used in the alternative analysis in (7), a perfect parallelism between the derivation
of clever adviser and clever legal adviser is lost. In the former case, only KO would
apply to generate a description that could combine with clever ; in the latter, rst
KSK and then KO′ would apply. Not only is this inelegant: crucially, it fails to
capture the fact there is no evidence that adviser and legal adviser are of distinct
semantic types.
The analysis of common nouns as properties of kinds fares better on this point,
insofar as it maintains a parallelism between the semantics of adviser and legal
adviser. However, it has a couple of weaknesses. First, it forces the introduction
of a kind variable as an ordered argument of the noun whose existence is motivated
exclusively by the need to mediate modication (see McNally 2006 for more on this
point). If, as (7g) suggests, the phrase clever legal adviser introduces a variable
yki referring to the legal adviser kind, we might expect that variable to license
discourse anaphora systematically. However, such reference is not systematically
felicitous, as shown in (11), in which it is very dicult to interpret they as picking
out legal advisers in general (as opposed to clever legal advisers).
(11) The banker avoided jail thanks to clever legal advisers. They are usually
worth the investment.
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While there could be a variety of explanations for this fact, it is hardly a merit
of the analysis in (7g).
A second weakness of both this analysis and Zamparelli’s, as noted in the intro-
duction, is that this appeal to kinds and kind descriptions implicitly acknowledges
that not all descriptive content within the DP is fullling the same function: kind-
level modiers serve to create subkind descriptions – complex concepts, in Löbner’s
sense of concept mentioned above – while token-level modiers simply provide
additional description of the referent(s) of the DP. Our understanding of the former
function is not particularly aided by a characterization grounded in a fundamentally
referential semantics of the sort that Carlson used, and indeed Löbner (loc. cit.)
suggests that common nouns pick out concepts. However, if indeed the layered
approach is justied, it suggests that, conversely, not all descriptive material with
the DP serves to form complex concepts, and therefore we do not necessarily want
to abandon a referential approach to meaning entirely.
As a concrete proposal for bringing something of the spirit of conceptual seman-
tics into a referential framework, with the specic goal of being able to model
the composition of subkind descriptions in a more interesting way than is possible
using standard formal semantic tools, I will appeal to distributional semantics.7
After presenting a brief introduction to the crucial features of distributional seman-
tics in the next section, I will then suggest a method for integrating it into the
layered analysis of DPs.
3 A brief introduction to distributional semantics
Distributional semantic models vary in detail, but the sorts of models that will
concern us all represent expression meanings as vectors or matrices based on
co-occurrence distributions in a corpus. For example, in the study described in
Boleda et al. 2013, to represent a noun, we automatically compiled the number of
occurrences of that noun with each of the 10000 most frequent content words in our
corpus (chosen from nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs), within a same-sentence
window. Using these criteria, in the representation of dog, the count for the verb
bark, would include the instance of bark in (12a), but not that in (12b).
7 The terms Latent Semantic Analysis and vector-space semantics are also used for essentially this sort of
approach. See Landauer & Dumais 1997 for an early discussion of the psychological interest of
these representations; see Turney & Pantel 2010 and Baroni et al. 2014 for overviews of more recent
developments in distributional semantics and additional background.
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(12) a. The dog barked.
b. We saw the dog. It barked.
Distributional models vary in the number and kinds of expressions that are included
in the vector representation, as well as in the nature and size of the window.8 In the
simplest models the co-occurrence counts follow a “bag-of-words” approach and do
not take into account grammatical information: for example, in the representation
of dog, the count for the verb bark would include both the co-occurrence found
in the sentence the dog barked at the child and in the child barked at the dog.
More sophisticated analyses (e.g. Erk & Padó 2008, Baroni & Lenci 2009) take
the grammatical relations between words into account.9
Table 1 oers a toy example of what distributional representations might look
like for the words dog, cat, car, and ink. From a simple inspection of this example it is
easy to see how distributional representations roughly approximate concepts. High
co-occurrence values for a given word in a vector indicate strong associations; low
values indicate little or no association. Thus, the information in Table 1 suggests
that there is a comparatively strong relation between dogs and fur (and cats and
fur), but no relation between cars or ink and fur. Note that these representations
dier sharply from logical semantic representations insofar as these associations
need not be entailed. For instance, nothing in the lexical entailments for dog,
as these are normally understood by formal semanticists, would directly include
anything about chasing or running, but the distributional representation indicates
some sort of relation between dogs and both running and chasing.
fur bark purr run chase pen
dog 53 22 0 16 29 0
cat 44 2 40 15 45 0
car 0 4 10 10 30 0
ink 0 0 0 10 0 33
Table 1: Toy distributional representations for dog, cat, car, and ink
8 The question of how best to set such parameters is far from trivial, but fortunately it is not crucial to
the point being made in this paper. I therefore will not explore it further here.
9 Note also that typically, the information in these vectors is compressed by additional mathematical
operations such as Singular Value Decomposition or Nonnegative Matrix Factorization. These details
will not concern us here.
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Crucial for our purposes is the fact that distributional representations for words
can be combined to make distributional representations for phrases (see Mitchell
& Lapata 2010, Baroni & Zamparelli 2010, Garrette et al. 2011, Coecke et al. 2011,
Clarke 2012, Copestake & Herbelot 2012, Socher et al. 2012, Lewis & Steedman
2013, Grefenstette 2013, Baroni et al. 2014 and references cited in these works
for various proposals and general discussion). Even more interestingly, there is
a very lively debate over whether it is preferable to rely exclusively on distributional
representations for modeling sentence meaning, or whether distributional semantics
might be better used in combination with logical semantics, and limited to modeling
only some parts of sentence semantics. One of the roots of this debate is the fact that
distributional models work well for what we might loosely refer to as “content words”
and short phrases made up of them, but fare rather poorly with “function” words
such as determiners, auxiliary verbs, or conjunctions – that is, those expressions that
referential semantic approaches handle well. These and other considerations will lead
us to use a combination of distributional and formal modeling in the next section.
Before moving on, however, let me briey illustrate semantic composition with
distributional representations so that the potential for improvement over the
analyses presented in the previous section becomes apparent. One nds signicant
variation not only in the operations used to combine vector, for words but also
in other parameters, such as whether specic values in the operations should be
weighted. Here we will limit ourselves to using the simplest method, namely vector
addition, to illustrate. Table 2 presents a toy model of how the vectors for two
words can be added to yield a vector representation for a phrase.
bright irritated burn stop warn apple
red 99 20 40 98 29 15
ag 19 2 1 50 45 0
skin 6 90 79 8 2 15
red ag 118 22 41 148 74 15
red skin 105 119 119 106 31 30
Table 2: Semantic composition modeled by vector addition
What can be observed is that when two words share high values for a given co-
occurrence item in the vector (e.g. stop in the case of red and ag), the association
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between that item and the resulting phrase is proportionally strengthened – for
example, the association between stop and red ag is stronger than that for stop and
red. Conversely, when two words share low values for some item, the corresponding
value for the resulting phrase is proportionally weakened. When the values on an
item for individual words go in opposite directions (e.g. bright for red and skin), the
value for the result lies somewhere in between.
The quality of distributional representations as models of meaning can be evalu-
ated in at least two dierent ways. First, since vector representations fundamentally
encode similarity relations, one can measure the similarity between words or
phrases as determined by the model against human judgments of similarity. One
specic measure of similarity is the cosine between the vector for a word or phrase
of interest and that of some target: a cosine of 0 indicates orthogonality, i.e. high
dissimilarity; the higher the cosine, the greater the similarity. Another measure is
the quality of the so-called nearest neighbors of a vector for an expression matched
against human judgments. The nearest neighbors of a vector v are those vectors
with the largest cosine values with respect to v. Thus, vectors that are nearest
neighbors are very similar, and we would expect the expressions they represent to
be judged as very similar by humans. Table 3 oers an example (larger numbers
of neighbors than just 3 could of course also be evaluated). Note that nearest
neighbors need not be of the same grammatical category; it is also relevant to
consider not only the quality of the nearest neighbors but also their density, that is,
their absolute distance from the vector of interest and from each other.
historical map important route
topographical important transport
atlas important road
historical material major road
Table 3: The 3 nearest neighbors of the corpus-derived distributional vectors of two
ANs (from Baroni and Zamparelli 2010), cited in Table 4 of Baroni et al. 2014.
A second way to evaluate the quality of distributional representations is to
test them on a specic task, such as the analogical reasoning tasks given on the
SAT exam (see Turney & Pantel 2010 for examples). The fact that machines using
distributional representations are currently able to perform at levels comparable to
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humans on such tasks suggests that the representations are at least in some sense a
meaningful model of human semantic knowledge.
Distributional representations for words, as well as operations such as vector
addition for combining them, have a number of interesting features for the model-
ing of certain aspects of semantic composition in natural language that are not
shared by logical models. Perhaps the most important one is that they are rel-
atively successful at handling the resolution of polysemy and co-composition-type
phenomena (Pustejovsky 1995), particularly for small phrases and generic contents
(Boleda et al. 2013, McNally & Boleda to appear). They also oer the possibility
of modeling metaphor (e.g. Kintsch 2000, Lemaire & Bianco 2003, Utsumi 2006).
The fact that distributional representations can be constructed using exactly the
same method for both words and phrases in a sense blurs the line between word
and phrase, suggesting an interesting avenue for exploring the origins and nature
of idiomatic expressions. Finally, as noted above, these representations make no
sharp distinction between “linguistic meaning” and world knowledge; depending
on one’s view of meaning, this is a bug or a feature. In addition to these theoretically
relevant properties, they have the practical advantage of being very easy to build
automatically for very large lexicons.
However, distributional models also have limitations beyond their poor han-
dling of function words mentioned above. First, it is not obvious how to model
phenomena grounded in reference and discourse dynamics, such as anaphora or
information structure. Second, at present distributional models say little or nothing
about how to capture mid-level semantic generalizations of the sort that are embod-
ied in approaches that posit semantic features for causation, change, agentivity,
etc. Third, it is not obvious how these models can account for most patterns of
entailment and logical inference, particularly those based on the behavior of logical
connectives such as conjunction, disjunction, or negation. For a review of all of
these issues, see Baroni et al. 2014. Finally, there is some question as to the adequacy
of distributional representations as models for language acquisition (Lenci 2008a,
Copestake & Herbelot 2012, though see also Landauer & Dumais 1997). Though
these limitations are daunting, distributional models are an active area of research
and eorts are under way to overcome them or, as will be done here, to nd an
optimal division of labor between distributional and formal modeling (see Kamp
et al. 2013 and references cited therein).
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4 Distributional representations as alternatives to kinds
and kind descriptions
With this brief introduction to distributional semantics in hand, let us return to the
focus of the paper, namely, if we accept the layered DP hypothesis, how do we
analyze the noun at the heart of the DP so as to avoid the weaknesses both of the
kind-as-entity and the kind-description accounts? Recall the problems: If kinds are
treated as entities, it is not obvious how to handle modication processes that
produce expressions picking out subkinds. On the other hand, if we treat nouns as
kind descriptions we end up introducing a variable into the syntax, corresponding
to the kind that is described, whose existence is not otherwise motivated. Moreover,
on both accounts, the notions of kind and kind description are rather poor.
Let us suppose that we treat common nouns as denoting distributional representa-
tions (or sometimes I will use simply distributions for short).10 In other words, we
use distributional representations instead of Carlsonian kinds or kind-descriptions,
the intuitions being 1) that the distributional representation serves as a convenient
way of modeling a concept and 2) kinds have been used, for better or for worse, as
the referential semantics counterpart to concepts (more on this latter point below).
Distributions will be represented in the logical translations by constants with an
arrow over them, as in (13a), to distinguish them from constants that refer to or-
dinary entities; following Espinal 2010, I will refer to the lowest layer of the nominal
where nouns are inserted as NP, rather than KIP. I will use Number as the functional
projection that contributes the type shifter KO′, which creates properties of token
entities, as in (13b), where the definition of the type shifter and the realization
relation R are revised to select for distributions rather than kinds (i.e., dr is the
variable over distributions). The R relation holds between an entity and a distribu-
tion (understood here as standing in for a concept) just in case the entity in question
is taken as an instance or exemplar of that concept. If we combine a simple noun
such as adviser with KO′, the result is a predicate of token entities, as in (13c).
(13) a. [NP adviser]:
−−−−−→
adviser
b. [Num KO′]: λdrλxo[R(xo, dr)]
c. [NumP KO′[NP adviser]]: λxo[R(xo,
−−−−−→
adviser)]
10 The expression “denotes a...representation” should not raise any concern, insofar as these representa-
tions are mathematical objects and not translations of natural language into some other representational
language that then needs to be interpreted.
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Let us further assume a parallel analysis for adjectives. We have seen that (McNally
& Boleda 2004) argued that adjectives, like nouns, must be able to denote properties
of kinds, in addition, in most cases, to being able to denote properties of token
entities. We can therefore hypothesize that adjectives also denote distributional
representations and can be converted into properties of token entities in combination
with functional structure in the morphosyntax. This functional structure will be
different from that which is relevant for nouns (e.g. Number, as suggested in footnote
5), insofar as adjectives typically do not have the same function in language as do
nouns. For example, one candidate might be Agr(eement) (see e.g. Cinque 2005), and
indeed this is what I will assume here for the sake of illustration.
I will also assume a second dierence between adjectives and nouns. Instead of
introducing the realization relation R, I take the adjective’s functional structure to
introduce a bearer relation (represented in (14) as Bear) between the distributional
representation and the individuals to which it is ascribed, as illustrated in the
logical translation in (14) for the adjective clever. I take the bearer relation to be
distinct from the realization relation insofar as when an individual stands in the
former relation to some concept, that concept will be manifest in that individual
without serving as a criterion for identifying the individual; when an individual
stands in the latter relation to some concept, that concept can be said to be both
manifest in the individual and to serve as a criterion for indentity.11
(14) a. [AP clever]:
−−−−→
clever
b. Agr: λdrλxo[Bear(xo, dr)]
c. [AgrP Agr [AP clever]]: λxo[Bear(xo,
−−−−→
clever)]
11 On this view, adjectives and nouns, as represented in the lexicon, differ only in the sorts of concepts
that they represent. We might therefore expect an expression like clever to be able to combine with
functional structure like Number to make a description that serves to identify individuals. Indeed, this
sort of thing is possible, as illustrated in English examples in (i) from Glass (2014) and the Dutch ones in
(ii) from McNally & de Swart (2015), though its nature and productivity vary from language to language.
(i) a. In Tacloban, the dead are being taken to a mass grave in a public cemetery.
b. “progress” always seems to go in one direction — toward the dead and the dull.
(ii) a. Hoe
how
leer
teach
je
you
een
a
kind
child
dat
that
het
it
niet
not
met
with
een
a
vreemde
strange
mee
with
mag
may
gaan?
go
‘How do you teach a child not to leave with a stranger?’
b. Ze
they
moeten
must
wennen
get-used
aan
to
al
all
het
the
nieuwe,
new
al
all
het
the
vreemde
strange
dat
that
dit
this
land
land
hen
them
biedt.
oers
‘They must get used to everything new, everything strange that this land oers them.’
See McNally & de Swart 2015 and references cited there for more general discussion of the syntax and
semantics of such constructions.
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With these elements in hand, we can now develop an analysis of modication at the
NP level that distinguishes it from modication above NP and that overcomes the
problems faced by the analyses in section 2. We now have as the basic denotation
for nouns and adjectives saturated, concept- or kind-description-like objects for
which interesting compositional rules, such as the vector addition illustrated in the
previous section, are dened. We need only posit that semantic composition within
the NP involves not functor-argument application or predicate conjunction, but
rather vector addition (or whatever vector compositional method eventually proves
to be most eective). The result of this operation will a new vector – that is, an
object of the same semantic type as the noun. Specically, we can revise the rst
step of the derivation (7) as in (15), where + stands for the composition operation
that combines two distributional representations, e.g. vector addition.
(15) a. [NP adviser]:
−−−−−→
adviser
b. [NP legal]:
−−−→
legal
c. [NP legal adviser]: +(
−−−→
legal,
−−−−−→
adviser)
We therefore maintain a uniform analysis of all expressions in the NP category,
whether simple or complex, improving upon the kind analysis of common nouns. We
also avoid any appeal to variables that do not have any motivation beyond mediating
in semantic composition, thus improving upon the kind-description analysis.
Exactly like simple nouns, complex NPs such as that in (15c) can be turned into
predicates of token entities via the KO′ type shifter, as in (16a). At this point,
an adjective phrase that has also been converted to a predicate of token entities as
in (14) can be conjoined with it in the usual fashion used for modication in formal
semantics. In this way, it is possible to derive an analysis of phrases like clever legal
adviser that distinguishes two kinds of adjectival modication, as in (16b,c).
(16) a. [NumP KO′[NP legal adviser]]: λxo[R(xo, +(
−−−→
legal,
−−−−−→
adviser))]
b. [AgrP Agr [AP clever]]: λxo[Bear(xo,
−−−−→
clever)]
c. [NumP[AgrP Agr [AP clever]] [NumP KO′[NP legal adviser]]]:
λxo[R(xo, +(
−−−→
legal,
−−−−−→
adviser)) ∧ Bear(xo,−−−−→clever)]
The use of distributional representations to model common noun and adjective de-
notations has some additional advantages. I close this section by briey mentioning
three of these.
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First, the use of these representations allows for the integration into formally-
oriented semantic analysis of techniques for handling the problems of polysemy
in modication and other phenomena involving the lexicon that are poorly handled
by traditional formal semantic tools. This integration can improve the empirical
coverage of existing formal semantic theories and yield models that are better
suited to natural language processing.12
Second, distributional models arguably come closer to capturing the intuition
that common nouns and adjectives name concepts, and thus establish a point of
connection to conceptual approaches to meaning. Having a richer model of what
words and phrases describe than that provided by kinds or descriptions of kinds
brings formal semantics, with its emphasis on reference, closer to that sector of
cognitive science that is concerned with conceptual representation. Indeed, concep-
tually oriented semantic theories have arguably attracted much more attention
from cognitive scientists than have referential theories precisely because they
focus specically on the cognitive component of meaning; referential theories have
largely failed in this respect.
On the other hand, conceptual and cognitive approaches to meaning represen-
tation (e.g. Frame Semantics, Fillmore & Baker 2010) have met resistance from
formally-oriented semanticists both because of concerns about how to ground the
representations and because of skepticism about implementability on a large scale.
Though distributional models as described here are still highly inadequate as models
of concepts, they can be augmented, e.g. by incorporating image information (see
e.g. Andrews et al. 2014), and the ease with which they can be constructed and
implemented makes them useful as a methodological tool. Mixed conceptual and
referential approaches are also arguably less susceptible to concerns about grounding.
Finally, integrating distributional representations into a formal semantics via a
specic hypothesis about the syntax/semantics interface allows us to return to
and address in a clearer way an issue alluded to in the introduction. I noted that
Müller-Reichau 2011 proposes that kinds are the reication of concepts, while
the view of Barsalou 2000 and Löbner 2002 seems to be that kinds are categories
of entities that are established based on conceptual information. If we now ask
ourselves what kind terms such as snakes or the snake in (1), repeated in (17),
denote, we can consider at least two explicit hypotheses.
12 See especially Garrette et al. 2011, Copestake & Herbelot 2012, Lewis & Steedman 2013, Kamp et al.
2013, Erk 2016, and Baroni et al. 2014 for discussion and examples.
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(17) a. Snakes are reptiles.
b. The snake is a reptile.
Following Müller-Reichau, a kind term should arguably have a representation such
as the following, picking out the unique distributional representation – the concept
– associated with snake.
(18) ιdr[dr =
−−−→
snake]
In other words, when we use the snake generically, we are referring to the snake
concept, rather than to any class of individuals that it might serve to individuate.
If we maintain the analysis of common nouns developed in the previous section,
this would also be the predicted denotation for definite kind terms if we accept the
syntactic analysis of them defended in Espinal 2010, where (based on independent
considerations) such DPs are assigned a syntax in which Number does not intervene:
(19) [DP [D′ the [NP snake]]
Interestingly, this is more explicit than the semantics that emerges from Espinal’s
proposal, which is based on the premise that common nouns denote descriptions of
kinds. The representation for the semantics of (19) given her assumptions would
thus be as in (20):
(20) ιxk[snake(xk)]
Whether this is substantively equivalent to (19) of course depends on whether
kinds are equivalent to concepts or not, an issue that the formal literature has done
a notoriously poor job of addressing (see e.g. the discussion in Müller-Reichau 2011,
Chapter 3). One advantage of the introduction of distributional representations is
that it forces one to address precisely this issue.
On the other view, where concepts serve to support categorization of entities as
belonging to one kind or another, the notion of kind or category is not the reication
of a concept. As a result, whatever semantics we assign to the kind terms in (17), it
should not be that in (19). For example, we might consider the sort of proposal
advocated in Chierchia 1998, on which kinds are conceived of as “regularities that
occur in nature...similar to individuals like you and me, but [whose] spatiotemporal
manifestations are typically ‘discontinuous”’ (p. 348). Formally, Chierchia models
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kinds as “individual concepts of a certain sort: functions from worlds (or situations)
into pluralities, the sum of all instances of the kind” (p. 349). Implemented in
the system proposed here, a rst attempt a such a semantics for the snake would
look as follows:
(21) [DP [D′ the [NumP snake]]: λw[maxxo[Rw(xo,
−−−→
snake)]]
If we assume that xo ranges over both singular (atomic) and plural (nonatomic)
entities, the result is very close but not identical to what Chierchia proposes.
Interestingly, he adds a slight renement on which the sum identied by the
equivalent of maxxo[R(xo,
−−−→
snake)] is converted into an atomic group whose
members are not accessible for compositional semantic purposes (Landman 1989a,
1989b). In other words, he essentially reies the class of entities picked out by
(21). However, on what morphological basis this additional reication is motivated
is not clear.
Though this is not the place to decide what is, in fact, the best analysis of the
dierent sorts of nominals that appear in generic sentences,13 this brief discussion
has allowed us to model two dierent possibilities in an explicit and easily dis-
tinguishable fashion. This is arguably an improvement over the previous situation,
in which the use of the same formal object, namely kinds, both to model common
noun denotations (whether directly, or indirectly via descriptions of kinds) as well
as to model the denotations of DPs such as the snake, hampered the identication of
relevant dierences between dierent proposals. Given the semantics for common
nouns advocated here, the analysis on which kind terms such as the snake refer
to the concepts themselves, rather than to the class of entities identied by the
concept, is derived more naturally from the syntactic structure. To the extent
that this result might seem prima facie counterintuitive, the implications for the
analysis of generic sentences as well as for so-called kind-referring predicates such
as to be extinct are non-trivial.
13 It should also be noted in passing that both Chierchia and Espinal suggest analyses for bare plurals in
English that are distinct from the analyses they defend for general denite singulars; I set aside
bare plurals because a proper treatment of them would take us too far aeld.
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5 Conclusion
The linguistic salience of something like Carlsonian kinds has been amply sup-
ported in the formal linguistics literature, as has the idea that DPs have a layered
structure in which kinds or descriptions of them serve as the semantic core. I have
argued here that distributional representations have potential to serve as models
for the semantics of this lowest layer, with the advantage that there are explicit
compositional mechanisms for combining them that make interesting and testable
predictions, and that they avoid using otherwise unmotivated variables in the
composition process. I have also very briey sketched how these representations
could be integrated into a more standard compositional semantic framework.
Though the paper has focused on layered DPs, it is possible to imagine extending
the analysis advocated here to other linguistic categories. Within what Borer
2003 refers to as “exo-skeletal” approaches to morphosyntax, such as Distributed
Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993; see Borer 2003 for additional references to
related work), the open-class lexicon consists of:
...sound-meaning pairs, where by meaning we refer to the appropriate notion of
a concept, and where by sound we mean an appropriately abstract phonological
representation. Following tradition, I will refer to that reservoir as the encyclo-
pedia, and to items within it as encyclopedic items (EIs). Crucially, an EI is not
associated with any formal grammatical information concerning category, argu-
ment structure, or word-formation. It is a category-less, argument-less concept,
although its meaning might give rise to certain expectations for a felicitous con-
text... (Borer 2003, p. 34)
These lexical items combine with other, possibly abstract, morphemes in the lexi-
con that contribute functional material (e.g. plural morphology, tense) that convert
them into categorized expressions – full-edged nouns or verbs, for example.
The similarities to the layered DP hypothesis are obvious, and in particular,
the idea that these category-less encyclopedic items are paired with concepts
looks very much like the idea we have developed in the previous section. We
might therefore consider extending distributional representations to model the
denotations of roots more generally. But that is a task for another paper.
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Dependencies, semantic constraints and
conceptual closeness in a dynamic frame
theory
Ralf Naumann
A neglected, if not almost ignored topic in formal semantic theories of natural
language are semantic (or meaning) relations between lexical items. Results from
psycholinguistics and neuroscience, in particular based on the N400, provide ample
evidence that such relations play indeed an important and prominent role during
the (semantic) processing of sentences in the brain. For example, although neither
John squeezed an orange nor John squeezed an apple contain a semantic anomaly,
they are processed dierently in the brain, because orange is more expected as the
direct object of squeeze than apple. Similarly, This melon sounds ripe is acceptable
whereas This melon sounds oval is not, although in both cases an adjective is used
that is semantically not directly related to the sound dimension of a melon.
In this article we propose a dynamic and probabilistic extension of frame theory
(Löbner 2014, Naumann 2013) in which data like the above can be analyzed. In
order to capture both semantic relations and constraints (or expectancies), we use
techniques from Dependence Logic (Väänänen 2007) and theories of belief revision
and belief update (Spohn 1988, Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992, Boutilier 1998, Gärdenfors
1988). Using frames makes it possible to use a decompositional analysis: an object
is related to a set of properties that can be changed by events. As a consequence,
a lexical item like ‘orange’ can be taken as a table in a database or knowledge
base consisting of attribute-value pairs. This way of interpreting lexical items
makes it possible to apply the strategies from Dependence Logic and theories of
belief revision and belief update mentioned above. In particular, it is possible (i) to
dene dependency relations between dierent properties of an object and (ii) to
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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dene quantitative plausiblity relations (κ-rankings) on a frame that determine
how this frame is revised or updated with new information.
1 Introduction
According to many, if not most, current formal semantic theories, common nouns
like ‘orange’ or ‘paper’ are basically analyzed as sets of objects. For example,
‘orange’ is rst translated as the lambda-term λx.orange(x), which, in a second
step, is interpreted as a subset of the domain, or, more precisely, as a function
from this domain to the set of truth values (1a). Similarly, using an event-based
approach, verbs like ‘run’ are interpreted as sets of events or the corresponding
characteristic function (1b).
(1) a. [[orange]]M = λx ∈ D〈eobject〉forange(x) = 1
b. [[run]]M = λe ∈ D〈eevent〉frun(e) = 1
In recent years, such approaches to dening the semantics of basic lexical items like
common nouns and verbs have been criticized from neuroscience. According to
Baggio & Hagoort (2011), those theories are ‘by design insensitive to dierences
between words of the same syntactic category denoting objects of the same type’
(Baggio & Hagoort 2011, 1343). As a consequence, they are inappropriate as a
theory of semantic processing in the brain. This criticism is based on empirical
results from neurophysiological and neuroimaging phenomena like the N4001,
which is a component of event-related potentials (ERP’s), whose amplitude is
modulated by semantic complexity.
N400.
Consider the examples in (2) and (3).
(2) a. Jenny put the sweet in her mouth after the lesson.
b. Jenny put the sweet in her pocket after the lesson.
(3) Every morning John makes himself a glass of freshly squeezed juice. He keeps
his refrigerator stocked with (oranges/apples/carrots).
1 For details on this component, see Baggio & Hagoort (2011).
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A formal semantic analysis of the sentences in (2) diers only in the sort of object
assigned to the locative argument of the verb put: mouth versus pocket. Yet, when
this sentence is uttered in a context where Jenny leaves the classroom after a lesson,
Hagoort & Brown (1994) found a dierence in the N400 between mouth and pocket,
showing that there is a dierence during processing in the brain that needs to
be accounted for by formal semantic theories.
Sentences like (3) were used by Federmeier & Kutas (1999) in an ERP experiment
also targeting the N400. The authors found an increasing N400 eect with the
ordering ‘oranges’ < ‘apples’ < ‘carrots’. According to one interpretation of the
N400, this eect is closely related to predicting upcoming words in a sentence
which is based on semantic relations between words in the memory component
of the brain. For example, in (3) both ‘apple’ and ‘carrot’ trigger a larger N400
compared to ‘orange’ because the former are semantically less related to an event of
squeezing a fruit than the latter (Kutas & Federmeier 2011). As an eect, the cost of
semantically integrating ‘apple’ or ‘carrot’ in the given semantic context (say ‘John
squeezed’) is higher than in the case of ‘orange’. Thus, the N400 is an eect that is
directly related to semantic relations between concepts expressed by words in
the lexicon, in particular by relations between nominal and verbal concepts.
Stimulus subject perception verbs.
Perception-based verbs (henceforth PBVs) refer to sensory properties of objects like
‘taste’ or ’sound’. Correlated to each sense modality is a set of values that this
property can take and which are specic to it. For example, for the property ‘sight’
appropriate values are ‘square’, ‘oblong’ and ‘oval’. PBVs admit of a direct-sensory
use in which a predicative complement is added. Semantically, this complement
species an intra-dimensional value, i.e. an element of the set of values appropriate
for the property expressed by the verb.
(4) This melon sounds mued/tastes sweet/smells fruity.
In addition to the direct perception use, PBVs can be used inferentially. In this case
the predicative complement does not determine a value of the scale corresponding
to the modality expressed by the verb, but a value belonging to another modality.
(5) a. This melon sounds ripe/old/*oval.
b. This melon looks oval/*mued.
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The examples in (5) show that the inferential use is not always admissible but
depends on the types of sense modalities expressed by the verb and the predicative
complement. Thus, similar to the examples of simple sentences, semantic pro-
cessing of this use of PBVs involves semantic relations. In this case, these are
relations between dierent properties of objects that can be changed by actions or
events.
The the . . . the construction.
The third and nal construction involving semantic relations discussed in this
article is the the . . . the-construction.
(6) a. The older a stamp, the more expensive it is.
b. The more alcohol you drink, the higher is your blood alcohol concentration.
c. The more residents are aected, the sooner noise abatement measures will
be implemented.
Similar to the inferential use of PBVs, this construction expresses a dependency
relation between the values of two properties over time. The relation between
the values of the two properties need not be strict, as shown by the following
example: ‘The older a stamp, the more likely it is that it gets more expensive’.
What is common to all the examples discussed in this section are the following
points: (i) there is an explicit or implicit reference to properties of objects or events.
Events of squeezing are semantically more related to objects of sort ‘orange’ than
to, say, objects of sort ‘carrots’; this reference is explicit in the case of the inferential
use of PBVs and the the . . . the construction. It is always implicit in the case of verbs,
at least if they are formally analyzed as given in (1b). (ii) this reference to properties
of objects and events is not used in isolation but rather in the context of a semantic
relation between various properties. So what is at stake are semantic relations
and, even more importantly, the degree to which those properties are semantically
related to each other. This latter aspect will be called semantic closeness between
properties (or between the concepts related to those properties) and (iii) since
all example involve non-stative verbs like ‘squeeze’, or analogous constructions
like ‘getting older’, which denote events that bring about changes with respect
to objects, one also has to consider semantic relations between properties over
time when the values of these properties are changed by actions or events.
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2 Outline of the theory
According to Baggio and Hagoort (2011:1342), formal semantic theories which
describe how words belonging to dierent syntactic categories or denoting dierent
sorts of objects combine to more complex units are ‘by design insensitive to
dierences between words of the same syntactic category denoting objects of
the same type’. The authors put the blame for this ‘insensitivity’ on the fact that
such theories focus on truth conditions, i.e. how language relates to the world,
and not on considering natural language as a psychological phenomenon. What
is required, instead, is to provide a theory of semantic processing that is both
combinatoric and able to track usage-based semantic expectations of the kind
involved in the data from section 1. It is important to note that this criticism
not only applies to static formal semantic theories in which the notion of truth
conditions is taken as central but equally to dynamic variants of formal semantics
if the dynamic component is restricted to account for inter-sentential anaphoric
relations, which are analyzed in terms of discourse referents or pegs. Consider
(3) again. The dynamic aspect of the update operation triggered by the direct
object (say ‘an orange’) is independent of the particular sort of object, but only
depends on the context change potential of the existential quantier associated
with the translation of ‘a’ in the formal language since this constituent introduces a
new discourse referent. By contrast, the head noun receives a completely static
interpretation. It is analyzed as a test. The sortal information provided by the
common noun is used to eliminate all possibilities in which the object assigned to
the discourse referent fails to satisfy this condition. As a result, there is no further
dierence between, say, ‘an orange’ and ‘an apple’ at this level of information.
What is completely missing from this view of information encapsulated both
in static and dynamic approaches to meaning in natural language is the aspect
that (declarative) sentences describe situations in the world. Such a description
can either concern the fact that some property of an object holds (or fails to hold) or
that an event (action) occurs which changes some property of an object. One area
in which this type of information is dealt with are theories of belief revision and
belief update. Belief revision is usually taken as dealing with incorporating new
information about a static, unchanging world. By contrast, belief update is about
incorporating information about changes in the world that are triggered by actions
or events. New information about a static world is incorporated into a ranked belief
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set (often called an epistemic state). As a consequence, the way such an epistemic
state is changed not only depends on the formulas that currently form the belief set
(or knowledge base) of an agent but also on the way those formulas (or the possible
worlds used to interpreted those formulas) are ranked. Such information cannot
be inferred if the meaning is restricted to sortal information, say it is an orange or a
running, and if the dynamics only captures discourse information.
The conclusion that we draw from this failure of current formal semantic theories
is that semantic processing cannot solely be based on (i) truth-conditional content
and (ii) discourse information in form of information about anaphoric relations which
leads to the notion of a context change potential in terms of discourse referents or
pegs and (iii) (possibly) world knowledge and context information. In addition,
there are at least three further types of information: (i) information about the
semantic closeness between nominal and verbal concepts, which expresses degrees
of expectancy or plausibility between these two types of concepts. This type of
information corresponds to ranking functions in theories of belief revision and belief
update; (ii) dependency relations between the values of two properties of an object
which can be expressed in Dependence Logic and (iii) information about the way such
dependencies are related over time if the values of the corresponding properties are
changed by events. Such information requires the use of various ranking functions
that not only consider static semantic relations but also the way of how such relations
can be defined in the context in which not only a static world but a world in which
events bring about changes is taken into consideration (belief update).2
Consider the following example. When processing a common noun like ‘orange’,
a language user only gets sortal information: it is an object of sort ‘orange’ belong-
ing to a particular subset of the universe (or the domain of the model). This kind of
information is exactly what is usually captured in an (extensional, type-theoretic)
truth-conditional semantics and which is formalized by the meaning or satisfaction
clauses in (1). This aspect of meaning will be called the proper or lexical meaning of
a common noun or an intransitive verb. Thus, as in model-theoretic semantics, the
lexical meaning of common nouns and verbs is dened in terms of only sortal
information and (possibly) its arity.
2 Another way of looking at the dierence between current dynamic approaches and our approach is
the following: whereas the former denes the dynamics with respect to words belonging to closed
word classes like determiners (‘a‘ or ‘some’) or modal expressions like ‘might’ (Veltman’s Update
Semantics), our approach locates the dynamics in open word classes like common nouns and verbs
that are used to express changes occurring in the world.
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Given only this information, no information about non-sortal properties is sup-
plied. In order to get such information, a language user applies both local contextual
information and global world knowledge to extend this lexical information, e.g. by
information about properties of objects.3
sort color form origin ripeness taste
object orange green oval spain ripe sweet
Table 1: Tabular representation of the lexical meaning of the common noun ‘orange’
enriched with contextual information and world knowledge
From a linguistic point of view, the representation in Table 1 provides a decom-
positional analysis of a common noun.
(7) λx(orange(x) ∧ color(x) = green ∧ form(x) = oval ∧ origin(x) = spain ∧
ripeness(x) = ripe ∧ taste(x) = smooth . . .)
However, such a decompositional representation of the meaning of a lexical item is
still both a at and completely static structure in the following sense. First, no
distinction is made between admissible values for a particular property. Although
these values can be ordered (e.g. say in form a scale, i.e. a partially or linearly
ordered set), there is no relation that orders them with respect to plausibility or
expectancy. Second, no distinction is made between admissible values for objects to
which this object can be related. For example, for the denotation of common nouns:
what are the most plausible (expected) events that bring about a change w.r.t. one
of its properties? Conversely, for events denoted by verbs: with respect to which
sorts of objects does the event most likely bring about a change? Third, ‘Does the
event have more than one outcome, i.e. it is deterministic or non-deterministic?’
Fourth, no information about dependencies between (the values of) properties
is expressed. Thus, the problem is not only related to getting more information, but
also to the question of how this information is ranked and what dependencies exist
between dierent properties. However, in order to impose both expectancy and
3 Thus, our analysis follows Hagoort’s ‘Immediacy Hypothesis’: all sorts of information available to
the comprehender is immediately used in parallel in order to arrive at a meaningful interpretation.
According to this hypothesis, a language user not only uses the information provided by the lexical
meaning of an expression, say it is an orange or a port, but also information from the context in which
an expression is processed and his world and/or background knowledge.
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dependency constraints a decompositional analysis of the denotations of common
nouns and verbs is needed because only then is it possible to explicitly refer to
the properties with respect to which those constraints are dened.
Another way of looking at this problem is in terms of the information state of
a language user. We follow dynamic approaches and dene an information state as
a set of possibilities consisting of the alternatives that are still open according
to the information available to the language user. In this paper information sets are
dened in terms of variable assignments.4 Following standard practice, sets of
assignments will be called possible worlds. Consider (7) again. The information
state of a language user w.r.t. to this information is given by a set of possible worlds
capturing his epistemic uncertainty, which is due to the fact that his knowledge
about the values of properties of an orange is only partial and incomplete. As
an eect, his knowledge consists of all those possibilities that are compatible
with his current knowledge. In the present case the alternatives concern possible
expansions of his knowledge about the orange. He then assumes that the actual
(correct) description is some subset U of the set W of possible worlds. However,
since all possible worlds are assumed to have equal status for the language user, no
world is preferred or more expected than any other in the set of all possibilities. As
a consequence, updating amounts to intersecting. A further problem concerns
the information that a language user can infer from his current information state
provided, say, by applying the information given by the lexical meaning plus
context information together with world knowledge. If his information state is
a at structure in the sense that all worlds are taken as equal, no information about
the values of properties about which no information is provided can (defeasibly) be
drawn. By contrast, if a language user has information both about dependency
and expectancy relations, he can use this type of information to (defeasibly or
non-defeasibly) infer other pieces of information about the situation described
by the sentences he is currently processing. For example, knowing only that a
melon is ripe, he defeasibly infers a value for its Sound attribute: mued. Thus,
the cognitive signicance of dependency and expectancy relations consists in the
fact that given part of a sentence, a language user will defeasibly infer as much
additional information about the situation described by the sentence as possible.
Consider the following example. Suppose there is an input state representing
mostly ducks (say, because the topic of a conversation are ducks). Then an event of
4 Or, as sets of sets of assignments. See section 3 for details.
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swimming is more expected than events of jumping or walking. By contrast, if
the topic is about deers, swimming is less expected than jumping.5
3 Outline of the formalization
3.1 Structures for events, objects and their properties
We start by xing models for objects and events that capture sortal information
which is used in dening the lexical meanings of common nouns and verbs.
Denition 1 (Object structure) Let CN be a set of object sort symbols like ‘or-
ange’. An object structure O is a quadruple 〈O, {Pcn}cn∈CN ,vo,unionsqo〉 s.t. (i) O is
a non-empty set of objects like trees and dogs; (ii) each Pcn is a subset of O; (iii)
vo is the material part-of relation onO, which is required to be a partial order and (iv)
unionsqo is the join operation on O, which is required to be a join-semilattice.
Denition 2 (Event structure) Let VERB be a set of event sort symbols like e.g.
‘squeeze’. An event structure E is a quadruple 〈E, {Pv}v∈VERB,ve,unionsqe〉 s.t. (i) E is
a non-empty set of actions and/or events like runnings or readings; (ii) each Pv is
a subset of E; (iii) ve is the material part-of relation on E, which is required to
be a partial order and (iv) unionsqe is the join operation on E, which is required to be
a join-semilattice.
Elements of E and O will be called entities. At the level of O and E , entities are
taken as elements of the underlying domain of some xed global modelM, which
can have parts. Examples are the leg of a table or the tail of a dog for the domain O
of persistent objects and a subevent of eating half an apple for the eating of the
whole apple in the domain E. Such relations are represented by a part-of relations
vo and ve, respectively. In addition, they can be ‘summed’ to form plural entities.
For example, if o, say Fred, and o′, say Mary, are elements of the object domain
O, then o unionsq o′ is also an element of O. This is modeled by the join operations
unionsqo and unionsqe, respectively.
What is missing at this level is the view of an entitiy as a ‘bundle’ of properties,
corresponding to a decompositional analysis at the linguistic and/or conceptual
level. Such a view makes it possible to impose constraints on (the values of)
properties of entities denoted by common nouns and events. Properties of objects
5 See van Elk et al. (2010) for empirical evidence based on an EEG study and references cited therein.
71
Ralf Naumann
like ‘Ripeness’, ‘Sound’ or ‘Age’ are represented by partially or linearly ordered sets,
called scale structures.
Denition 3 (Scale structure) A scale structure D is a pair 〈∆,≤〉 s.t. ∆ is a
non-empty set of degrees, the set of admissible values for the scale, and ≤ is an
ordering on ∆, usually either a partial or a linear order. Scales are required to have a
least element. Intuitively, the least element means that no information about the
value is known or provided.
Let PROP be a set of property symbols like ‘sort’ or ‘ripeness’ and let {Dp}
⊕
p∈PROP
be a family of scale structures indexed by elements from PROP. Elements of O
are assigned a subset of {Dp}p∈PROP by a (subset of a) family of partial functions
{γp}p∈PROP, which assign to an o ∈ O the scale structure Dp, if dened. The
following condition is imposed on this assignment. If o, o′ ∈ Pcn, then γp(o) is
dened i γp(o′) is dened and one has γp(o) = γp(o′), i.e. objects belonging
to the same sort are assigned the same scale structures. If γp(o) is dened for
an object of sort cn, the property p is said to be admissible for objects of sort cn.
While processing a common noun, context information and world knowledge
provide a language user with the current values of some of the properties assigned
to the object denoted by the common noun. This decomposition can be represented
as a (nite) conjunction of the form (8).6
(8) φσ ∧ φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn (= φ)
In (8), φσ expresses sortal information (lexical meaning), i.e. information about
the property ‘Sort’ and the φi non-sortal information (context information and
world knowledge), e.g. information about properties like ‘Ripeness’. Since in
general a language user doesn’t know the values of all properties of the object,
he is epistemically uncertain about the exact ‘status’ of the object. For example,
suppose that w.r.t. a particular melon the values of the properties ‘Form’ and
‘Origin’ are known to be ‘oblong’ and ‘spain’ by a language user and that there are
exactly two other properties ‘Sound‘ and ‘Ripeness’, whose possible values are
‘dull’ or ‘mued’ and ‘not ripe’ or ‘ripe’, respectively. The set of possibilities can
be represented by the following set of assignments. The ‘real’ melon could be
any of the four melons, each corresponding to a variable assignment.
6 Alternatively, the conjunction φ can be taken as a set of formulas, i.e. as a knowledge base in theories
of belief revision.
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object sort form origin sound ripeness
m1 melon oblong spain dull ripe
m2 melon oblong spain dull not ripe
m3 melon oblong spain mued ripe
m4 melon oblong spain mued not ripe
Table 2: A set of possibilities for an object denoted by the common noun ‘melon’
3.2 Dependence logic
One way of looking at Table 2 is as a table in a database. In Dependence Logic
(Väänänen 2007), such tables are an instance of a team. A team is a set of agents,
with an agent being dened as a function from nite sets (or tuples) of variables,
called the domain of the agent, into an arbitrary set, called the codomain of the
agent. In the present context, agents are objects, i.e. elements of the domain O,
viewed as bundles of properties.
Denition 4 (Team Dependence Logic) Let 〈x1, . . . xn〉 be a nite tuple of prop-
erty variables such that no two variables are of the same property sort (i.e. each variable
has associated with it a sort p ∈ PROP). LetM be the union of the domains ∆ from
{Dp}p∈PROP. An agent is any function from 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 toM . A team S is a set
of agents. A team S is admissible for objects of sort cn if dom(S) = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
and for xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n the sort of x1 v(i) is admissible for objects of sort cn.
Each row in Table 2 is an assignment, or, when viewed from the point of view
of an application, a possible description of an object (an agent). Properties of
objects (agents) are represented by attributes which are variables in the formal
representation. Thus, teams are directly related to the view of an object as a ‘bundle’
of properties.
An operation on teams is the supplement operation, which adds a new attribute
to the objects in a team, or alternatively changes the value of an existing attribute.
Denition 5 (Supplement of a team; Väänänen 2007) If M is a set, S is a
team with M as its codomain and F : S → M , S(F/xn) is the supplement
team {s(F (s)/xn) : s ∈ S}, where s(a/xn) is the assignment which agrees
with s everywhere except that it maps xn to a: dom(s/xn) = dom(s) ∪ {xn},
s(a/xn)(xi) = s(xi) when xi ∈ dom(s) \ {xn} and s(a/xn)(xn) = a.
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The supplement operation is used to model the combination of the lexical mean-
ing of a common noun with context information and world knowledge about
the referent of this noun in a given context. Let xn, . . . , xm, n < m, be the
attributes about which the context and world knowledge provide information.
If S is the team corresponding to the lexical meaning of a common noun, then
S(F/xn)(F/xn+1) . . . (F/xm) is the team resulting from adding the information
aboute the attributes xn, . . . , xm.
In Dependence Logic, formulas are interpreted with respect to sets of assign-
ments (teams) and not w.r.t. to single assignments as in rst-order logic. In Dynamic
Dependence Logic, formulas are interpreted as relations between sets of assign-
ments (Galliani 2014). This shift makes it possible to dene dependency relations
between attributes. For example, functional dependency between a sequence ~x
of variables and a variable y is expressed by the atomic formula =(~x, y), with
the intuitive meaning ‘the ~x totally determine y’. The satisfaction clause for this
dependence atom is (9a). The constancy atom =(x) requires the value of the
attribute x to be constant in a team, (9b). This formula is used to express that
a language user knows the value of an attribute.7
(9) a. M |=S =(~x, y) i ∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(~x) = s′(~x)→ s(y) = s′(y))
b. M |=S =(y) i ∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(y) = s′(y))
c. M |=X ∃xφ i there is a function F : X → ∃M such that M |=X[F/x] φ,
where ∃M is the local existential quantier dened by {A ⊆ M |A 6= ∅}
and S[F/x] is the team {s[a/x] | s ∈ S, a ∈ F (s)}.
The interpretation of the existential quantier is based on the supplement operation,
i.e. it either adds a new attribute to all agents in the current team, or alternatively
it changes the value of an existing attribute. Thus, the existential quantier is
inherently dynamic in the sense that it changes the current team w.r.t. which
it is interpreted (see Galliani 2014, for details on a dynamic interpretation of
Dependence Logic).
Using the dependence formula =(~x, y), it is possible to express dependencies
between properties like ‘Age’ and ‘Price’ for stamps and ‘Ripeness’ and ‘Sound’ for
melons.
7 For formulas that do not contain a dependence atom, one has:M |=S φ i for all s ∈ S :M |=s φ,
where |=s is the usual Tarskian satisfaction relation.
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(10) a. =(age, price)
b. =(ripeness, sound)
For example, (10b) says that the value of the attribute Sound is functionally de-
pendent on that of the attribute Ripeness. Both examples in (10) are not quite
correct because they do not take into consideration that for example (10a) holds for
stamps but not for other artefacts or human beings. Second, the value of the price
depends in general not only on its age but also on other factors like availability or
demand. These shortcomings can be remedied as follows.
(11) a. xsort = stamp→ =(age, price)
b. xsort = stamp→ =(age, availability, demand, . . . , price)
A team represents the set of possibilities of a language user in the following sense:
g ∈ S if and only if the language user believes g to be a possible (and complete)
description of the object. As noted in Galliani & Väänänen (2014), moving from
assignments to teams (or sets of assignments), makes it possible to assign to
each formula φ and model M the family of teams S = {S |M |=S φ}. As a
consequence, formulas can be interpreted as conditions over belief sets. Knowledge
of the value of a property in the sense that this property is assigned the same
value in all information states can be expressed by a constancy atom =(x). In Table
2 above, this holds for the attributes ‘sort’, ‘form’ and ‘origin’.
Denition 6 (Information state w.r.t. to an object) Given a decompositional
formula φ representing the beliefs of a language user about an object o ∈ O, his
epistemic uncertainty (or his set of possibilities) w.r.t. to o is given by the family
of teams S of teams satisfying φ, i.e. S = {S |M |=S φ}.
Note that information states are dened w.r.t. the domainO of objects. The domain
E of events plays no role. Rather, this domain functions as a state transformer:
elements of this domain trigger changes in information states.
3.3 Ranking functions
So far, the information state about an object of a language user is at in the sense
that all teams in this information state are taken as equally plausible. However,
a language user also has expectancies about (i) the values of properties about which
he so far doesn’t have any information and (ii) sorts of events in which an object of
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the given sort is most plausibly involved. These expectations lead to a ranking
of the teams in his information state. Such expectancies are dened in terms of
κ-rankings, which are based on the notion of surprise.
Denition 7 (κ-ranking function; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992, Spohn 1988)
A ranking is a function κ : Ω → N∗ with Ω a non-empty set such that κ(ω) = 0
for at least one ω ∈ Ω and N∗ = N ∪ {∞}.
In the present context, Ω is either a set of teams (or possible worlds with each
world representing a team in Ω) or the domain E. The numbers can be thought of
as denoting degrees of surprise (Halpern 2005, p.43). For example, κ(w) is the
degree of surprise a language user attributes to team w to be the ‘correct’ team
representing the interpretation of a sentence or a part of it. The higher the number,
the greater the degree of surprise. For example, ‘0’ means ‘completely unsurprising’
whereas greater numbers express increasingly higher degrees of surprise. The
value ∞ means ‘impossible’ or ‘so surprising as to be impossible’. In terms of
plausibility or expectancy, the value 0 means ‘most plausible’ or ‘most expected’.
Though degrees of surprise are assigned to elements of Ω, they can also be dened
to formulas φ. The rank or degree of surprise of φ is the least rank of the set of
worlds in which φ is true, (12).
(12) κ(φ) = minw{κ(w) |M |=w φ}
One has κ(φ) < κ(ψ) if φ is less surprising than ψ. For example, given an
information state about a melon in which it is known that this melon is ripe it
is less surprising to nd that its taste is sweet than to nd that the taste is not sweet
but sour. One therefore has κ(sweet) < κ(sour).
κ-rankings are not only used for ranking information states and formulas but
also to dene defeasible conditionals that allow to defeasibly infer information ψ
from information φ. These conditionals have the form φ δ→ ψ and mean ‘Typically,
if φ then expect ψ with strength δ’ (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992). If φ δ→ ψ holds
w.r.t. a ranking κ, ψ must be true in all most expected (or least surprising) worlds
in which φ is true. This condition imposed on→ can be expressed in terms of
conditional ranks, which have the form ψ|φ. Intuitively, ψ|φ expresses the degree of
surprise of nding ψ given that φ is known to be true. The denition of ψ|φ is
given in (13).
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(13) κ(ψ|φ) = κ(ψ ∧ φ)− κ(φ)
The inequality κ(¬ψ|φ) > δ means that given φ it would be surprising by at least
δ+ 1 ranks to nd ¬ψ and is equivalent to κ(ψ∧φ) + δ < κ(¬ψ∧φ) (Goldszmidt
& Pearl 1992). Now φ δ→ ψ is dened by (14).
(14) φ δ→ ψ i κ(ψ ∧ φ) + δ < κ(¬ψ ∧ φ).
A ranking function κ is said to be admissible with respect to a set ∆ of defeasible
conditionals if (15) holds.
(15) κ(φi ∧ ψi) + δi < κ(φi ∧ ¬ψi) for all φ δ→ ψ ∈ ∆.
Each type of (defeasible) inference discussed in the introduction is analyzed in
terms of a mapping whose range is a ranking function of a particular kind. These
mappings dier w.r.t. (i) the sort of the domain, which reects what is known
by the language user, and (ii) the domain of the ranking function, which reects the
type or sort of knowledge that is defeasibly inferred from this knowledge. The
following cases have to be distinguished.
1. given: information about the sort of an object;
inferred: information about the action (event) in which this object is involved.
Example: given: ‘duck’; inferred: ‘swim’.
2. given: information about the sort of an action (event);
inferred: information about the sort of participants (modulo a thematic role)
Example: given: ‘swim’; inferred: ‘duck’, ‘dolphin’ or ‘sh’.
3. given: information about the value of an attribute a;
inferred: information about the value of a dierent attribute a′.
Example ‘The melon is ripe’: given: ‘Ripeness:ripe’; inferred: ‘Sound:mued’.
4. given: the sort of an ection (event);
inferred: the values of attributes of objects involved in the event that hold
in the consequent state of the event.
A rst example is ‘The melon ripened’. There are at least two inferences that
can be drawn about the consequent state of the ripening: (i) it is ripe, i.e.
the value of the Ripeness attribute is ‘ripe’ and (ii) the value of the Sound
attribute is ‘mued’. Inference (i) is non-defeasible because ‘ripen’ is a degree
achievement that requires the maximum value on the underlying scale to
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hold in the end state of the event. By contrast, inference (ii) is defeasible.
A second, more complex, example is given by PBV’s: ‘The melon sounds ripe’.
This sentence is based on experiencing a mued sound of the melon (‘The
melon sounds mued’). Next, a most plausible sort of event is looked for such
that Sound:mued holds in its consequent state. In this case an event of
ripening is the most expected candidate. Since in the consequent state of
such an event Ripeness:ripe holds, ‘The melon sounds ripe’ follows.
5. given: a change in the value of an attribute a;
inferred: a change in another attribute a′.
An example is given by ‘The older a stamp, the more expensive it is’.
3.4 Rankings on information states
In a rst step, the set of teamsW satisfying (part of) a decompositional formula φ is
ranked.
Denition 8 (Ranking on information states) A ranking on an information
state corresponding to a decompositional formula φ = φ1 . . . φn is a ranking function
κ : W → N∗ s.t. κ−1(0) ⊆ [[φi]] iM |=w =(φi) for all w ∈W .
The condition κ−1(0) ⊆ [[φi]] iM |=w =(φ) expresses the requirement that a
language user knows the value of a property if it is constant in all teams belonging to
the information state.8 Note that it is not required that the whole decompositional
formula φ be known. For example, if a language user only knows that the object is
of sort Pcn, only φσ satises the condition κ−1(0) ⊆ [[φσ]].
The ranking function κ can naturally be interpreted as characterizing the de-
gree to which a language user is willing (i) to predict possible continuations of
a sentences with respect to properties of objects and (ii) to accept alternative
descriptions which are not in accordance with his current information about the
object. For example, in the case of a melon or an orange, the most plausible or least
surprising values for the attribute ‘Taste’ is ‘fruity’, whereas ‘salty’ will most likely
get the value∞ because it is deemed to be impossible.
8 It is assumed that an attribute (or a property) has exactly one value, i.e. attributes are functional
relations.
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3.5 Rankings of information states on events
The rst mapping to be dened captures case (1) Since this case concerns the
expectancy of particular sorts of events given the sort of an object, it has to be a
mapping from the domain W of teams in an information state to a ranking function
κ with domain E.
Denition 9 (Event ordering; Boutilier 1998) An event ordering is a mapping
µ : W → (E → N∗) that maps each w ∈ W to a κ-ranking E → N∗ on the
domain of events E. Instead of µ(w), we will write κw . It is required that κw(e) = 0
for some event e ∈ E, i.e. there is at least one most plausible event to occur in a world
w. If κw(e) =∞, this means that an occurrence of e atw is taken to be impossible. In
addition we require κw(e) = κw(e′) for two events e, e′ belonging to the same sort
Pv , i.e. events of the same sort are assigned identical plausibility for a given w.
Given µ, each world w has associated with it an event ordering µ(w) that deter-
mines the plausibility of event occurrences at that world.9 For example, if W is a
family of teams of sort ‘duck’, events of sort ‘swim’ will be assigned the value
0. By contrast, if the sort is ‘deer’, events of sort ‘jump’ are most plausible and
hence get value 0. For human beings, the set of most plausible events is in general
rather large due to the fact that they can be correlated to a large number of dierent
sorts of events (see van Elk et al. 2010, for details).
Since W represents information about objects, the mapping µ establishes a
relation between the domain O and the domain E. The cognitive signicance
of this mapping is the following. Given an information state w, a language user
uses κw to defeasibly infer the most plausible events that are likely to occur with an
information state of this sort and, in an additional step, expects particular verbs (or
verbs stems) to occur farther down the sentence which denote events of those sorts.
3.6 Rankings of information states w.r.t. events
The mapping µ only captures the expectancy of the occurrence of an event given
objects of a particular sort. Next we dene an analogous mapping that determines
the expectancy of a particular sort of object, given information about an event
of some sort. It maps elements of the domainE to ranking functions with a domain
of teams. This corresponds to case (2).
9 Intuitively, κw(e) captures the plausibility of the occurrence of event e at w.
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Denition 10 (Information state ranking for events) An information state
ranking for events is a mapping µ∗ : E → (W → N∗) that is dened by µ∗(e)(w) =
µ(w)(e).
Intuitively, µ∗ captures the fact of what types of information states are ‘preferred’
by events of a given sort. The cognitive signicance of this mapping is similar to
that of µ. If a verb is encountered denoting events of type σ, a language users
uses this mapping to predict the most plausible sorts of objects to ll in a role in the
event. In contrast to the mapping µ, there is not a single mapping but rather a
family of such mappings because this type of mapping must be dened relative to a
particular thematic role like actor or patient.
3.7 Event outcome ranking
In a nal step, we dene the relation between an event and its possible outcomes.
This mapping maps an event and a team (the input state) to a ranking function on
teams such that an element of this domain functions as the consequent state which
results when the event occurs in the input state.
Denition 11 (Event outcome ranking) An event outcome ranking is a mapping
τ : E → (W → (W → N∗)) that assigns to an event e ∈ E and an (input)
information state w a ranking function on the set of information states. It is required
that ∀e, e′ ∈ Pv : τ(e)(w) = τ(e′)(w) hold, i.e. events of the same sort have the
same outcome ranking functions relative to a given world w. Since τ(e)(w) is a
ranking function, one must have τ(e)(w)(w′) = 0 for at least one event w′ so that
one outcome of e is most plausible.
Intuitively, τ(e)(w)(w′) describes the plausibility that the worldw′ results when
event e occurs in w (Boutilier 1998:292). For example, an event denoted by ‘ripen’
results in a state in which the object that undergoes the change, say a melon, is
ripe.10 The cognitive signicance of τ is the following. If a language user knows the
sort of the event, say after having processed the predicate, he can defeasibly infer
possible outcomes. Thus the set of possible outcomes (teams) is not a at set but a
ranked set of alternatives. LetSe,w = {v | τ(e)(w)(v) 6=∞} be the set of outcomes
that possibly result for a given e and w. The mapping τ then induces a ranking
κ on this information state as follows: κ(v) < κ(v′) i τ(e)(w)(v) < τ(e)(w)(v′).
10 ‘The melon ripened’ implies that the melon was ripe at the end of the event since ‘ripen’ is a so-called
degree achievement.
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This mapping is used for case (iv). For example, if the sentence "The melon
ripened" is processed, a language user not only knows that an event of sort ‘ripen’
occurred but in addition, by using τ , he infers that (i) the melon is ripe and (ii) that
it sounds mued. Again, (i) is a non-defeasible inference whereas (ii) is defeasible.
The mapping τ is extended to sequences (or histories) of events in the following
way.
(16) w e
n
−→ v i there are u0, . . . , un s.t. w = u0 and v = un, e1 . . . en s.t.
en = e1unionsq. . .unionsqen and for each (ui, ui+1) with 0 ≤ i < n one has ui ei+1−→ ui+1.
For w e
n
−→ v, the rank is dened as the sum of the ranks of its component (atomic)
transitions.
(17) τ∗(e)(w)(v) =
∑
τ(ei+1)(ui)(ui+1)
This rank expresses the degree to which a language user thinks that this history
might occur (or has been occurred, using an abductive argument). It is used for
case (5). Each history represents a possible evolution of how an outcome φ can
be brought about by a sequence of events e = e1 . . . en = en. For example, if
the sort of the events ei is restricted to events of sort ‘ageing’, all histories have an
outcome in which the object undergoing the change is older than in the input
state. The output states can dier w.r.t. other properties, like ‘Price’ for example,
that can also be changed by an event of sort ‘ageing’.
4 Applying the formalism to the data from section 1
When processing a sentence, a language users knows that his current information
state will be changed to a new one. Using his world knowledge, he also knows that
this sentence either describes a change in the world or the persistence of a property
of an object. In the former case the event described can either be deterministic or
non-deterministic and the sentence can describe a relation between two properties
over time that are linked by a dependency relation.
The cognitive signicance of ranking functions and dependency relations is
grounded in the fact that they allow a language user to anticipate as much in-
formation as possible about the potential output information state that results from
processing the next upcoming sentence. Using the mappings κ, µ, µ∗ and τ , he
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can already calculate the plausibility of a transition w e−→ v as follows (Boutilier
1998:292).11
(18) κ(w e−→ v) = τ(e)(w)(v) + µ(w)(e) + κ(w).
According to (18), the plausibility of a transitionw e−→ v depends on the plausibility
of w, the degree to which an event e is expected to occur in w and the degree
to which event e can bring about an outcome v given input w.12 Given a condition
φ that has to hold in the output state v, the set of possible φ-transitions is dened
by (19) (Boutilier 1998:293).
(19) Tr(φ) = {w e−→ v | v |= φ ∧ κ(w e−→ v) 6=∞}.
The most plausible transitions resulting in an outcome state satisfying φ are (20).
(20) mpt(φ) = {v |w e−→ v ∈ min(Tr(φ))}.
In our application to natural language, the interpretation of a sentence need
not involve all three mappings. Consider ‘The melon ripened’ and ‘The duck swam’.
After processing the subject a language user is given a ranked set of teams, i.e.
an information state, of a particular sort: ‘melon’ and ‘duck’, respectively. He noe
uses the mappings τ andµ∗ to predict a most expected action and/or event together
with most expected results in which a melon or a duck are involved. Thus, in this
particular case he will calculate κw(w
e−→ v) = τ(e)(w)(v) +µ(w)(e) for a given
w or, equivalently, κ(w e−→ v) = τ(e)(w)(v) + µ(w)(e) + κ(w) with κ(w) = 0.
For ‘melon’, an event of ripening has a particular non-defeasible outcome: the
melon is ripe. Given this most expected event, there is in addition a most expected
(least surprising) outcome: it will sound mued. As a consequence, the most
expected (least surprising) elements of the setS(w) = {(e, v) |w e−→ v} will be
events of sort ripening with a consequent state v in which the melon is both ripe
and sounds mued. By contrast, for ‘duck’ and ‘swim’, the corresponding set
is larger because a swimming event usually has no single, most expected outcome.
For example, there can be a change of location or a loss of energy as well as a
combination of such results. However, none of those changes need be salient in a
11 As noted by Boutilier (1998:292), this formula is the qualitative analogue of the probabilistic equation
Pr(w
e−→ v) = Pr(v|w, e) · Pr(e|w) · Pr(w).
12 For expectations that involve the passing of time like for instance in ‘The older a stamp, the more
expensive it is’, the mapping τ∗ instead of the mapping τ is used.
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given context. One way of modelling this lack of salience of particular results
is to assume that nothing changes with respect to properties in the input state w by
setting v = w. Below we will see how this idea can be made precise by using
defeasible conditionals.
A drawback of using ranking functions directly is that they involve teams.
However, in many cases an expectation only involves two particular properties
and not all properties denoted by a complete decompositional formula. For this
reason, defeasible inferences based on expectations are better directly expressed in
terms of those properties. One way of doing this which is still based on ranking
functions, is to formulate defeasible inferences in terms of defeasble conditionals.
We follow Goldszmidt & Pearl (1992), who dene a consequence relation on a
set ∆ of defeasible conditionals and a distinguished κ-ranking κ+. This ranking is
dened as a ranking function that is minimal in the sense that any other admissible
ranking function must be assigned a higher ranking to at least one world and
a lower ranking to none.13 As a consequence, κ+ assigns to each world the lowest
possible rank permitted by the admissible constraint. The exact denition is given
below. The parameter δ stands for the strength with which the consequent follows
from the antecedent. This takes care of the fact that the inference is defeasible
and, at least in general, not strict. The greater δ, the greater the strength with
which σ follows from φ. In the limiting case if δ = ∞, the defeasible inference
is strict. In the sequel, when giving examples of defeasible conditionals, the exact
value of δ will be left open since this value has to be determined empirically.
Denition 12 (Plausible inference; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992) σ is a plausi-
ble conclusion of φ relative to a set ∆ of defeasible conditionals, written φ |δ∼ σ, i
κ+(φ ∧ σ) + δ < κ+(φ ∧ ¬σ).
The antecedent contains information about the input information state which
expresses information that is known to the language user, i.e. it is required that one
has M |=S =(φ) for each team S in the input information state. The dierence
between the two types of information consists in their strength. Whereas the
antecedent has to be known, for the information in the consequent this need not
be the case.14 Thus, the consequent contains information that can defeasibly be
added to this input information state, resulting in a new (output) information
state. This information state not only consists of the information that results
13 Goldszmidt & Pearl (1992) show that any consistent set ∆ has a minimal ranking.
14 How this dierence is modelled in the output information state must be left to another occasion.
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when semantically processing the (surface) constituents of a sentence but also
by adding the information in the consequent of defeasible conditionals whose
antecedent matches information that is given by processing a particular constituent
or, more generally, by information that is given by the context. The addition of the
information in the consequent is modeled by using the supplement operation from
Dynamic Logic, expressed by the existential quantier. In the context of a dynamic
semantics defeasible conditionals are used to construct the output information
state. For example, if the consequent has the form φ1 ∧ . . . φn with φi ≡ xσ , For
‘The melon ripened’, one gets the defeasible conditional (21a), and for ‘The duck
swam’ the defeasible conditional (21b).
(21) a. xobject = melon |δ∼xevent = ripen ∧ xripeness = ripe ∧ xsound = mued
b. xobject = duck |δ∼xevent = swim
The dierence between an event of ripening, which brings about particular results
and which therefore has a consequent state, and an event of swimming is captured
by the fact that for the former but not for the latter there are defeasible conditionals
specifying inferences about what holds in the consequent state.
Simple sentences and the N400.
For simple sentences like ‘John squeezed an orange’, only the mappings µ and
µ∗ are important. Outcomes play no role because only the expectancy relations
between sorts are involved. In (22), two examples of plausible inferences are given
(22) a. xsort = squeeze |δ∼xtheme = orange.
b. xsort = orange |δ∼xevent = squeeze ∨ xevent = buy.
Example (22b) is used to augment the current state with the information that the
eventuality is of sort ‘squeeze’ or of sort ‘buy’. If δ > 0 holds, this means that
a language user is more reluctant to draw the plausible inference. However, in the
present context it is assumed that a language user only uses plausible inferences
where δ = 0. In the consequent, the existential quantier is used, in order to
capture the dynamic character of this defeasible inference since a new attribute,
here xevent has to be introduced.
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The the . . . the-construction and the inferential user of PBVs.
In contrast to simple sentences like ‘John squeezed an orange’, which can be
analyzed in terms of only using κ, µ and µ∗, both the the . . . the-construction
and the inferential use of PBVs involve in addition the outcome mapping τ . This is
a direct consequence of the fact that they involve dependencies of (the values
of) properties over time.
The the . . . the-construction.
Consider again example (6a), repeated here as (23).
(23) The older a stamp, the more expensive it is.
The price of a stamp is in general not only dependent on its age but also on other
factors such as availibility and demand. In Dependence Logic, this dependency can
be expressed by (24), where ~x is a sequence of variables (attributes) containing ‘age’.
(24) =(~x, price)
Such a functional dependency is a necessary condition for the truth of a the . . . the-
construction. In addition, a stamp can get older without becoming more expensive
at the same time. Thus, one only has ‘Typically (normally), a stamp gets more
expensive if it gets older’. Therefore, an event of sort ‘ageing’ (or ‘getting older’) for
a stamp can have at least two dierent outcomes. In one output only the age of the
stamp has increased and in a second output both its age and its price have increased
(relative to the input state). As a consequence, events of ageing for stamps are
non-deterministic. Since the the . . . the-construction involves the comparative
construction the . . . the, it is necessary to not only consider single transitions but
sequences of such transitions dened in terms of the mapping τ∗.
The output states ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the (atomic) transitions dier in the value
assigned to the outcome mapping τ .15 Assuming τ(e)(w)(v) = 0, just in case
v satises both the condition that the value of ‘Age’ has increased and that the
value of ‘Price’ has increased, the most plausible histories involving a sequence of
ageing events for a stamp are those in which both the stamp not only gets older but
also gets more expensive.16
15 They do not dier w.r.t. κ and µ because an event of ageing leaves these rankings unchanged.
16 An analogous argument for other sorts of objects need not go through as in this case τ(e)(w)(v)
need not be 0.
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In dening a defeasible conditional based on τ∗, one abstracts from the temporal
development. Rather, one only uses the information that the value of the given
attribute, say Age, in the input information state has increased (decreased) and
that there is a corresponding change in the dependent attribute, say Price. Thus,
the general form of a defeasible conditional based on τ∗ has the form (25a). For
(23), one gets (25b). Using this defeasible conditional, one infers that the value
of the Price attribute has increased too.
(25) a. xesort = σe ∧ xosort = σo ∧ xoattr = β ∧ xoattr′ = α |
δ∼xoattr 6= β ∧ xoattr′ 6= α.
b. xesort = ageing∧xosort = stamp∧xoage = α∧xoprice = β|δ∼xoage > α∧xoprice > β.
Inferential use of PBVs.
On its inferential use, the interpretation of a PBV involves a change. We will argue
that the interpretation process is similar to an abductive argument (see Boutilier
1998) involving three steps. Consider the example ‘The melon sounds ripe’. First,
there is an observation (perception): the melon emits a particular sound that is
classified as ‘muffled’. Second, an explanation for this particular sound value is
given by postulating some (most) plausible event or events that could have brought
about the observed change in the property expressed by the verb (‘sound’ in this
case). Besides a ripening event, the sound of the melon could have been manipulated
mechanically. But the former event is assumed to be more plausible, say due to
experience and general world knowledge. Finally, the outcomes of this event are
calculated. In this case one gets that the melon is ripe. The defeasible element is
the postulation of a (most) plausible event. In the case of PBVs, this is an event
related to the property expressed by the predicative complement, e.g. a ripening
in the case of ‘The melon sounds ripe’ where the predicative complement is ‘ripe’.
Similar to the the . . . the-construction, there are two constraints that must be
satised. First, there must be a functional dependency between the two properties.
For example, the value of the ‘Sound’ property must be determined by the value of
the ‘Ripeness’ property. Second, this condition need only hold in the normal or
typical case.17 Consider (26).
(26) *The melon sounds oval.
17 Gamerschlag & Petersen (2012) and Petersen & Gamerschlag (2014) formulate related constraints in
their type-based frame analysis of PBVs.
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In this case there is no functional dependency between the value of the property
‘Sound’ and the property ‘Form’. In a team of sort ‘melon’, the value of the ‘Form’
property can arbitrarily vary while the ‘Sound’ property remains constant, say
‘mued’. For ‘The melon sounds mued’, the information in the input information
state is (27a). The rst defeasible inference is based on the mapping µ, (27b). The
second step involves the non-defeasible inference that an event denoted by the
verb ‘ripe’ brings about a state in which the object undergoing the ripening is
ripe at the end of the event (27c). When taken together, one gets (27d).
(27) a. xosound = mued ∧ xosort = melon.
b. xosound = mued ∧ xosort = melon |δ∼xesort = ripen.
c. xesort = ripen ∧ xosort = melon ` xoripeness = ripe.
d. xosound = mued ∧ xosort = melon ∧ xesort = ripen |δ∼xoripeness = ripe.
5 Summary
In this paper we developed an extension of a dynamic semantic theory for natural
language which makes it possible to express both dependency relations between
properties of objects and expectancies between nominal and verbal concepts. The
theory is based on a decompositional analysis of common nouns in which they are
interpreted as ‘bundles’ of properties, similar to the way objects are represented in
database theories. The ranking functions dening those expectancies are used
to draw defeasible inferences from information that is provided by the lexical
meaning of words in a sentence that have already been processed.
Needless to say, the theory has to be worked out in greater formal detail: (i) The
relation between Dependence Logic and κ-rankings must be further explored. E.g.,
is it possible to dene ranking functions directly in Dependence Logic?; (ii) The
dynamic component must be made more explicit. In particular, how are information
states for various objects modeled and how is it possible to explicitly talk about
changes?; (iii) How are the rankings empirically determined? Possible approaches
are strategies from n-gram models and techniques used in neuroscience based
on the concept of cloze probability; and (iv) Defeasible inferences are simply added
to the output information state. As a consequence, there is no distinction between
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ (defeasible) information.
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What Cost Naturalism?
Martin Stokhof & Michiel van Lambalgen*
The paper traces some of the assumptions that have informed conservative natu-
ralism in linguistic theory, critically examines their justication, and proposes
a more liberal alternative.
1 Introduction
In this paper we take up an issue that was touched upon in our earlier paper on
abstraction and idealisation in linguistics1 only in passing, viz., what we there
called ‘the ideological nature’ of certain views about the nature of linguistics as
a scientic enterprise. The choice of the term ‘ideological’ has confused some
readers and may have been less fortunate. But apart from the choice of appropriate
terminology, there is, we feel, an important issue here, one that needs further
investigation. This note is a rst step.
What is the issue? To put it in general terms, many approaches in modern
linguistics are characterised by an, implicit or explicit, commitment to a concept of
language that views it as the kind of natural phenomenon that can be studied
by scientic means, with the natural sciences (physics, biology) acting as role
models for what proper scientic theorising looks like. Language here is an
ontologically homogeneous phenomenon that, in principle, can be captured and
explained completely in, broadly speaking, physicalistic terms.
The original remark about the ideological nature of this view is motivated by our
concern that it is insuciently based on a prior and independent conceptualisation
of what language is and what an explanatory theory of it would need to account for,
* We would like to thank the participants in the workshop and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments and criticisms.
1 Stokhof & van Lambalgen (2011a).
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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with only subsequently an argumentation that such goals can actually be achieved
best by a physicalistic theory. Rather, it seems, the reverse has taken place. With
the choice of a particular type of theory already in place, the concept of language
has been adjusted and changed so as to t the pre-conceived idea of what a proper
theory of language should look like. But such a move can only be inspired by
the idea that only the type of theoretical explanation that we know from the natural
sciences can count as a proper account of whatever phenomenon we are dealing
with. And that, we venture to claim, is not motivated by argument but by ideology.
In order to make good on this claim, we need to do a number things. First of all,
we need to provide evidence that this kind of reasoning is indeed used in discussion
about what the nature of linguistics is. Second, we need to show that this leads
to the ontological homogenisation that we claim it does. That should settle the
‘ideology’ claim. But if, thirdly, we also are able to show that the resulting picture
is decient, both descriptively and explanatorily as well as philosophically, our
investigation will also be able to provide some support for alternative conceptions
of language and for other ways of doing linguistics.
2 A quick exploratory dig
One prevalent view on naturalism as applied to linguistics, to which we will turn in
the next section, is, we venture, a reection of what one might call ‘Chomsky’s
shadow’, a result of the deep and still present inuence of some key assumptions
that were infused in modern linguistics with the advent of generative grammar.
There are many such elements that continue to shape theoretical thought in the
discipline, here we focus on two that we think are directly relevant for the topic of
this paper, viz., individualism and the adoption of a particular type of explanation.
We realise of course that what follows is only a very rough sketch, one that
traces one particular way of thinking, and that does not do justice to some of
the alternative approaches that have been developed.2 Nevertheless, we do think
that the underlying assumptions that we discuss are not operative only in one
particular paradigm, but that they are around in other frameworks as well.3
2 Such as various approaches in functional linguistics and cognitive linguistics. Cf., e.g., Givon (2013)
for some discussion of the assumptions underlying functional linguistics that is congenial with
the argument developed in this paper.
3 Cf., below, footnote 13 and 22 for two examples from dierent frameworks.
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The individualism that is part and parcel of many approaches in linguistics, past
as well as present, can be stated succinctly as follows: ‘language is an individual
asset, and linguistic ability is an individual property’. The assumption is that in
principle, though not de facto, an individual could be a competent language user all
by his- or herself. Or to put it slightly dierently, in giving a description of what
linguistic ability is, and in giving a description of what that ability is about, viz.,
language, there is no need to refer to anything over and above the individual itself.
Language use may be a social art, but language itself and the ability to use it are not.
Of course, in real life people do not become language users in complete isolation,
nor do they function as such without being part of a social environment. But, or so
the idea goes, ‘in principle’ these social aspects can be bracketed, at least if they
themselves are not a topic of study, of course. With regard to individualism, then,
the basic divide is not between theories that leave out the social (communicative)
dimension as a proper concern for linguistics and theories that include it, but
between those that assume that the social dimension can be viewed in terms of
the interplay of individual abilities and those that do not view the individual ability
as an independent and foundational element.
The second factor that we want to draw attention to is the reliance on a particular
form of explanation. There is a tendency in many linguistic theories to assume
that explanations of linguistics facts ultimately need to be stated in terms of
structural properties, of language, grammar, and of individual language users.4 This
inspires an exclusive focus on structural properties of the human cognitive make-
up, ultimately, those of the human brain. This notion of a structural explanation is
familiar from the sciences. However, in the case of linguistics actual access to
such underlying structural properties never was a substantial part of the enterprise:
it remained, rather, an assumption that such access would be possible, i.e., it was a
way of formulating explanations, rather than a way of explaining things. This is
what Ernan McMullin called ‘hypothetico-structural explanation (McMullin 1978,
p. 139):
When the properties or behaviour of a complex entity are explained by alluding
to the structure of that entity, the resultant explanation may be called a structural
one. [. . . ] Such explanations play only a small role in scientic enquiry. Much
4 This is not to say that the resulting theoretical frameworks will be the same: what counts as the
relevant structural properties, what form the system takes, what role semantics and pragmatics
have to play in an overall account, are some of the parameters along which dierent approaches
distinguish themselves.
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commoner are those where the structure is postulated to account for the observed
properties or behaviour of the entity under investigation. [. . . ] [These] could be
called ‘hypothetico-structural’.
When individualism and the concept of hypothetico-structural explanation are
combined the distinction between competence and performance that has been
enormously inuential, and not just in the generative grammar tradition,5 seems
almost self-evident. And with that the rst, decisive step on an ever more abstract
construction of the central object of linguistics is taken that we know from the
generative tradition: from actual languages, as used in the ‘here-and-now’, to the
concept of ‘possible human language’, and then to that of ‘universal grammar’
and ultimately the ‘faculty of language in the narrow sense’.
Of course, not all linguistic theories have been travelling that far on the road of
abstraction, but many of them have been, and still are, aected by this powerful
combination of assumptions.
3 Abstraction and idealisation, once more
Now, one could regard the movement just described also in a positive way, i.e.,
as a manifestation of the increasing maturity of linguistics as a scientic enterprise.
And it has been presented as such in the literature. After all, no scientic discipline
engages directly with the continuous stream of experiences of phenomena that we
have, they all construct their object of investigation from the endless particularities
of phenomena by focussing on what is deemed important and leaving out the
rest. Thus any discipline needs to create from the experiental ux a more or less
stable set of entities that it aims to investigate.
That much is certainly true, and it is something can be observed in any scientic
discipline (as well as in many other branches of human cognitive activity, by the
way.) But as we have argued elsewhere,6 there are crucially dierent ways of doing
this, that have substantially dierent implications for the relationship between
what a discipline is concerned with and the phenomena themselves.
Very briefly, in the paper just referred to, we made a distinction between ‘abstrac-
tion’ and ‘idealisation’, and characterised the difference in broad terms as follows.
5 It was also a formative element in the development of formal semantics, for example.
6 Cf., Stokhof & van Lambalgen (2011a, 2011b).
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Features of a phenomenon that are abstracted are real features that at some
point in time are considered to be too complex or too intractable, or, in some
cases, not suciently relevant, to be taken into account in conducting a scientic
inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon. A decision to abstract away from
a feature is thus context-dependent and reects various types of constraints that
may obtain at a particular moment in time, relating to the availability and accuracy
of instrumentation, availability and access to data, and so on. What needs to
be pointed out is that abstraction is an intentional move: the features that are
abstracted from are acknowledged as real, and they do occur, albeit in a special way,
in subsequent theories, and, being actual features of the phenomenon, they will
manifest themselves in experiment and observation. That holds, of course, also for
features of a phenomenon that have not been acknowledged as such, i.e., features
that have not been observed. These play a role in experimental and observational
results as well, but they are not intentionally left out of the theory. They are simply
not taken into account because they have not been observed.
Features that are abstracted from are typically quantitative in nature, and often
they concern the numerical value of something that is known to exist, but dicult,
or in some cases not particularly relevant, to measure precisely. Examples for
the natural sciences would be movement on a frictionless plane; the concept
of a perfectly rigid rod, or of perfect vacuum; free space constants, such as the
gravitational and magnetic constants; or the concept of a perfectly pure chemical
substance. In each of these cases there is a quantitative parameter (friction, the
number of molecules in a certain volume, etc) that is set to a particular value (zero,
innity, or a specic number, as the case may be), not because that value is known,
which it isn’t, but because it is too dicult or too unimportant to actually measure.
What should be kept in mind is that although abstracted from, these parame-
ters not only do turn up in experiment and observation they also are essential
ingredients of the theories that are based on them. If we described the movement
of an object on a frictionless plane, we are not assuming that friction does not exist;
we’re only setting its value to zero. That is of crucial importance because it implies
that there will always be discrepancies between the predictions made by a theory
that is based on the abstraction and what we can observe in the laboratory or
in the real world. And it are such discrepancies as we would be able to observe
and eventually measure, e.g., when better or new instruments become available,
that will allow us to provide richer and better theories that rely on less abstractions.
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Thus in the case of abstraction there is always a ‘back-and-forth’ between the
theory based on an abstraction and the real phenomenon as it manifests itself
in experiment and observation. And it is this back-and-forth that allows, and,
in some cases, forces us to ‘undo’ the abstraction and come up with a better theory.
So the motivation for abstraction is primarily methodological (in a fairly literal
sense, as ‘having to do with what methods we have at our disposal’) and practical,
and hence in principle always temporary and revisable.
What about the second way of constructing an object of investigation, viz.,
‘idealisation’? The dierence with abstraction is that here features that are ‘idealised
away’ literally disappear from view. These are features of the phenomenon that
are considered to be irrelevant from the perspective of what the discipline is
interested it. Hence an idealised feature no longer plays a role in the empirical
investigation: it is declared unnecessary to be considered further. The dierence
with abstraction may be subtle, but is it fundamental: an idealised feature is not
‘merely’ too complex or intractable, or not relevant in a specic use case, rather,
it is viewed as something that need not be considered in, and may even stand
in the way of, an attempt to understand the phenomenon since it is irrelevant
for acquiring such an understanding.
Thus idealisation creates an ontological gap between phenomenon and con-
structed object: an idealised feature is, of course, a real one at the level of the
phenomenon, but it is no longer present in the constructed object and has no
role to play in the subsequent theories that employ that object. In a quite literal
sense idealisation is an ontological move, rather than an epistemological one like
abstraction: it changes the subject.
Features that are idealised are typically qualitative features of the phenomenon.
Examples from linguistics that suggest themselves are: language as an innite
set of sentences; the competence – performance distinction; or the concept of
literal meaning. In each case there is a particular feature of actual language use
(e.g., its dependence on non-linguistics aspects of context, or the limitations of
cognitive processing power, and so on) that is being discarded. As a result a new
concept is formed that lacks this feature, and thus constitutes a dierent kind
of entity than the original phenomenon.
Take the rst example: if we look at languages in the ‘here-and-now’, i.e., as the
phenomenon that we actually encounter when people use language, it is obvious
that it is a nite object. The total number of utterances of any natural language,
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past, present and future, is nite, as is the existence of the human species. What is
important is that this nite number of utterances appears to be unpredictable in
this sense that we constantly encounter utterances of new expressions and that we
have no reason to assume that this is bounded purely quantitatively (i.e., there
there is some xed n that serves as the upper bound of the number of utterances we
may encounter). Thus ‘creativity’ of language use/users is a real phenomenon,
one that needs to be accounted for. What is important to note is that this creativity
in fact is bounded: it does not mean that anything goes and that there are no
restrictions, e.g., on the length or the complexity of the structure of utterances
(especially embedding) that are operative
And this is were things go wrong. The preferred way of accounting for creativity
is to drop the actual feature of language’s niteness and switch to a dierent concept
of language that identies a language with an innite number of expressions.7
But this is an ontological switch that is underdetermined by the observed creativity,
and that turns a fact to be explained into a dening feature, and thereby changes
the phenomenon that we observe into a dierent type of entity altogether.8
This also means that with idealisations there is no straightforward ‘back-and-
forth’ between the theory containing the idealisation and the actual phenomenon
as it appears in experiment and observation. Since the idealised feature is missing
from the theory, there is not direct relation between what we learn from experiment
and observation and the predictions made by the theory. There is an ontological
gap, and that gap needs to be bridged by an additional ‘bridging theory’ that relates
what the theory says to what is actually out there. That means that idealisation
comes with an additional epistemological task, viz., to come up with an adequate
bridging theory. How to do that is not at all obvious, however, especially because
the adequacy criteria for such a theory seem hard to come by.
So unlike abstraction, which is clearly motivated by practical and methodological
concerns, the motivation for idealisation is dierent: it does not derive from
empirical considerations, but rather is motivated by conceptual-philosophical
ones. Where these are based on pre-conceived ideas about what constitutes a
proper scientic investigation, –and as we shall argue, such ideas are indeed
7 A move that is inspired by the concept of a language that comes from the deductive sciences.
8 For another example, viz., the celebrated ‘competence – performance’ distinction, cf., Stokhof &
van Lambalgen (2011a, section 8).
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behind idealisations that we nd in linguistics,– they can be properly be called
‘ideological’.
4 Naturalism in linguistics: a specic case
Before turning to a more general outline of naturalism in linguistics, we rst briey
discuss a specic way of arguing for this general view. It draws on the work of
Chomsky, arguably one of the most inuential thinkers in this area, and not just in
the generative tradition.9 Chomsky has argued extensively that linguistics is a
science like other sciences, and hence that it should follow the same leads in the
construction of its objects as well as in the methodologies it employs in studying
them. That means not only that linguistics should be held to the same standards as
any other empirical discipline, but also that it should be judged by similar criteria.
This, Chomsky claims, is not always the case, especially in philosophy, where what
is accepted as normal and appropriate in the other sciences is judged by other
standards if it occurs in linguistics (Chomsky 1995, p. 7):
[...] it is a rare philosopher who would sco at its [i.e., physics’,ms-mvl] weird and
counterintuitive principles as contrary to right thinking and therefore untenable.
But this standpoint is commonly regarded as inapplicable to cognitive science,
linguistics in particular. Somewhere between, there is a boundary. Within that
boundary, science is self-justifying; the critical analyst seeks to learn about the
criteria for rationality and justication of scientic success. Beyond that bound-
ary, everything changes; the critic applies independent criteria to sit in judgment
over the theories advanced and the entities they postulate.
The message here is clear. According to Chomsky philosophers accept what is done
in physics and related areas of research at face value, and they study it in order to
understand it the way it is. But when it comes to linguistics and similar disciplines
the subject matter is not studied ‘as is’, but it is judged, and apparently by criteria
that are germane to the disciplines in question.
9 The ‘present relevance’ of Chomsky’s thought is a matter of debate. It is certainly true that the
landscape of theoretical linguistics is much more heterogeneous now than it was in the sixties,
seventies and eighties of the previous century. And many approaches are self-proclaimed ‘non-’ or
even ‘anti-’Chomskyean. However, there is still a strong tradition in theoretical linguistics that
subscribes to some of the fundamental principles discussed here. Cf., below for some examples.
And we would claim that even in alternative theoretical approaches one can nd assumptions that
derive from the generative tradition. For more discussion and concrete examples, cf., Stokhof &
van Lambalgen (2011b, pp. 80–85).
98
What Cost Naturalism?
But clear as it is, what Chomsky claims here is not beyond dispute. There is
a lot of critical discussion of various aspects of physics, or at least of the conceptual
understanding of it, both in philosophy as well as in physics itself. The ongoing
debate on the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics immediately comes
to mind (and we will see a bit of that later on), but also more generally there
is critical engagement with the natural sciences and their self-understanding.10
So it is denitely not true that philosophers do not criticise basic concepts and
fundamental principles in the sciences.
Likewise, the charge brought against philosophy that it judges linguistics by
‘outside’ criteria does not seem completely justied either. Of course, as in any area
of investigation, here too there is no doubt that examples can be found of analyses
and criticisms that are ‘o the mark’. But that is not particularly interesting.
Rather, what Chomsky seems to take issue with is criticisms that start from other
assumptions regarding what is the proper methodology in linguistics than he
deems relevant, and that hence accept methodological pluralism. This is mocked
by Chomsky as follows (Chomsky 2000, p. 76):
We must abandon scientic rationality when we study humans ‘above the neck’
(metaphorically speaking), becoming mystics in this unique domain, imposing
arbitrary stipulations and a priori demands of a sort that would never be contem-
plated in the sciences.
It is here that a central element of Chomsky’s particular form of naturalism comes
to the fore. As the passage just quoted strongly suggests, there is, according to him,
no special methodology that needs to be employed when studying the human
mind, including language. Such an assumption can only lead to ‘mysticism’, not to
explanatory theories. Rather, there is every reason to extend the methodology
employed in the study of humans as physical (biological) entities to the study
of mind and language.
Thus it appears that Chomsky’s main gripe with his philosophical opponents is
that they do not share his assumption that, linguistics being an empirical discipline,
it should employ the same methodology as any other empirical science, i.e., that
they do not, as he does, subscribe to methodological monism.11
10 A nice example is Hartry Field’s discussion of the role of mathematics in physics (Field 1980); an
example in biology is the debate concerning the unit of selection in evolution.
11 That Chomsky’s ideas are still with us is testied by the way in which the nature and goals of
linguistic theory are described in more recent work. Here is an example from Culicover and Jackendo
(Culicover & Jackendo 2005):
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5 Naturalism in linguistics: three characteristics
The methodological monism that we identied in the previous section as the rock-
bottom of Chomsky’s distinct view on the nature of linguistics, is an important
characteristic of a naturalistic stance in linguistics (as it is in many other disciples).
In this section we briey review three distinct such characteristics. Of course,
in real life naturalism comes in many dierent forms and guises, and with dierent
motivations and justications. However, we do claim that these three features are
characteristic in the sense that they can be found, perhaps in mixed composition,
i.e., with dierent emphasis and motivation, in most naturalistic views.
The three characteristics are methodological monism, already introduced; onto-
logical monism; and explanatory monism. The rst is the assumption that all of
science employs the same methodology. This should be read in a broad sense, since,
obviously, not all concrete methods are equally relevant, or even applicable in
every discipline. The second characteristic embodies the conviction that there
are no major distinct ontological categories, i.e., that everything is basically made
of the same ‘stu’. Again, this is a claim that should be interpreted with some
caution, it is not necessarily a denial of any form of categorial distinction between
entities, but embodies the claim that all of them are part of the same ontology.
The third characteristic, nally, comes with the claim that there is one model of
explanation that ts all phenomena, i.e., that all scientic disciplines employ the
same requirements for what constitutes an adequate explanation of the phenomena
that constitute their subject matter.
The relations between these three characteristics are complex. It is important to
note that they are not merely three sides of one and the same (thick) coin, i.e., they
do not imply one another. For example, one could subscribe to ontological monism,
We begin a more thorough examination of the situation [in syntax, ms-mvl] by reviewing
the rst principles of generative grammar, articulated in detail by Noam Chomsky in
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) and many subsequent works. With only minor
modulation and reinterpretation, these principles have stood the test of time and have
received further conrmation through the ood of research in cognitive science in the
past forty years. [. . . ] Generative grammar is grounded in the stance that the object of
study is the instantiation of language in the context of the human mind/brain, rather than
an abstract phenomenon that exists ‘in the community’ [. . . ] The fundamental linguistic
phenomenon is a speaker producing an utterance that is understood by a hearer, and the
fundamental question is what is present in the speaker’s and hearer’s mind/brain that
enables this interchanges to take place.
From there Culicover and Jackendo proceed to identify ‘productivity’ and ‘competence’ as core
concepts.
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yet acknowledge distinctly dierent methodologies as required by dierent sets of
ontologically non-distinct phenomena. What does follow is that in such a case the
motivation for the methodological pluralism can not be ontological. But other
justications can be thought of.
Of course, despite the conceptual independence of these three forms of monism,
there are in fact strong anities between them, and people tend to embrace them
as a kind of package deal. But their unication does require some additional
assumptions. One such assumption that enables further identication of these three
forms of monism is that nature is material. Ontological monism then entails that all
entities are material, which in its turns lends much plausibility to methodological
monism: if what we study is basically of the same kind, then obviously the same
methodology applies across the board (of disciplines, not entities). A further
assumption then comes into view, viz., that there is a basic level of material
constitution at which all relevant phenomena can be studied. This reductionism
then further motivates explanatory monism: if what we study with the same
methodology takes place at the same level of material constitution, how could
the explanations we are after be dierent?
Thus arises the idea of a unied science, based on material reductionism. With
physics arguably being the most successful science we have, it would stand to
reason that this unied science employ the methodology of physics, and if we
accept that, we nd ourselves engaged with some form of physicalism.
In order to make this a plausible account for linguistics, we actually also need as
some form of (methodological) individualism as an additional assumption. This
individualism was identied in section 2 as one of the core contributions that
Chomsky has made to linguistic theory. It seems to work because the physical
realisations of all entities appear to be individual in nature. That holds in general,
and for linguistics it seems to imply that it is individual language users that
are the core entities that linguistic theory should be concerned with. Thus the
individualism appears to guarantee ontological homogeneity, and thereby it also
seems to guarantee explanatory unication.
As we have argued elsewhere,12 some strong idealisations, in particular the
competence – performance distinction, are needed to make this work in the case of
language. However, as pointed out above, the argumentation for these assumptions
is conceptual, and not (or at least not exclusively) empirical. And that suggests
12 Cf., Stokhof & van Lambalgen (2011a, section 8).
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that at least in linguistics this form of naturalism is ideologically motivated. It
is not based on empirical arguments for methodological monism, nor does it give
a sound empirical argumentation for the necessity of methodological individualism.
Rather, these two crucial assumptions are embraced on the basis of what ultimately
is a scientistic ideology.13
6 Naturalism: an alternative view
At this point it might be good to pause for a moment and ask ourselves what this
scientistic form of naturalism has bought us in linguistics, and whether there might
be an alternative way of being a naturalist and a linguist.
As for the rst question, we would venture that the answer is: ‘Actually, not that
much.’ It is true that linguistics enjoys considerable academic prestige, and in part
(but admittedly, only in part) this is due because it conceives itself, and is conceived
by others, as being the most scientic (rigorous, formal, . . . ) of the humanities.
The adoption of a naturalistic stance no doubt contributes to that. But in actual
practice it has led, or so we would argue, initially to an unjustied restriction of
the domain of inquiry, and later, when those restrictions became too stringent,
to a confusing variety of approaches and methodologies. The continuing adherence
to individualism and the model of hypothetico-structural explanation have played
a major role here.
13 To further counterbalance the impression that we are only after Chomsky, or generative grammar, we
illustrate very briey how similar ideas have crept into our own work in semantics. In our use
of the event calculus, which uses closed world reasoning in the description and explanation of a range
of phenomena, from tense and aspect to coercion and logical reasoning, some assumptions about
individualism and materialism can be discerned. Cf., the following passage from Stenning & van
Lambalgen (2008, p. 161–162):
Systems of closed-world reasoning are logics of planning. [. . . ] Maintaining a model of the
current state of the immediate environment relevant to action is a primitive biological
function. [. . . ] The planning logics are just as much what one needs for planning low-level
motor actions such as reaching and grasping, as they are for planning chess moves.
Approaching from the direction of the syntactic and semantic analysis of temporal ex-
pressions of natural languages also directs attention to planning as underlying our faculties
for language. More generally, a main human brain innovation is the increase in neocortex,
and specically in frontal areas of neocortex.These frontal areas are involved in planning
and ‘executive functions’, among other things.
Clearly the assumptions that are operative here are that language originates from non-linguistic
structural properties of the human brain; and that, hence, core aspects of linguistic meaning can
be explained in terms of such individual structural properties.
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But what about the second question, about the possibility of an alternative? If we
bracket our commitment to individualism combined with hypothetic-structural
explanation, the most intuitive way of explaining the human ability to use language
would seem to be one that proceeds in terms of dispositional properties of language
users. Instead of postulating ‘underlying’ structural properties that explain what
we can observe about language and its use, — a postulate that would seem to
bring along a mechanistic picture of language and language users —, we would try
to explain what we can observe in terms of dispositions to verbal and relevant
non-verbal behaviour that are triggered in a complex setting of natural, individual,
and social conditions.
Such a dispositional account has a number of attractive features. First, it would
provide an intuitive account of the voluntary nature of language use. This in-
tentional aspect is hard to give a place in the structure-based, mechanistic view, but
comes natural in a dispositional account. After all, dispositions need additional
conditions to manifest themselves, and an intentional volitional act would appear
to be a prime candidate for such a condition. (Which is not to say that it would be a
necessary condition.)
Secondly, it would provide space to accommodate a number of factors other than
the individual itself that play a role in a comprehensive account of language
and language use. One example here would the communicative purposes of
language users, that are relevant input for determining the manifestations of
their dispositions to use language. That is still at the level of language users and
their interactions. But the dispositional view could also accommodate other factors,
such as external determinants of (lexical) meaning, or institutions and other social
entities. Since the manifestation of a disposition is something that ‘takes place’, i.e.,
is a spatio-temporally located event, the role of both physical and social reality as
(co)determining meaning can be incorporated in a fairly straightforward manner.
And thirdly, unlike the competence – performance distinction, which isolates
competence from performance limitations, such as constraints on working memory,
or limited attention span, the dispositional view prepares a natural setting for such
limitation to operate in. After all, as noted above, the manifestations of a disposition
take place in concrete situations, and features of these situations may not only
contribute to the content of these manifestations, they may also set limits to them,
in various ways.
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So, all in all, it seems much more intuitive to look at what is individual about
language and language use in terms of dispositions than in terms of structure,
and to account for them as embedded in a rich and varied social ontology.
However, enter the commitment to hypothetico-structural explanation, again. It
is this commitment, that postulates that, ‘in the end’, explanations will refer only to
structural properties, that forces us to consider an explanation in dispositional
terms as ‘provisional’, at best. If not outright non-explanatory,14 then minimally
these are explanations that contain terms, viz., the ones referring to dispositions,
that will need to be analysed further until they are eliminated and only reference to
structure and structural priorities remains.15 And this is because, so the argument
goes, structure is real and dispositions are not.
As was already mentioned, a key element in the justication for this assumption,
and hence for the commitment to hypothetico-structural explanations, is the
conviction that physics works that way. And given that physics is the most
successful scientic discipline there is, the idea is that linguistics should follow its
lead. This raises two questions. First of all, does physics really work that way? And
secondly, and this is an issue that is quite independent from the answer to the
previous question, what is the justication for linguistics to follow suit?16
The first question is a complicated one. The idea that structural explanations
are the nec plus ultra of all scientific inquiry is based on what is often called the
‘Groundedness Thesis’, i.e., the view that all dispositions are ultimately grounded in
structural properties of the entities involved. As said physics is often assumed to
conform to this assumption, but there are dissenting voices. More specifically, it
has been argued that at the level of quantum phenomena we find properties that are
14 Arguments to that eect are, by the way, more often than not quite rhetorical in nature, and consist
mainly of obligatory references to the circular nature of, e.g., an explanation of the eect of opium in
terms of its ‘dormative’ power.
15 Getting rid of the non-individual entities would be another task.
16 It is good to note at this point that although naturalism is very much the default position among
linguists in the generative tradition, there are exceptions. An example is provided by Hinzen
and Uriagereka, who defend a non-naturalistic interpretation along the following lines (Hinzen
& Uriagereka 2006, p 71–72):
In our view the metaphysics of linguistics points to a radically dierent ontology of the
mind that invites a rather novel reection on the constraints that delimit the human
conceptual edice, and which to this day have no plausible biological or even physical
explanation. As a consequence of that, the human faculty poses much the same explanatory
problems for contemporary physicalism as the mathematical faculty does.
This is an unorthodox position that deserves further scrutiny. Unfortunately to do so is beyond
the scope of this paper and has to be deferred to another occasion.
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inherently dispositional, i.e., not reducible to structural properties that can serve
as their causal basis. One example is spin of an electron. Cf., Bigaj (2012, p. 212):
Orthodox quantum mechanics does not seem to identify any property which
could play the role of the causal basis for spin.
But also position arguably needs to be considered as a disposition, rather than
a classical property, in view of the probabilistic nature of quantum phenomena. In
fact, this holds across the board, given the very nature of quantum phenomena
(Bigaj 2012, p. 214)]:
The dispositional interpretation of quantum properties is a direct consequence
of the probabilistic character of quantum states.
Thus the dening characteristic of quantum theory, viz., it is inherently probabilistic
character, enforces a dispositional view of its basic objects and their properties.
And according to some this even applies to the very existence of quantum objects.
Cf., Thompson (1988, p. 77):17
In quantum eld theory (a more complete form of quantum physics), even the
existence of objects is a dispositional property that may or may not be manifested,
as, for example, pairs of particles and anti-particles may or may not be formed.
So, taking the lead of science does not force one to do away with dispositions: even the
most fundamental theory of physics does not obey the model of hypothetic-structural
explanation, because, as one might put it, ‘physical reality is dispositional’.
Now this view on physics and its explanatory model is not uncontroversial,
and one might very well maintain that ultimately a fully explanatory theory of
the physical world must satisfy the Groundedness Thesis. Which brings us to
the second question raised above: Even if physics could rely solely on structural
explanations, what reason is there to think that linguistics can too? In order to
answer this question, we need to take a step back and look at what motivates
naturalism in the rst place.
7 The basic claim of naturalism
The core of the naturalistic stance, i.e., the assumption that dierent forms of
naturalism all subscribe to, is that there are no supernatural entities that we
17 Cf., also Suarez (2007) for some further discussion.
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need to appeal to in the construction of adequate, explanatory theories of natural
phenomena. Or, to put it in the form of a slogan: ‘Nature can be explained on
its own terms.’
The reasons for making this claim fall in two broad categories. One is onto-
logical/metaphysical: we need not appeal to supernatural entities because such
entities do not exist, i.e., they are not part of the ontological furniture of the world.
The other is epistemological/methodological: an appeal to supernatural entities is
not needed because such entities do not appear in our explanations, i.e., they do not
belong to the ontological furniture of our theory of the world. These two types of
motivation are not completely independent, of course.
But what counts as a supernatural entity? One way to dene the concept would
be to give a list of what it applies to, i.e., a list of supernatural entities that have
been assumed, conceptualised, or otherwise ‘identied’ over the ages. It would
contain not only well-known concepts from religion, magic and kindred realms, but
also some that did occur in scientic explanations at some point in time: phlogiston,
vital force, . . . . Such an enumeration suggests also a more general characterisation,
which typically proceeds in terms of what a supernatural entity is not:
x counts as a supernatural entity if and only if x lacks relevant features of physical
entities, such as having material constitution, being situated in space-time, being
subject to laws, . . .
To be sure, this is still a fairly general and ‘open’ characterisation, but it will do to
illustrate that the driving force behind naturalism, at least initially, is to avoid
ontological and/or epistemological excess. What does not share basic characteristics
with what nature has on oer does not belong to nature but is (or rather: would be)
of an entirely dierent order.
The reference to physical entities in this characterisation might suggest that
naturalism and physicalism, which holds that all sciences can be reduced, in some
sense, to physics, are actually two sides of the same coin, but that would be too
hasty a conclusion. For note that being a naturalist comes with the commitment to
eschew reference to supernatural entities, not with the much stricter injunction to
refer only to physical entities. What makes its appearance in one’s naturalistic
explanations must have a physical realisation, but that falls short, or so we will
argue, of being a physical entity.
106
What Cost Naturalism?
8 Two avours of naturalism
In order to bring out the dierence we distinguish between two types of naturalism:
conservative, and liberal.18
Conservative naturalism represents the more strict view that not only all natural
entities need to have physical realisations, but that all entities are indeed physical
entities. It is in that respect that liberal naturalism takes a dierent stance: it
agrees with conservative naturalism that all entities need physical realisations, but
nevertheless maintains that not all such entities are therefore physical entities, or
can be reduced to such entities. In other words, liberal naturalism leaves open
the possibility that there are natural entities that are not 100% physical in this
sense that, although they do depend on physical entities that realise them, they can
nevertheless not be reduced to their physical realisations.
It will be clear from the above that there are natural anities between conserva-
tive naturalism and ontological monism, in particular physicalism, and, in its wake,
with methodological monism and explanatory monism. The conservative naturalist
position is indeed, as De Caro and MacArthur quite rightly note, a classical one.
It is strongly committed to the ‘unied science’ ideal of logical positivism in a
physicalistic form: there are no other entities than physical objects and their
properties and relations; everything natural can ultimately be viewed in just those
terms; and hence it is the methodological and explanatory canon of physics that
denes the scientic enterprise as a whole.
Liberal naturalism, on the other hand, embodies a specic kind of ontological
pluralism. It does not recognise any supernatural entities, since it abides with the
core commitment of a naturalistic stance. But it does allow natural entities to come
in dierent kinds which are not reducible one to the other. So liberal naturalism
subscribes to ontological pluralism within the natural world: it recognises dierent
kinds of natural entities as entities in their own right. With that comes the
possibility of methodological and explanatory pluralism: ontological pluralism can
not rule out, but it does not imply it either of course, that the study of dierent kinds
of natural entities calls for dierent methodologies, and also that these dierent
kinds of entities need to be explained in dierent ways.
18 ‘Conservative naturalism’ comes close to what is also called ‘classical’ or ‘scientic’ naturalism;
cf., De Caro & MacArthur (2004).
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It will be clear what determines the choice between conservative and liberal
naturalism: Are there natural phenomena that require for their proper explanation
reference to entities that need physical realisations, so are not supernatural, but
that can not be exhaustively characterised in terms of their physical realisations
and their properties? If no, than conservative naturalism is a viable stance; if yes,
then liberal naturalism is vindicated.
In the next section we will give a number of examples from a variety of disciplines
that suggest that, yes, such entities do exists, and that hence, no, conservative
naturalism is not a viable option in those disciplines. Moreover, we claim that
linguistics is one of these disciplines, so after this brief review we will go into
the question what this means for linguistics as a discipline.19
9 Groups on active duty: some examples
The rst two examples come from biology. The rst concerns the role that groups
might play as vehicles of selection in the evolutionary process. Where the standard
conception of evolution views individuals as the sole instruments in the selection
process, some have argued that we need also to take into account the groups
to which individuals belong, since the eects of behaviour on groups may be
signicant, and hence groups themselves may act as selection vehicles as well.
Although the idea of group selection was entertained by Darwin, it had fallen
in disrepute for a long time. It was revived by Wilson and Sober some twenty
years ago, and since then it has been the subject of a lively debate. This is how
Wilson and Sober motivate the idea in one of their earliest papers (Wilson & Sober
1994, p. 605–606):
There are compelling intellectual and practical reasons to distinguish between be-
haviours that succeed by contributing to group-level organisation and behaviours
that succeed by disrupting group-level organisation. [. . . ] A concern for within-
group versus between-group processes characterises the human mind and should
characterise the study of the human mind as well.
Since its original formulation, the theory of group selection has gone through some
revisions and the debate about has not subsided. But the point for our discussion is
19 To avoid misunderstanding, the examples from other disciplines serve to illustrative the viability of
liberal naturalism as such, not as (additional) arguments for a liberal naturalistic stance in linguistics.
Whether the latter is plausible or not does not depend on the former, of course.
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that if this is on the right track, then selection is a ‘multi-level’ process. It involves
not just individuals, but also groups, which hence have to be regarded as basic,
non-reducible entities: physically realised in their constitutive individuals, but
nevertheless with properties of their own.
The second example from biology concerns trait inheritance. Again, the standard
theory is individualistic, as it locates the inheritance mechanisms solely in the
individual genome, and thus considers that to be the only relevant factor for
phenotypic expression. However, this view arguably ignores the obvious and
important role of other contributing factors. This is how Dupré characterises the
situation (Dupré 2014, p. 81–82):
To expect in general that identiable bits of the genome will have privileged re-
lations to particular traits of the phenotype, given that they do not typically even
have unique relations to particular functional proteins, would be hopelessly unre-
alistic.The notion of the genome as composed of a series of genes ‘for’ particular
phenotypic traits has gone the way of phlogiston. [. . . ] The classicatory divi-
sion of the genome within genomics proper, therefore, is one driven very much
by theoretical considerations, and is little eected by social factors in the inter-
esting sense of ‘social’. If genomics eventually gives us a good understanding of
development, then we might expect to derive real abilities to control developmen-
tal outcomes, human and otherwise. But given the demonstrable complexity of
development and of its joint dependence on internal and environmental factors,
the task is a daunting one.
This goes against a widespread belief that phenotypic expression of inherited traits
is a matter of the individual only, whereas it is quite obvious that environmental
factors of various kinds also play a key role.20 And it seems quite likely that among
these environmental factors are entities that are not individual in nature, such
as kinship and other social groups, economic and social institutions, and so on.
Other scientic disciplines also provide arguments against the individualistic
bias that is a characteristic feature of conservative naturalism. For example, in
20 On the widespread nature of the individualistic bias, cf., Lobo & Shaw (2008):
In an age in which scientists and the public are excited about the sequencing of the entire
human genome, we need to temper that excitement, at least a little, and be careful not
to believe all the hype surrounding genes’ involvement in determining development and be-
haviour. While an organism’s genetic makeup plays a critical role in its development, there
is also a rich and complex interplay between the genome and cues from the environment.
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economics and decision theory the importance of the role of groups, in particular
of such factors as group knowledge and rationality, group intentionality and action,
is increasingly acknowledged. And more and more it becomes clear that the group
properties mentioned can not always be reduced to their individual counterparts.
Witness the ‘Diversity Prediction Theorem’, a mathematical result concerning the
accuracy of group and individual prediction:21
The squared error of the collective prediction equals the average squared error
minus the predictive diversity
What this says is that the prediction of the group as a whole becomes better as
the diversity of the predictions of its members increases. Again, what we have here
is a property of an entity that can not be reduced to properties of its constitutive
members, which means that groups as entities need to be taken on board. And
unlike its conservative counterpart, liberal naturalism allows for that.
And then of course there is an entire tradition in the social sciences that is
naturalistic in its basic stance, yet embraces a social ontology in which such
entities as communities, institutions, practices, and the like play an essential role.
That tradition has many dierent faces, as the works of authors such as Foucault,
Bourdieu, Giddens, Schatzki, and many others illustrates. But they all subscribe
to the starting point that was formulated already in the nineteenth century by
one of the founders of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim (Durkheim 1895):
Here, then, is a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they
consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual,
which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control
over him. Consequently, since they consist of representations and actions, they
cannot be confused with organic phenomena, nor with psychical phenomena,
which have no existence save in and through the individual consciousness. Thus
they constitute a new species and to them must be exclusively assigned the term
social. It is appropriate, since it is clear that, not having the individual as their
substratum, they can have none other than society, either political society in its
entirety or one of the partial groups that it includes – religious denominations,
political and literary schools, occupational corporations, etc.
We take it that these examples, coming from a range of dierent elds, though
not always uncontroversial within the respective disciplines, do illustrate the point
21 Cf., Page (2007).
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that the strict conservative naturalism that many would subscribe to as a matter
of course is not the only option, and in some cases arguably not the right one.
Liberal naturalism seems the way to go.
10 And in linguistics, too
In this section we list just a few of the many phenomena that substantiate the claim
that what was claimed in the previous section holds for linguistics as well. The
point here is not to introduce anything new, as these phenomena are well-known
and extensively studied. Rather it is to emphasise that social entities, used here as a
catch-all phrase to refer to groups, communities, social practices, institutions, and
sundry entities, play a key role in an account of them. And that means that if
we are to explicate the ontological implications of such accounts in a naturalistic
setting we need a liberal naturalism.
First of all, there is the area of speech act theory from which reference to
institutions and institutional practices can not be eliminated. Despite the fact
that in most classical formulations the focus in the analysis of linguistic actions,
and of the intentionality that is involved in them, remains at the individual level,
it is also true that the institutional level is a necessary ingredient of a proper
understanding of many speech acts. A similar argument can be made for the
analysis of linguistic performativity, which also requires the acknowledgement of
institutional frameworks. The ensuing ontological diversity is usually not spelled
out very explicitly, but it is there.
A second example comes from semantics, and is provided by various forms
of semantic externalism and by the phenomenon of the division of linguistic labour.
By its very presuppositions, semantic externalism is at odds with the cognitivist
conception of meaning that locates meaning in the individual’s mind (or brain,
as the case may be). It brings in other factors that co-determine meaning, such
as the physical world in the case of natural kind terms, or the social or cultural
environment in other cases. Especially the latter are hard to account for on a
strictly individual basis. And the same holds for the phenomenon of division of
linguistic labour, with it associated references to dierent subgroups in a linguistic
community. The commitment to a social ontology and the concomitant failure of a
conservative naturalistic stance may not always be very clear from the formal
accounts that have been proposed, but they are there.
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At the interface between semantics and pragmatics we nd a third phenomenon:
that of meaning contextualism. The assumption of stable (‘literal’) meanings is
a prerequisite for the classical individualistic sender – receiver model of linguistic
communication to make sense. It does provided that meanings can be regarded
as individual assets. For only on that assumption does it make sense that meanings
are used (expressed, transmitted) in context. But if meanings themselves depend
on context, such an account is no longer an option. Meaning contextualism
reverses the order of explanation: it is not individual, stable meanings that explain
communication, rather it is the other way around, it is communicative practices
that produce meanings that have (limited) stability. This is how Medina puts it
(Medina 2004, p. 571):
[S]emantic determinacy is the always fragile and relative accomplishment of com-
municative interactions which rest on a tacit agreement in action that is always
undergoing transformation. Meanings become contextually determinate through
the practical consensus achieved by participants in situated linguistic interactions
against the background of shared practices.
And again, it is only when we spell out meaning contextualism that we nd that we
can not make do with a strictly individualistic model, but that we need to accept
communicative practices and the communities in which they exists as bona de
denizens of our theoretical framework. The point can be strengthened further
by pointing to such a phenomenon as successful communication with incomplete
understanding. Just like the phenomena just mentioned this is something that
lies outside the grasp of a linguistic theory that embraces conservative naturalism
and its strict individualism.22
22 At this point it may be good to point out that in many explicitly non-Chomskyean paradigms, in which
semantics and pragmatics are considered to be intrinsic parts of linguistic theory, methodological
individualism still plays a role. Here is an example from construction grammar, cf., the following
passage in Goldberg (1995):
Theorists working in this theory [i.e., construction grammar, ms-mvl] share an interest in
characterising the entire class of structures that make up language, not only the structures
that are dened to be part of ‘core grammar’. This interest stems from the belief that
fundamental insights can be gained from considering such non-core cases, in that the
theoretical machinery that accounts for non-core cases can be used to account for core cases.
[. . . ] Construction Grammarians also share an interest in accounting for the conditions
under which a given construction can be used felicitously, since this is take to be part of the
speakers’ competence or knowledge of language; from this interest stems the conviction
that subtle semantic and pragmatic factors are crucial to understanding the constraints on
grammatical constructions.
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11 Liberal naturalism and the dispositional view
So it seems that a comprehensive account of language needs the liberal natural-
istic perspective, i.e., a framework that can accommodate both individual and
social dimensions of language and language use, and that is not committed to
the hypthetico-structuralist model as the only respectable type of explanation,
and that thus makes room for the incorporation of dispositional properties at the
individual level and for social entities as autonomous elements in its ontology.
Of course groups, social practices, and so on, are not not supernatural entities,
they have physical realisations in the natural world. What is important to note
here is that, in general, the physical realisations of these social entities are not
ontologically homogeneous. In some cases, specic parts of such a realisation may
be identied with individual language users. But others pertain to quite dierent
kinds of entities, such as implements, historical records, spatial congurations, and
other material aspects. And yet others need to be explained in terms of properties
of collectives, such as group intentionality and group knowledge.
This has important consequences, since it paves the way for ontological plu-
ralism, viz., the acknowledgement of dierent categories of natural entities that are
irreducible one to the other. Reduction of behavioural and psychological properties
of groups and institutions and their practices, to properties of the individuals that
realise them is not always possible. And even the individual behavioural and
psychological properties that are involved cannot be reduced, as conservative natu-
ralism would require, to underlying structural properties at the neurophysiological
level, at least not in a signicant sense.
Thus the picture that emerges is pluralistic in a number of ways. First of
all, it comprises dierent kinds of individual entities, not just human language
users. Second, it acknowledges collectives of such individuals, such as linguistic
communities, as entities in their own right. And thirdly, it allows not just for
the structural properties of the entities involved to play an explanatory role, but
also for their dispositions.
This requires an explanatory model that can integrate these various aspects
in such a way that the dierent components and their interactions can all be
Obviously, the scope of linguistic theory as it is conceived of here is wider than in the generative
paradigm. But note that the central role of the individual is still present: linguistic competence
may be a more encompassing notion but it still remains an individual aair
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accounted for. An example of such a model, taken from Vanderbeeken & Weber
(2002), is given in gure 1.
     triggering causes: 
    Situation of type S 
Behavior    
  
structuring causes: 
    Disposition D 
 
 
specifying D:             explaining D:  remote causes 
• social history 
• biological history 
• personal history 
internal causal basis 
•mental terms 
•naturalistic terms 
Figure 1: Dispositions in explanations
Not only does a model such as this make room for dispositions as an explanatory
factor, it also allows for an account of the complex interactions between different
kinds of causal factors, among which are dispositions, structural factors, and en-
vironmental factors. A model along these lines thus seems much more adequate
for dealing with the rich and varied phenomena that language and language use are.
12 The role of linguistic theory in liberal naturalism
But what, one may (and should) ask, is the role of linguistic theory in such a
complex model?
Marr (Marr 1977) usefully distinguished between two types of theories of cogni-
tive phenomena. ‘Type 1’ theories are theories in which one can distinguish Marr’s
famous three levels. The top level is like the competence models of linguistics
– it species in mathematical terms the inputs and outputs of a cognitive process
(such as, on one view, language production and comprehension) viewed as an
information processing task. Once the top level is specied one can construct
algorithms meeting the specications and compare these algorithms with respect
to neural implementability. It is characteristic of a type 1 theory that its inputs and
outputs can be described formally, and this makes it doubtful whether linguistics
can be regarded as a type 1 theory. Before we substantiate these doubts, we quote
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Marr’s very interesting description of the alternative, ‘type 2’ theories, which apply
when (Marr 1977, pp. 38–39):
[. . . ] a problem is solved by the simultaneous action of a considerable number of
processes, whose interaction is its own simplest description.[. . . ] At each moment
only a few of the possible interactions will be important, but the importance of
those few is decisive. Attempts to construct a simplied theory must ignore some
interactions; but if most interactions are crucial at some stage [. . . ] a simplied
theory will prove inadequate.
Indeed, in language comprehension, the input may itself be the product of interact-
ing processes, in the following sense: a piece of discourse may seem uninterpretable
gibberish (even though not obviously ungrammatical), until interaction with a
non-verbal information source restores sense to the discourse. A classic example
of this phenomenon is the experiment in Bransford & Johnson (1972), in which
subjects were presented with the following discourse, supposedly from a man
muttering to himself:
If the balloons popped, the sound wouldn’t be able to carry since everything
would be too far away from the correct oor. A closed window would also prevent
the sound from carrying, since most buildings tend to be well insulated. Since the
whole operation depends on a steady ow of electricity, a break in the middle of
the wire would also cause problems. Of course, the fellow could shout, but the
human voice is not loud enough to carry that far. An additional problem is that a
string could break on the instrument. Then there could be no accompaniment to
the message. It is clear that the best situation would involve less distance. Then
there would be fewer potential problems. With face to face contact, the least
number of things could go wrong.
Some subjects were shown gure 2 before they had to interpret the discourse.
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Figure 2: A modern serenade
These subjects could adequately recall and summarise the discourse. By contrast,
subjects who were shown the picture after the discourse or not all, were unable
to summarise or even recall the discourse. Thus the hearer must have access to
the speaker’s ‘situation model’ to be able to interpret the discourse. Realistically,
this means that the hearer, starting from a few clues concerning the speaker’s
situation model, elaborates the situation model and interprets the discourse in
an interactive and defeasible manner. Since making the picture available after the
speaker has stopped talking does not benet the hearer, processing must obey the
‘principle of immediacy’ , i.e., ‘all available information will immediately be used to
co-determine the interpretation of the speaker’s message’ (Hagoort & Berkum 2007,
p. 801). If one adopts this processing principle, linguistics cannot be a type 1 theory.
13 Conclusion
Although much more detail needs to be added, we do think that the considerations
given in this paper support the conclusion that an adequate account of language
and language use needs a liberal naturalistic perspective. The main reason is
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that language manifests itself in categorically distinct ontological entities, and
methodological individualism does not succeed in constructing an ontologically
homogeneous base for this variety. We have to accept that language is ontologically
heterogenous and explanatorily not uniform. And the way in which a conservative
naturalistic view is defended in the literature supports the claim that theories that
aim to give a uniform explanation based on a homogeneous ontology are informed
by some form of ideologically informed reductionism.
An alternative, liberal naturalistic view, which is ontologically, methodological
and explanatory heterogeneous seems to be called for, and a dispositional account
of several aspects of language and language use needs to be incorporated in such a
view. The role of linguistic theory in this alternative view is to provide a systematic
description of certain properties of linguistic expressions that can be part of such
an encompassing account of language and its use. This means that linguistic theory
must be viewed as one methodology among many, that deals with one particular
aspect among many, of a heterogeneous phenomenon. Viewed in this way linguistic
theory oers a conceptual reconstruction of certain aspects of language that also
may suggest further empirical investigations. That is an important element of
our investigations, but not the nal word: linguistic theory is not an explanatory
theory of a distinct empirical phenomenon.
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Measuring out the relation between
formal and conceptual semantics
Tillmann Pross & Antje Roßdeutscher*
In this paper, we argue that contemporary approaches of constructionalist syntax
in which there is no generative lexicon provide an interface between formal and
conceptual semantics with which the gap between formal and conceptual semantics
can be bridged. We introduce the framework with the discussion of formal and
conceptual aspects of meaning in German spatial denominal prex- and particle
verbs. We then show the representation of both formal and conceptual semantics in
the same framework that allows to measure out the relation between formal and
conceptual semantics in terms of the distribution of direct objects over verbs and
corroborate our proposal with a corpus study.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we perceive the ’gap’ between formal and conceptual semantics
as pertaining to the dierent principles according to which the formal semantics of
sentences and the conceptual semantics of lexical items is derived. On the one
hand, the formal semantics of a sentence is determined compositionally from the
meanings of the constituents of the sentence according to the syntactic analysis
of the sentence. On the other, the meaning of a word is determined by the
arrangement of elements from a xed set of basic concepts in a lexical entry
where the arrangement is not governed by syntactic structures similar to that
of sentences.
* This work was supported by a DFG grant to the project B4 ’Lexikalische Information und ihre
Entfaltung im Kontext von Wortbildung, Satz und Diskurs’, as part of the Collaborative Research
Center 732 Incremental Specication in Context at the University of Stuttgart.
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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In order to bridge the gap between formal and conceptual semantics, we propose
to make use of a logical form framework in which the perceived gap between
formal and conceptual semantics does not manifest itself in a dierence of the
derivation of meaning in words and sentences. Instead, in the proposed framework,
word meaning, and in particular the meaning of morphologically complex words,
is structured according to the same syntactic principles underlying the structure
of sentence meaning. Our approach is introduced with the discussion of spatial
German denominal prex- and particle-verbs (henceforth short ’p-verbs’) as in (1).
(1) abstützen (to support), aufbahren (to lay sb. out), aufbocken (to jack up), aufkan-
ten (to tilt sth.), aufstocken (to ramp up), einlagern (to put in a store) einsacken
(to bag sth.), einkellern (to store), einkerkern (to incarcerate), einsperren (to
cage), überbrücken (to bridge), überdecken (to cover), überdeckeln (to cover
with a lid), überpastern (to cobble), ummauern (to wall), umzäunen (to fence
in), unterfüttern (to reline), untermauern (to support), untertunneln (to tunnel
under), verstreben (to strut)
Based on a detailed analysis of the p-verbs in (2) at the syntax-semantics interface,
we show how in our approach the formal components of word meaning can be
separated from the conceptual components of word meaning.
(2) a. eine
a
Terrasse
terrace
überdachen
over.prfx.roof
to roof a terrace
b. einen
a
Dachstuhl
truss
abstützen
up.prtc.stilt
to prop up a truss
c. eine
a
Flasche
bottle
in
in
den
the
Keller
cellar
einlagern
in.prtc.store
to put a bottle in the cellar
Furthermore, we argue that the separation of formal and conceptual meaning in
a word allows to correlate the relation between formal and conceptual meaning in a
p-verb with the restrictions on llers of argument slots imposed by the p-verb.
More specically, we propose that the relation between formal and conceptual
meaning in a given p-verb can be measured out in terms of the distribution of
possible llers of argument slots over p-verbs which in turn provides a linguistic
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characterization of conceptual meaning independent of assumptions about the
cognitive structures underlying conceptual meaning.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide some background on
the syntax-semantics framework that we employ and relate it to previous approaches
to p-verbs in the tradition of lexical decomposition grammar. We illustrate our
syntax-semantics interface with the discussion of the three examples of p-verbs in (2)
in section 3. The focus of our analysis is on emphasizing the differences between
the formal and conceptual constituents of the meaning of those p-verbs. Next, in
section 4, we relate the differences in the meaning of p-verbs to the restrictions
which these p-verbs impose on the selection of direct objects. We generalize the
observations about divergence in selectional preferences with a statistical measure
known as selectional preference strength in section 5 and discuss the results of a
proof-of-concept corpus study in section 6. We conclude in section 7.
2 Pervasive semantics
2.1 Decomposition in the lexicon
The assumption that the representation of word meaning in the lexicon is structured
(and not purely denotational) proved to be a fruitful starting point for the decompo-
sition of meaning in the lexicon to conceptual structures such as ’semantic forms’
(Bierwisch 2007, Wunderlich 2012), ’event structure templates’ (Rappaport Hovav
& Levin 1998), ’dot-types’ (Asher 2011, Pustejovsky 2001), ’frames’ or ’scenarios’
(Fillmore 1982, Hamm et al. 2006). But what all these approaches share is the
assumption that word meaning is determined in the lexicon according to principles
dierent from the principles which apply to the determination of sentence meaning
in the syntax. It is the assumption of a principal dierence between the structure
of meaning in the lexicon and the structure of meaning in sentences which we
think causes the gap between conceptual and formal meaning. In formal semantics,
sentence meaning is determined by the compositional interpretation of the syntac-
tic structure of the sentence. In lexical semantics, word meaning is determined
by ’at’ conceptual structures built from a set of basic concepts or fundamental
constituents of meaning. Denominal p-verbs in particular have been in the focus of
interest for lexical decomposition approaches, where it is assumed that a noun
is incorporated with a lexical process into an abstract verbal template (Kaufmann
1995, Stiebels 1998). As an illustration, consider the semantic form that (Stiebels
123
Tillmann Pross & Antje Roßdeutscher
1998, p. 289) proposes for the denominal spatial p-verb unterkellern (build a cellar
under sth.) in (3), see also (Roßdeutscher 2011,2013a) for a comparison of lexical
decomposition with the present approach.
(3) Lexical entry for unterkellern:
λy.λxλs.CAUSE(x,BECOME(POSS(y, CELLAR)))(s)
∧BECOME(LOC(CELLAR UNDER[y]))(s)
The semantic form (3) involves six dierent conceptual predicates CAUSE, BECOME,
POSS, CELLAR, LOC and UNDER. unterkellern itself does not indicate the arrange-
ment of these predicates. Also, the meaning of the conceptual predicates must be
given in terms of a pre-theoretic language grounded in assumptions about the
structure of human cognition such that paraphrases of the meaning of unterkellern
as provide an object x with a cellar such that the cellar is located under x can be
provided a reasonable interpretation. It is also assumed that each of the conceptual
predicates encodes a number of additional constraints on the type of arguments it
takes, e.g. that for a cellar to be located under an object, this object must provide a
region in its underground (see (4a)). Similarly, the combinatorics of conceptual
predicates must prevent an incoherent combination as in (4b). Furthermore, the
conceptual predicates must license only appropriate modications and rule out
examples such as (4c). Taken together, the constituents (conceptual predicates) and
principles of meaning formation (cognitively motivated processes) in the lexicon
are fundamentally dierent from those constituents (words) and principles of
meaning formation (compositional interpretation of syntactic structure) that have
been employed with great success in the analysis of sentence meaning.
(4) a. *ein
an
Flugzeug
airplane
unterkellern
under.prfx.cellar
b. *ein
a
Haus
house
überkellern
over.prfx.cellar
c. *ein
a
Haus
house
mit
with
Wasser
water
unterkellern
under.prfx.cellar
Acknowledging these dierences in scope and motivation and grossly generalizing,
formal semantics is concerned with how meaning is derived compositionally from
sequences of words but not what the fundamental constituents of meaning are
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and how they pattern in words. Lexical semantics is concerned with how the
fundamental constituents of meaning pattern in words under the assumption that
the meaning of words must be explained with the help of non-linguistic conceptual
knowledge. In the following, we propose that bridging the gap between formal and
conceptual semantics can be accomplished in an account of word-formation in
which there is no generative lexicon but word-formation is entirely syntactic and
consequently, the same semantic principles apply to words and sentences.
2.2 Pervasive Syntax
In pervasive syntax approaches to word formation (e.g. Hale & Keyser 1993, Marantz
1997, Alexiadou 2001, Borer 2005), the same syntactic principles are assumed to be at
work below and above the ’word level’. Words are formed from ’roots’, atomic,
non-decomposable and category-neutral elements associated with encyclopedic
knowledge. Roots combine with features to build larger linguistic elements. Conse-
quently, the term ’lexical item’ has no significance in the theory and nothing can be
said to ’happen in the lexicon’. We take the idea of pervasive syntactic structure
all the way down as an inspiration for the development of a similarly pervasive
semantics. We assume a fairly standard minimalist syntax of phrase structure with
move and merge (Chomsky 1995, Adger 2003) and that incorporation is governed by
the head movement constraint (Travis 1984). We also assume a minimalist approach
to argument structure, where argument structure is determined in the syntax (Hale
& Keyser 1993) and a structural parallelism across the nominal (cf. Alexiadou 2001),
verbal (cf. Harley 2011) and prepositional (cf. Svenonius 2003) domain.
The basic – and fairly standard – syntax of denominal verbs which we take
as the starting point for our discussion is given in (5), (6) and (7).
(5) eine Terrasse bedachen
to roof a terrace
(6) eine Flasche lagern
to store a bottle
(7) einen Patienten stützen
to support a patient
vP
v
v
√
dach
PP
P’
nP
√
dach——-n
P
be
DP
eine Ter-
rasse
vP
v
v
√
lager
PP
P’
nP
√
lager——n
P
∅
DP
eine
Flasche
vP
v
v
√
stütz
PP
P’
nP
√
stütz——n
P
∅
DP
einen Pa-
tienten
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The structure of each of the examples (5), (6) and (7) evolves from the insertion
of a root
√
into a nominal phrase template. The nominal phrase is merged with
a prepositional head P which projects a phrase structure the specier of which
is a DP. Independent of whether P is overtly realized with the prex be- (as in
(5)) or not (as in (6), (7)) P has the same syntactic and semantic function. Finally, the
prepositional phrase is merged with a verbalizer head v, into which the nominal
root incorporates via head movement.
2.3 Pervasive Semantics
In our approach of pervasive semantics, the semantics of (morphologically complex)
words is not reconstructed in the lexicon but in the syntax. The starting point
of our reconstructions is the insertion of a root into a syntactic context which
determines the category of the root. The semantics of the root in that particular
insertion context is incrementally specied by the semantic interpretation of the
syntactic structure of the insertion context. That is, one and the same root can have
dierent meanings, depending on the syntactic context in which it is inserted
and interpreted. For example, the same root
√
lager can show up in the verb
lagern (to store) and the noun Lager (the store), depending on the syntactic context
into which
√
lager is inserted. As we have seen in the examples (5)-(7), syntactic
contexts for root insertion have a functional structure determined by the layering of
functional heads and their projections. In fact, functional heads have a categorizing
function in the syntax we pursue. Heads of verbal phrases vP categorize verbs,
heads of nominal phrases nP categorize nouns and heads of prepositional phrases
PP categorize prepositions. The layering of functional structure also implies that in
“a ’pervasive syntax’ approach to morphologically complex forms [. . . ] the analysis
and structures proposed for a form must also be contained within the analysis
of any structure derived from that form” (Harley 2009, p.320).
The hierarchy and modular organization of functional structure determined in
the syntax requires a similar organization of the compositional semantic interpreta-
tion of the syntactic structure. Consequently, we propose that each functional
head in the syntax is responsible for the introduction and predication of a par-
ticular sort of discourse referents. Put another way: functional layers in the
syntax correspond to the ontological building blocks of word meaning. For ex-
ample, v introduces events: e, P introduces states: s, n introduces invididuals: x,
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Place introduces regions (sets of bounded directed vectors): r and K(ase) intro-
duces Eigenspace-vectors: rid (Wunderlich 1991). We also propose that the same
close-knit connection between syntax and semantics holds for the introduction of
conceptual predicates such as that between an event and its result state, i.e. the
conceptual predicate CAUSE. Roßdeutscher & Kamp (2010) argue that the syntactic
conguration which gives rise to the CAUSE predicate is one in which a verbalizer
v is merged with a state-denoting XP to the eect that the event introduced by e is
conceptualized as that event of which the state denoted by the XP is its result.
Of particular interest to this paper are those conceptual relations that arise from
the syntactic conguration of a merge of a P head with an XP, among them the
application of one object to another object APPLICATION, the support of one
object by another object SUPPORT, and the relative location of an object AT. To
identify the conditions for the introduction of conceptual predicates from a merger
of P and an XP, we need to make precise what exactly it is that application, support
or location is a conceptualization of, i.e. how the denotation of the XP with which P
merges inuences the conceptual predication over the merge of P and the XP. To
this end, we propose to take into account that the denominal verbs which we focus
on in this paper involve an additional meaning component. Verbs like überdachen
or einlagern identify a spatial conguration of the nominal root of the verb and the
direct object of the verb. For example, überdachen in (8a) describes an event in
which an object – the roof – is brought into the region above some other object
– the terrace. einlagern as in (8b) describes an event in which an object – the bottle –
is brought into a location inside of another object – the store. abstützen as in (8c)
describes an event in which an object – the truss – is provided with pillars in
its below region.
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(8) a. eine
a
Terrasse
terrace
überdachen
over.prfx.roof
to roof a terrace
b. eine
a
Flasche
bottle
einlagern
in.prtc.store
to store a bottle
c. einen
a
Dachstuhl
truss
abstützen
up.prtc.stilt
to prop up a truss
(9) vP
vPP
P’
SpaceP
np
√
n
Space
P
DP
Spatial congurations of the type described in (8a)-(8c) can be represented as
conditions on vector spaces: (Zwarts 1997, 2005, Zwarts & Winter 2000) proposed a
formal semantics for spatial expressions built from vector spaces in which the
denotation of objects is their Eigenspace and spatial congurations are formally
dened in terms of structural constraints on sets of vectors such as spatial inclusion
(represented as “⊆”) or being a set of vectors which point upwards from a reference
object x (represented as “↑(x)”), giving the ’above region’ of x. For example, in
terms of vector space semantics, (8a) is true i the Eigenspace of the roof used
to cover the terrace is located in the above region of the terrace and the above
region of the terrace is covered by the Eigenspace of the roof. Similarly, (8b) is true
i the Eigenspace of the bottle is a subset of the vectors dening the interior space
of the store. Finally, (8c) is true i the Eigenspaces of the pillars have contact
with and are located in the below region of the truss.
It is obvious even from these informal elaborations that just the spatial congura-
tions described by (8a)-(8c) are not sucient as characterizations of the meaning
of (8a)-(8c). What is necessary in addition is a conceptualization of the spatial
conguration as a conguration of support, application or inclusion. Earlier we
said that the conceptualization of support, application or inclusion is realized with
the merge of P and an XP and we are now in a position to make more precise
what the XP with which P merges is about. P merges with an XP describing a
spatial conguration. To keep the formal characterization of the spatial cong-
uration in terms of vector space semantics apart from the conceputalization of a
spatial conguration as a certain relation holding between objects, we call the
functional head of the XP with which P merges ’Space’. The syntactic structure of
denominal verbs taking into account their spatial semantics is thus a renement of
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the basic structure in (5), (6) and (7): it contains an additional functional layer
SpaceP inbetween the functional PP layer and the root nP, see (9).
The syntactic structure in (9) provides two main switching points for the semantic
interpretation. On the one hand, there is the Space functional layer responsible
for the computation of the spatial conguration of vectors described by the verb.
On the other, there is the P functional layer responsible for the conceptualization of
the spatial conguration of vectors as a certain conceptual relation between objects.
The dierence is that not any vector space object can be conceptualized as a roof or
a terrace, because a roof or a terrace is more than just their geometry and location,
a roof is associated with a certain concept and so is a terrace. Conceptually, a roof is
“a protective covering that covers or forms the top of a building” (Wordnet search,
Fellbaum 1998) and a terrace is a “usually paved outdoor area adjoining a residence”
(Wordnet search). That is, the function of P conceptualizing a spatial conguration
is to check whether the concepts associated with the vector-space object can be
coherently predicated as standing in a conceptual relation of support, application
or inclusion based on the contribution of SpaceP. This is the syntactic ’locus’ where
the incoherent examples in (4a), (4b) and (4c) are ltered out. The structural split of
formal and conceptual aspects of meaning has two welcome consequences. First,
formal and conceptual aspects of meaning are not located in dierent places as in
customary approaches that distinguish a lexicon and the syntax-semantics interface.
Second, the unied treatment of formal and conceptual aspects of meaning in the
same system of linguistic interpretation allows to assess the distinction between
formal and conceptual aspects of meaning from a perspective that is based on
linguistic evidence rather than on the distinction between lexicon and sentence that
must be motivated by dierent evidence, e.g. assumptions about the architecture of
the human cognitive system à la lexical decomposition grammar. Before we explore
the issue of the relation between formal and conceptual semantics in full detail
in section 4, we now turn to an in-depth analysis of three examples of spatial
denominal p-verbs.
3 Example analyses
3.1 überdachen
The rst example of a denominal spatial p-verb which we would like to discuss in
more detail is überdachen as in (10). (10) is exemplary for a class of spatial denominal
129
Tillmann Pross & Antje Roßdeutscher
p-verbs involving a conceptual relation of application. This class includes verbs
such as ummauern (to wall), überpastern (to cobble), umzäunen (to fence in),
aufstocken (to ramp up), überdeckeln (to cover with a lid), überdecken (to cover),
untertunneln (to tunnel under) and überbrücken (to bridge).
(10) eine
a
Terrasse
terrace
überdachen
over.prfx.roof
The reconstruction (11) of (10) at the syntax-semantics interface contains only the
main steps of interpretation and is thus grossly simplified. In particular, we use free
variables in the lower parts of the structure that would enter the representation
only higher up in a compositional analysis. The representations we use are to be
understood in the spirit of those representations used in Discourse Representation
Theory (Kamp et al. 2011). For überdachen and the next example einlagern, a detailed
reconstruction making explicit all step of composition is given in the appendix. In
(11), all constituents in the syntactic representation are in situ. Under the assumption
of a functional split between formal and conceptual semantics in the syntax, we
distinguish two aspects of the compositional semantic structure of p-verbs.
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(11) eine Terrasse überdachen
vP
r1, rid, y, s, e
terrace(y) eCAUSEs r1 = above− reg(y)
s :
x
APPL(y, x) roof(x) rid(x) ⊆ r1
v
e
PP
P’
SpaceP
PlaceP
KP
nP
x
roof(x)
√
dachn
K
r2
r2 = rid(x)
Place
r1
r1 = above− region(y)
√
überPlace
Space
r2 ⊆ r1
P
∅
s
s : APPL(y, x)
DP
eine Terrasse
y
terrace(y)
Starting at the bottom of the representation, the root
√
über introduces a region
(indicated by the head Place) which is the above-region of the terrace. The root√
dach is inserted into a nP context which is selected by KP so as to reconstruct the
Eigenspace rid of the entity denoted by nP. SpaceP relates the region denoted
by PlaceP with the Eigenspace denoted by
√
dach + KP so as to express the spatial
truth-conditions expressed by the phrase consisting of the p-verb and its direct
object, i.e. that the Eigenspace of
√
dach is contained in the above region of the
reference object.
On top of SpaceP, P is responsible for conceptualizing the vector space semantics
calculated at SpaceP. In the present example, P conceptualizes the containment
of the Eigenspace of
√
dach in the above region of the reference object as the
application of a roof to the reference object. Conceptualization of the abstract
truth-conditions at SpaceP as an instance of application requires that roofs and
terraces are not just geometrical objects. In order to enter the conceptual application
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relation in a coherent way, the geometrical objects representing terrace and roof
must be conceptualized as a terrace or roof. We will discuss our implementation of
conceptual coherence in more detail in section 4.
Finally, the representation of the vP-node is to be read as follows: the state-
denoting PP is merged with v, giving rise to the conceptualization as eCAUSEs,
i.e. that the result state of the event of application described consists in the terrace
y having a roof x and that the eigenregion of the roof, rid(x), is a included in the
above-region r1 of the terrace. The variable x and its characterising condition
roof(x) are part of an inaccessible sub-DRS, representing incorporation.
What is important for the argument we want to put forward in this paper is that
both conceptual and formal aspects of meaning are encoded by the same principles
of semantic composition. Consequently, the dierence between conceptual and
formal meaning does not manifest in the same way as it does in the opposition
between lexical and sentence meaning. Rather, what the analysis of überdachen
suggests is that the distinction of conceptual and formal meaning is more ne-
grained than the binary lexical vs. sentence distinction. In particular, the way
in which we represented the semantics of überdachen encodes both formal and
conceptual aspects of meaning linguistically, i.e. without recurse to a language-
independent structuring of conceptual predicates. For überdachen, we located
the contribution of conceptual meaning in the constraints that conceptualization
puts on the interpretation of formal meaning, i.e. in the selection of appropriate
denominal roots, prexes and direct objects. überdachen constitutes a case in which
such selection restrictions are relevant to all constituents of verbal phrases in which
überdachen occurs. We will see in the next two examples that this does not always
need to be the case.
3.2 einlagern
The next example which we would like to discuss in more detail is einlagern (to
store). (12) is exemplary for a class of p-verbs involving the conceptual relation
of location, among them einsacken (to bag sth.), einsperren (to cage), einkellern
(to store), einkerkern (to incarcerate).
(12) eine
a
Flasche
bottle
(in
(in
den
the
Keller)
cellar)
einlagern
in.prtc.store
put a bottle in the cellar
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einlagern is a particle verb, see (13).
(13) Peter
Peter
lagert
store.V
die
a
Flasche
bottle
ein
in.prtc
Peter stores a bottle
Syntactically, the particle verb einlagern has a particle-phrase pP on top of the de-
nominal vP, see (15). This construction prevents the incorporation of the particle ein
into the verb via the head movement constraint. The pP contributes the information
that the bottle becomes stored inside a location. It should be noted that even if the
location in which the direct object of einlagern ends up is not mentioned explicitly,
it is nevertheless presupposed part of the meaning of einlagern that there is a distinct
location inside of which the object to be stored ends up. The interior space of the
denominal root can be picked up with a locative PP such as in den Keller (in the
cellar), compare (12). To see why the constraint that the final location of the direct
object ends up inside the space provided by the nominal root is contributed by the
particle ein, consider the verb lagern without the particle as in (14).
(14) Peter
Peter
lagert
store.V
Holz
wood
auf
on
dem
the
Boden
ground
Peter stores wood on the ground
Lagern on its own does not come with the requirement that its direct object must be
located inside the space provided by its nominal root, because any distinct place
will be suitable to store an object. Geometrically, lagern requires that its direct
object is located in space relative to another object or landmark. This boils down to
the requirement that the direct object has an Eigenspace and that this Eigenspace
can be located in space. In contrast, the contribution of ein in einlagern is that
it additionally requires that the direct object is located inside a store and not just at
a certain location. That is, the dierence between lagern and einlagern is that
lagern only requires a specied location of the direct object where it remains for
some contextually specied time whereas einlagern makes explicit that the direct
object is moved into a certain place. Consequently, in the pP structure, we have
a gure-ground relation between the bottle and the cellar, where the bottle ends up
in the cellar.
133
Tillmann Pross & Antje Roßdeutscher
Semantically, the specic syntax of the particle construction in which the con-
tribution of the particle ein is considered only above the denominal vP leads to
a conguration in which there are two states s1 and s2 responsible for the con-
ceptualization of two dependent geometrical congurations. s2 represents that
state which conceptualizes the location of the direct object with respect to the
denominal root. s1 further species this location as a location inside the space
provided by the denominal root. However, the states s1 and s2 are result states
of the same event event e. That is, particle constructions of the type exemplied by
einlagern involve a ’double predication’ of the result state relative to the denominal
root. We thus assume that s1 and s2 are unied as results of the event dened
by the merge of pP and vP but are semantically distinct.
What is important to the goals of this paper is that in (12) the conceptualization
of the geometry with LOC resp. IN does not impose restrictions which are not
already structurally conveyed at SpaceP, namely that the location of the bottle is
xed with respect to a certain region or place: at(r1, r2) and that the Eigenspace of
the bottle is included in the Eigenspace of the store r1 ⊆ r2. In other words, unlike
in (überdachen), the conceptual meaning of einlagern does not eect interpretation
in the form selection restrictions on possible llers of the argument slot for the
direct object.
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(15) eine Flasche in einen Keller einlagern
vP
e, s, t, u
bottle(t) cellar(u) eCAUSEs
r1 ⊆ r2
s : IN(t, u) s :
x
store(x) at(rid(t), rid(x)) LOC(x, t)
vP
v
e
PP
SpaceP
KP
nP
x
store(x)
√
lagern
K
r3
r3 = rid(x)
Space
at(r1, r3)
P
s2
s2 : LOC(x, t)
pP
p’
p√
ein
figure(t, u)
PlaceP
SpaceP
DP
KP
nP
Keller
u
cellar(u)
K
r2
r2 = rid(u)
einen
Space
r1 ⊆ r2
P
s1
s1:IN(t, u)
√
inP
DP
eine Flasche
t, r1
bottle(t)
r1 = rid(t)
3.3 abstützen
The nal example (16) is exemplary of a class of denominal p-verbs which involves
the conceptual relation of SUPPORT, among them aufbocken (to jack up), verstreben
(to strut), untermauern (to support), unterfüttern (to reline), aufkanten (to tilt sth.)
and aufbahren (to lay sb. out).
(16) einen
a
Dachstuhl
truss
abstützen
under.prtc.stilt
to prop up a truss
Like einlagern, abstützen is a particle verb and thus has a similar syntax and
semantics in which a particle phrase is merged with a denominal verb phrase
and the denominal root is subject to double predication by both the verb and the
particle. Despite these structural similarities, the the contribution of the particle
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structure with
√
ab as its prepositional element is of a dierent nature than the
contribution of ein in einlagern.
We propose that the geometrical relation involved in the reconstruction of (16)
is a relation of contact between an object x and a face r of another object . We
represent contact between x and r as x@r  (rid(x)
⋂
r 6= ∅)). But for the
conceptualization of SUPPORT, geometrical contact between objects is not enough
because there are lots of geometrical contact relations which are not relations
of support, e.g. a bubblegum adhering at the bottom of a table has contact with
a face of the table but it does not support the table. Instead, the conceptualization of
SpaceP with the relation SUPPORT between the nominal root
√
stütz (pillar,
stilt), the particle ab and the direct object Dachstuhl is quite complex in (17).
(17) einen Dachstuhl abstützen
vP
e, s, p, t, r, f
truss(t) r(t) eCAUSEs
s :
x
stilt(x) rid(x)@r(t) SUPPORT (x, t)
s : f(t) = 0
p = magnitude(f(t))
p = {pi|pi + 1 ≤ pi}
p ≥ 0
vP
e
PP
SpaceP
KP
nP
x
stilt(x)
√
stützn
K
r1
r1 = rid(x)
Space
r1
r1@r(t)
P
s2
s2 : SUPPORT (x, t)
ppassP
ppass
s1
s1 : f(t) = 0
ScaleP
DP
einen
Dachstuhl
t
truss(t)
Scale
p, f
p = magnitude(f(t))
p = {pi|pi + 1 ≤ pi}
p ≥ 0
√
abScale
To identify the specic contribution of the particle ab, let us consider the vP
branch of the structure representing the contribution of the nominal root
√
stütz.
The vP branch derives the verb stützen (to support) as in (18).
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(18) einen
a
Patienten
patient
stützen
stilt.V
to support a patient
stützen does not imply that the force exerted on the direct object is completely
absorbed but the direct object itself absorbs some portion of the forces exerted on it.
In contrast, the contribution of the particle ab in abstützen is that the forces exerted
on the direct object are completely absorbed in the course of the event described.
Conceptually, we model this contribution of ab in terms of ab contributing a
decreasing scale p = {pi|pi + 1 ≤ pi} of magnitudes of the net force f(t) exerted
on the direct object t. From this point of view, what abstützen describes is an event
which is made up from a sequence of change of states each of which results in a
lower point on the scale of net forces exerted on the truss. In plain words, abstützen
describes an event of incremental reduction of the net force exerted on its direct
object. This event is bounded by a particular state, namely that state in which
the net force exerted on the truss becomes zero. The approach we just sketched
receives further support from constructions in which the incremental nature of
the supporting event and its boundedness is made explicit with a mit/(with)-PPs
involving genügend (sucient) as a description of the event boundary, see (19)
(19) den
the
Dachstuhl
truss
mit
with
genügend
sucient
Balken
timber
abstützen
under.prtc.stilt
to support a truss suciently with timber
We render the intuitions about the contribution of the ab-particle with a con-
struction in which a ppass head quanties over a sequence of states of decreased
net force and the event modied with ab pertains to the sum of the states quantied
by ppass. Formally, our analysis in (17) is based on (Roßdeutscher 2012,2013b)’s
proposal for such ’passive’ p constructions. In analogy to verbal passives where the
agent is demoted and the theme is promoted, in passive p-constructions the gure
is demoted and the ground is promoted. For einlagern, the direct object is the gure
whereas the nominal root plays the role of the ground. In abstützen, there is no
explicit gure. Instead, the ground (if we would still call it like this) – the truss – is
promoted as the direct object of abstützen: dierent from einen Keller in (15), which
receives prepositional accusative case, einen Dachstuhl does not and leaves the
ppass-phrase in order to receive accusative case in vP.
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The semantic eect of ppass is a quantication over the elements of the implicit
resp. demoted gure, i.e. the decrease in net force on the truss that the timber stilts
that are moved into the below-region of the truss bring with them. The eect
of this quantication is boundedness of the event description: the totality of timber
stilts exerts a force on the truss which renders the net force on the truss zero
and thus, as a result of the event described, the truss is supported in upholding
against gravity. (17) represents the semantic constribution of ppass in a simplied
manner, leaving out the details of the quantication over states represented on the
scale of net forces exerted on the truss. Additional complexity is introduced in
the analysis by the fact that abstützen is, just like einlagern, a particle verb and
thus the semantics involves the same kind of ’double-predication’ of the result
state of the event predicated in vP. That is, similar to the predication of the nominal
root
√
lager in einlagern (12), the mit-PP in (19) reintroduces the incorporated
nominal root
√
stütz.
What is important to note from the discussion of abstützen and the involved
conceptualization with SUPPORT is that formal meaning is by far not enough
to capture what the conceptual meaning of SUPPORT is about. For SUPPORT,
the additional conceptual machinery of force dynamics has to be invoked to grasp
the meaning of constructions involving abstützen, which sets it apart from the
relation between formal and conceptual meaning in both einlagern and überdachen,
an observation which we explore in full detail in the next section.
4 Selection Restrictions
With respect to the case under consideration, in our discussion of the relation
between formal and conceptual semantics, we focus on conceptual coherence
pertaining to the restrictions imposed on the selection of appropriate llers of
a conceptual relation, in the case under discussion the nominal root of the verb
and the direct object of the verb. For example, not any objects will aord the
selection restrictions involved in überdachen imposed by the application relation.
Basically, there are two cases to be distinguished. First, it may be the case that
the nominal root of the verb fails to satisfy the selection restrictions imposed by the
conceptual application relation as in (20).
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(20) ?eine
a
Terasse
terrace
unterdachen
under.prfx.roof
While unterdachen as in (20) is supercially similar to überdachen, there is an im-
portant conceptual dierence between the two. If a roof is conceptualized as being
an object in the above region of the object which it protects, then the combination
of dach with über is conceptually coherent. But for (20), this conceptualization runs
into a problem: a roof cannot be conceptualized as being in the below region of
the object with respect to which it is conceptualized as a roof. That is, although
unterdachen is perfectly acceptable from a formal point of view, conceptualization
rules out unterdachen as a possible word. The second case of selection restrictions
applies to the conceptualization of überdachen with respect to the direct object
Terasse. This conceptualization requires that the direct object can be conceptualized
as an object which provides a bounded ’above-region’ in order for the roof to be
applied: a terrace fullls these restrictions whereas a basement does not. einen
Keller überdachen as in (21) is conceptually incoherent because a basement is usually
not conceptualized as providing an above region in which another object can be
placed, and thus selection restrictions rule out Keller as a suitable direct object
of überdachen.
(21) *einen
a
Keller
basement
überdachen
over.prfx.roof
The argument that we develop in the following pertains to the relation between
the degree of selectivity on direct objects imposed by the conceptual relation
involved in the reconstruction of a p-verb and characterization of the three dif-
ferent types of conceptual relations that we introduced with our examples: (a)
a conceptual relation of support as in abstützen, (b) a conceptual relation of appli-
cation as in überdachen and (c) a conceptual relation of location as in einlagern.
When we reconsider the relation between the geometric truth-conditions, i.e. the
spatial congurations expressed by each of these verbs and the conceptual relation
involved, then it appears that each of the verbs exemplies a dierent proportion
between the role of conceptual and formal meaning. For the geometrical relation
of location inside a region as in einlagern, conceptualization with LOC does not
impose any additional constraints on direct objects which are not already conveyed
in terms of geometrical constraints. What is important to einlagern is only that
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the direct object ts into the space provided by the store, not conceptual properties
of the direct object. For überdachen, conceptual properties of the direct object
are relevant: as we saw with Keller, the direct object must be associated with a
concept that provides a bounded above region into which the roof can be applied.
Consequently, selection restrictions play a role for überdachen in that only a certain
class of objects will be accepted. Finally, the strongest conceptual contribution can
be found with support relations as in abstützen. The conceptualization of support
involves conceptual properties that allow for the computation of forces and as
such involve additional knowledge about gravitation and physics. Consequently,
support p-verbs are quite restrictive with respect to their possible direct objects: e.g.
direct objects must not absorb gravitational forces on their own in order to be
propped up. These observations on the divergence between geometry and con-
cepts in p-verbs suggest a measure on the relation between formal and conceptual
semantics as follows.
Any well-formed logical form has an interpretation but not any interpretation of
a well-formed logical form is conceptually coherent. Logical forms (whatever their
extension is, individuals or geometrical objects) employed in truth-conditional
semantics are insensitive to conceptual coherence. What distinguishes formal and
conceptual semantics in our approach is not the distinction between lexicon and
sentence but their respective contribution to the meaning of a construction. That is,
if selection restrictions (i.e. restrictions pertaining to content) are the contribution
of conceptual semantics and truth-conditions (i.e. restrictions pertaining to struc-
ture) are the contributions of formal semantics, then the relation between formal
and conceptual semantics shows up in the contribution of selection restrictions on
the llers of argument positions of a logical form: selection restrictions reect
the contribution of conceptual semantics in the instantiation of a logical form.
Consequently, the stronger conceptual restrictions are imposed on the selection of
llers of argument slots of logical forms, the more emphasis is put on concep-
tual structures in the meaning of the logical form. This hypothesis has a direct
reection in our pervasive approach of semantics. Instead of a divide between
conceptual meaning in the lexicon and truth-conditional meaning in sentences,
in our approach there is a continuum of relations between truth-conditions and
conceptual structure with verbs such as einlagern focusing formal semantics and
structural constraints on the one and verbs such as abstützen focusing conceptual
semantics and selection restrictions on the other end.
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Given the argument of the last paragraph, we expect that if application, support
and inclusion are dierent conceptual relations, this dierence shows up in terms
of dierent selectional preference strength. That is, we expect that there is a
correlation between the conceptual relation involved in the reconstruction of word
meaning and the selectional preference strength of the verb. Consequently, we can
measure the relation between formal and conceptual semantics in considering the
selectional strength of conceptual relations against the insensitivity of logical forms
to conceptual coherence. In our examples, we predict that conceptual relations
are ordered according to their selectional preference strength, from strong to weak:
SUPPORT > APPL > LOC . We saw that LOC in einlagern does not involve
conceptual restrictions which are not already captured by the truth-conditions
of geometrical inclusion: for putting an object in a store, it does not matter which
concept is associated with the object to be stored as long as the geometry of the
stored object can be included in the geometry of the store. We also saw that
APPL in überdachen involves a relevant conceptual restriction on the objects
standing in the application relation which is not captured by the truth-conditions
of geometrical inclusion: the direct object must have an above region with distinct
boundaries. Finally, SUPPORT in abstützen does not only involve conceptual
constraints on the objects which stand in the support relation but also requires to
take into account the additional concept of force dynamics. abstützen requires
appropriate direct objects to be possible subject to the laws of gravity and to provide
a below region.
5 A statistical measure for selectivity
The point we want to make with our analysis is the following: in our framework,
there is a linguistic measure for the relation between formal and conceptual se-
mantics in terms of selection restrictions, which exemplify the relation between
conceptual semantics sensitive to conceptual coherence and truth-conditions insen-
sitive to conceptual coherence. According to our proposal, if conceptual relations
manifest linguistically in the strength of selection restrictions and selectional
association, conceptual predicates may be considered as a stepping stone towards
the linguistic exploration of conceptual meaning. In our approach, conceptual
meaning can be dened linguistically without reference to conceptual structures
in the rst instance. Instead, our notion of conceptual meaning paves the way
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to a classication of concepts based on empirical observations (for p-verbs see
e.g. Rüd 2012, Springorum et al. 2012), where conceptual predicates are labels
for degrees of selection preference strength. Empirically, our hypothesis can be
tested with the help of the observation of the relative entropy of verbs and the
conceptual class of their direct objects as proposed by Resnik (1996). Resnik (1996)
approaches selection restrictions as the degree to which a pair of a verb and a
syntactic relationship, here direct object, constraints possible conceptual classes of
llers of the argument slots of the syntactic relationship.
The intuition behind Resnik’s selectional preference strength (SPS) is that a
verb-relation pair that only allows for a limited range of direct objects will have a
posterior distribution of conceptual classes of direct objects in which the verb is
taken into account that strongly diverges from the prior distribution of conceptual
classes of direct objects in which the verb is not taken into account. In order to
quantify the degree of restrictions in a verb-relation pair, the overall probability
distribution of noun classes is compared to the distribution of noun classes in the
direct object position of the verb. Technically, this is achieved by calculating the
relative entropy (the Leibler-Kullback divergence) D of two distributions, the prior
distribution P (c|r) and the posterior distribution P (c|v, r). The parameters P (c|r)
and P (c|v, r) can be estimated from the corpus frequencies of tuples (v, r, a) and
the membership of nouns a in GermaNet classes c.
(22)
SPS(v, r) = D(P (c|v, r)||P (c|r)))
=
∑
c∈C
P (c|v, r)logP (c|v, r)
P (c|r)
Resnik’s approach relies on Wordnet for the generalization from direct objects to
conceptual classes, but it should be noted that selection restrictions can be induced
without lexical resources by using e.g. co-occurence for the generalization step
(Erk & Padó 2010).
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6 Testing our predictions on Corpus Data
Verb Concept SPS(4) SPS(7)
einlagern IN 0.1 0.2
einsperren IN 0.7 0.9
überbrücken APPL 0.6 2.0
überdachen APPL 0.8 4.1
abstützen SUPP 1.3 8.0
aufbocken SUPP 1.7 4.9
Table 1: Selectional Preference Strength SPS(n) for selected p-verbs with respect to
mappings of direct objects to GermaNet Classes of level n, counting levels
from the top-level concept.
To give the reader a rst impression of how Resnik’s Selectional Preference
Strength relates to our predictions, we conducted a proof-of-concept study. First,
we estimated the prior distribution of nouns occuring in the direct object position
of verbs mapped to GermaNet Classes (Hamp & Feldweg 1997) from the rst
200.000.000 sentences of SdeWac (Faaß & Eckart 2013). Second, we extracted pairs
of p-verbs and their direct objects with accusative case from SdeWac, manually
disambiguated the set of direct objects to those objects which do not imply a
metaphorical or non-spatial usage of the verb and mapped the remaining direct
objects to GermaNet Classes in order to calculate the posterior probability of
a GermaNet Class to occur in the direct object position of a p-verb. Table 1
shows the results for some of the verbs for which we were able to acquire enough
instances which were covered by GermaNet. The higher the SPS of a verb, the
more restrictions it imposes on possible llers of its direct object argument slot.
Intuitively, the data in table 1 reproduces our predictions quite well. P-verbs such
as aufbahren or aufbocken are quite restrictive with respect to the type of direct
objects they accept. In fact, aufbocken selects for land vehicles and abstützen selects
for physical objects such as buildings. einlagern and einsperren on the other hand
select for a wide range of GermaNet classes of direct objects and thus receive a
lower SPS number.
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7 Summary
We introduced a pervasive approach to semantics which does not postulate a
structural distinction between lexicon and sentence. We proposed that in our
framework, the relation between formal and conceptual semantics can be measured
out empirically in terms of selectional preference strength.
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A. Detailed Analyses
For the detailed representation of überdachen and einlagern in this section, we use an
extension of a basic DRT language (Kamp et al. 2011) with presuppositions and a λ-
calculus for variable stores (Cooper 1983). λ-conversion selects the leftmost variable
from the store. The storing of variables instead of immediate existantialization
allows for a greater exibility in the derivational process when it is necessary to
distinguish between the introduction of existentially quantied discourse referents
and manipulations of variables for discourse referents. A Discourse Representation
Structure (DRS) K with a presupposition P, λ-abstracted variables x, y and a store
v, z is represented as in (23). For more details on the semantic formalism, see
(Roßdeutscher 2013b).
(23) λx.λy. 〈{P} 〈v, z K〉〉
The composition of DRSs is governed by applying λ-conversion and consequent
merge of DRSs at each node of the syntactic structure. For example, the composition
at the bottom of (27) on page 147 consists of a DRS taking a predicate (represented
with capital letters) as an argument.
(24) λP
〈
x, P (x)
〉
+
√
dach→ λx roof(x)
Also, at each node in the composition it is checked whether presuppositions can be
resolved by considering the new information made available. For example, when P’
is merged with the DP introducing the direct object in (27), the presupposition
{ z } introduced by the root√über is resolved to the discourse referent introduced
with the direct object DP.
The introduction of discourse referents for states captures incorporation in that
all conditions involving discourse referents predicated by the state are relocated
into an inaccessible sub-DRS K representing the semantic content of the state.
For example, when P and SpaceP are merged with the predication of a state in
(27), all conditions and existentializations involving discourse referents aected
by the conceptual predicate APPL are grouped together in a new sub-DRS, thus
rendering the nominal root
√
dach inaccessible as a discourse referent:
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Tillmann Pross & Antje Roßdeutscher
(25)
〈
x, roof(x)
〉
+ λu.λy.
s
s : APPL(y, u) → λy.
s
s :
x
APPL(y, x)
roof(x)
In example (28), we use a version of Kratzer (1996)’s event identication principle
applied to prepositional phrases in order to chain together the internal ’Ground’
argument of a preposition and its gure. The referential argument to be identied
is a set of vectors v and the thematic role to be added is that of a Figure, see (26).
Spatial refential arguments are existentialized at pP.
(26) λx.λv. figure(x, v) + λv.
u
IN(u, v)
→ λx.λv.
u
IN(u, v)
figure(x, v)
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A.1. überdachen
(27) eine Terasse überdachen, full analysis
vP
e, s, v1, v2, r1, s, t
eCAUSEs
↑ (v1, t)
r1 = region(v1)
v2 ⊆ r1
s :
x
APPL(t, x)
v2 = rid(x)
roof(x)
terrace(t)
v〈
e,
〉
PP
v1, v2, r1, s, t
↑ (v1, t)
r1 = region(v1)
v2 ⊆ r1
s :
x
APPL(t, x)
v2 = rid(x)
roof(x)
terrace(t)
P’
λy.
〈{
z
}
v1, v2, r1, s
↑ (v1, z)
r1 = region(v1)
v2 ⊆ r1
s :
x
APPL(y, x)
roof(x)
v2 = rid(x)
〉
SpaceP
〈{
z
}〈
x
v1, v2, r1
↑ (v1, z)
r1 = region(v1)
roof(x)
v2 ⊆ r1
v2 = rid(x)
〉〉
PlaceP
〈{
z
}〈
r1, v2, x
v1
↑ (v1, z)
r1 = region(v1)
roof(x)
v2 = rid(x)
〉〉
KP〈
v2, x
roof(x)
v2 = rid(x)
〉
nP〈
x, roof(x)
〉
√
dach
n
λP
〈
x, P (x)
〉
K
λy
〈
v2, v2 = rid(y)
〉
Place’〈{
z
}〈
r1,
v1
↑ (v1, z)
r1 = region(v1)
〉〉
Place〈
v1, r1 r1 = region(v1)
〉√über
λv.
〈{
z
} ↑ (v, z) 〉
Space
∅
λr.λv. v ⊆ r
P
∅
λu.λy. s : APPL(y, u)
DP〈
t, terrace(t)
〉
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A.2. einlagern
(28) eine Flasche in den Keller ein(lagern), pP branch
pP
〈
t,
u, t, v1, v2, s1
bottle(t)
figure(t, v1)
s1 : IN(u, v1)
v2 = rid(t)
v2 ⊆ v1
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
〉
p’
λx.λv
〈{
z
} 〈
v1
u, v2, s1
figure(x, v)
s1 : IN(u, v)
v2 = rid(z)
v2 ⊆ v1
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
〉〉
p
λx.λv figure(x, v)√
ein
PP
λv
〈{
z
} 〈
v1,
u, v2, s1
s1 : IN(u, v)
v2 = rid(z)
v2 ⊆ v1
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
〉〉
SpaceP
〈{
z
} 〈
v1, u,
v2
v2 = rid(z)
v2 ⊆ v1
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
〉〉
DP〈
v1, u,
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
〉
KP〈
v1, u,
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
〉
nP〈
u, cellar(u)
〉
√
keller
n
λP
〈
u, P (u)
〉
K
λy
〈
v1, v1 = rid(y)
〉
D
den
Space
λv
〈{
z
} v2
v2 = rid(z)
v2 ⊆ v
〉
P
λxλv
s1
s1 : IN(x, v)
√
in
DP〈
t, bottle(t)
〉
nP〈
t, bottle(t)
〉
asche
n
λP
〈
t, P (t)
〉
D
eine
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(29) (eine Flasche in den Keller ein)lagern, vP branch
vP
u, t, v1, v2, v4, e, s
eCAUSEs
s :
x, v4
at(v4, v3)
LOC(x, y)
v3 = rid(x)
store(x)
v4 = rid(t)
bottle(t)
figure(t, v1)
s : IN(u, v1)
v2 = rid(t)
v2 ⊆ v1
cellar(u)
v1 = rid(u)
vP
λy
〈{
z
}
e, s2, v4
eCAUSEs2
s2 :
x, v4
at(v4, v3)
LOC(x, y)
v3 = rid(x)
store(x)
v4 = rid(z)
〉
v〈
e,
〉
PP
λy
〈{
z
}
s2, v4
s2 :
x
at(v4, v3)
LOC(x, y)
v3 = rid(x)
store(x)
v4 = rid(z)
〉
SpaceP
〈{
z
} 〈
x,
v4
at(v4, v3)
v4 = rid(z)
store(x)
v3 = rid(x)
〉〉
KP〈
v3, x,
store(x)
v3 = rid(x)
〉
nP〈
x, store(x)
〉
√
lager
n
λP
〈
x, P (x)
〉
K
λy
〈
v3, v3 = rid(y)
〉
Space
λv
〈{
z
} v4
at(v4, v)
v4 = rid(z)
〉
P
λxλy
s2
s2 : LOC(x, y)
pP
eine Flasche in den Keller ein-
see example ((28))
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Representing the Lexicon: Identifying
Meaning in Use via Overspecication
Henk Zeevat, Scott Grimm, Lotte Hogeweg, Sander
Lestrade & E. Allyn Smith*
1 Lexical Specication and Meaning in Use: Traditional
Views on the Lexicon
Traditionally, the lexicon is the list of words of a language or communication
system. From a biological perspective, the lexica of human languages are special
with respect to animal communication systems because they can be freely extended,
both by the creation of new (lexical) forms and by the extension of the meaning of
these words. Notwithstanding this extensibility, the construction of dictionaries as
xed lists of words with their meanings pays o for the purposes of language
education, reliable communication and translation.
Computational models of language largely share this view, as it seems initially
reasonable to think that such a lexicon could be part of what characterizes the human
ability to code thoughts into linguistic expressions and to recover thoughts from such
expressions. What is needed for conventional dictionaries—in the tradition started
by such eminent scholars as Samuel Johnson and Jacob Grimm—is precision with
respect to the characterization of the word senses described. Such a task would be
* We wish to express our thanks to audiences at Szklarska Poreba, the Workshop Bridging Formal
and Conceptual Semantics, and Formal Semantics Meets Cognitive Semantics as well as to Katrin Erk,
to Louise McNally and, especially, to an anonymous reviewer of these proceedings for many useful
comments, more, in fact, than we could integrate into this preliminary report. In addition, Lotte
Hogeweg and Sander Lestrade would like to thank the the Netherlands Organization for Scientic
Research (NWO) for their nancial support. All errors are our own. Authors after the rst author are
listed in alphabetical order.
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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difficult with an entailment-based semantics only, since many word senses include
connotations that are usually but not always associated with an utterance of that
word. However, abandoning formal semantic approaches ignores the fact that the
senses distinguished by lexicographers do often reflect truth-conditional differences,
e.g. Anna went to the bank would entail ‘Anna was very near a flowing body of water’
in one of the word bank’s senses but not another. We contend that a formal account
would need to distinguish as many senses as traditional dictionaries do, and one goal
of the present paper is to suggest some steps toward such an account.
The main challenge faced by lexicographers and semanticists alike with respect
to characterizing word senses precisely is lexical disambiguation. Given the large
number of senses that dictionaries distinguish for the same word, one needs a
cognitively plausible account of the fact that listeners only rarely interpret the sense
of a word in a way unintended by the speaker. Suppose that the list of word senses
were simply a list and that lexicalisation meant just choosing a word for a concept.
Now suppose further that all concepts linked to a word after lexicalisation were
listed with it and that disambiguation occurred by making a random choice from the
list of senses. In this case, the chance of speaker-hearer coordination would be
very small, namely 1 divided by the number of word senses of the item in question.
Given that this is not what we nd, a natural extension to such a simplistic model
would be to include stochastic data with the senses. The rst type of stochastic data
to consider would be the relative frequency of the senses (such as the fact that
‘nancial institution’ is perhaps more frequent than ‘river bank’ as the intended
meaning of bank in industrialized societies), but this by itself would predict that the
best choice would always be to select the most frequent sense, so the very existence
of the other senses makes this option implausible. A second stochastic approach in
line with recent proposals (Baroni et al. 2014, Erk 2014) also includes frequency data
about the words that a given sense is likely to combine with (the “distributional
semantics” of the sense). For example, the presence of words like deposit and
savings around the word bank will bias the nancial institution interpretation.
The option of adding distributional semantics to senses needs further study. It
is, however, our suspicion that this will only work properly in combination with
a decompositional approach to senses because decomposition would be needed
for estimates in the presence of data scarceness. These distributional approaches
nevertheless aim to solve the same problem that we address in this paper, namely
that of predicting the meaning of lexical items in use (i.e. in the speech contexts in
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which they appear), but they use a dierent representation of lexical knowledge
than the one we advocate here.
The approach pursued in this paper tries to exploit semantic decomposition of
word senses to arrive at a cognitive representation that is eective in selecting the
meaning in use: one of a word’s potentially many senses that should be listed in a
full traditional dictionary. In some respects our approach is in line with other more
linguistically-oriented approaches to lexical representations. For example, it shares
the assumption of decomposability of word senses with cognitive approaches such
as Jackendo’s Conceptual Semantics (e.g. Jackendo 1996). It is similar to more
formal theories like Pustejovsky’s (1995) Generative Lexicon and Blutner’s (2004)
Lexical Pragmatics in its aim to systematically account for meaning alternations.
Our approach diers from these approaches in that, in our proposal, words typically
overspecify their meanings, and it is the combination with context that trims the
overspecied meaning down to the meaning in use, i.e. the word sense that applies.
The meaning in use may be determined by earlier language use, but it can also
be computed for the rst time.
After a discussion of semantic features in the following section, we examine
previous accounts of overspecication of meaning upon which we build. We
provide an analysis of lexical items in terms of stochastic sets of features in section
3, with an extended treatment of the verb fall in English, Dutch and German,
which demonstrates how one overspecied representation can apply in dierent
contexts resulting in dierent word senses. In section 5, we then discuss the issue
of overgeneration and the subsequent need to put constraints on the production of
words, in turn dening the lexicalization process. We conclude in section 6.
2 Semantic Features and Moderate Universalism
In this section, we want to defend the view that word senses are composed of a set
of (moderately) universal semantic features combined with natural classications
of experience. By ‘moderately universal,’ which we return to below, we mean
that any two languages will have a signicant overlap in the features they use
to construct word senses, but there may be unique features as well. To demonstrate
what we mean by “a natural classication of experience”, take the verb walk. The
particular kind of locomotion that we achieve in walking is dicult to analyse
further by people who can walk, and AI attempts at modelling it have revealed how
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little humans understand about how it functions.1 But it is part of the human
repertoire of activities and, as such, humans use it in planning their behaviour
and in recognizing it in the behaviour of other humans and animals. This particular
kind of locomotion is thus a “natural classication of experience”.
The decomposability of word senses has been a controversial issue in the litera-
ture on the lexicon. On the one hand, there are proponents of a atomistic view of the
lexicon such as Fodor (e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988, Fodor & McLaughlin 1991 and
Fodor & Lepore 2002) and more recently Relevance Theorists, e.g. Carston (2010).
On the other hand there are advocates of more complex lexical representations
such as Pustejovsky (1995). A common argument against a decompositional view is
the lack of necessary and sucient features in dening word senses (e.g. If a tiger
is dened as having four legs, does that make a three-legged tiger not a tiger?)
Furthermore, one could argue that semantic features are cognitively meaningless
if features can freely be invented and added to a representation. We argue that
semantic features are needed for overspecication and for formalizing the selec-
tion of meaning in use. We contend that these features need to be moderately
universal in order to account for the fact that knowing one language’s lexicon
helps in learning another language’s lexicon and also to account for typological
generalisations about the lexicon and morphology. But most importantly for our
purposes, universal features are needed for methodological reasons to ensure that
the decompositions of verbal meaning are cognitively meaningful. They should not
be freely inventable (since there are things that are dicult or impossible for us to
conceptualize) and, like optimality-theoretic constraints, they should preferably
come with a demonstration that they are typologically valid.
For an example of typologically-valid semantic features, one can turn to agency,
and more specically to the proto-agent and proto-patient features set out by
Dowty (1991), such as sentience, volition, control and cause. The typical agent of
walking toward the sunset forms the intention of doing so within the situation
she nds herself in, causes her movement to start, controls and monitors her
progress and has a criterion for when it is nished. The notions of agent, intending,
controlling, and end of action all belong to the realm of typologically-valid features.
1 Introductory AI texts take as given that locomotion, grasping something with your hands, and seeing
objects belong to the everyday behavioural repertoire of humans and that they turn out be much
more dicult than the naive views of these activities would suggest. The use of natural language falls
in the same category.
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Grimm (2011) shows that these features are central to the typology of case
systems, in the sense that they play a role in accounting for the variation between
languages that one nds in the realisation of case systems. Typological research
and monolingual investigation of central semantico-pragmatic themes such as case,
tense, aspect, modality and deniteness provide a large number of ostensibly-valid
semantic features.
It is further possible to give a foundation for semantic features using the semantic
map method in typology (de Schepper & Zwarts 2010). In the semantic map
approach, one studies the meaning of a word or a group of related words using
comparison with other languages, by systematically looking at translatability. This
provides a natural way of dividing words into their uses without appealing to
semantic intuitions. If one uses translations into suciently many languages, one
can map them onto a two-dimensional graph where the points are sets of translation
equivalents. If two languages do not make a meaning distinction that is made
in a third language, the rst two are connected in the graph. For example, neither
English nor French distinguishes direction and recipient in their prepositions, but
German does, which would mean that English and French are connected in the
graph for this semantic concept (Haspelmath 2003).
De Schepper and Zwarts (2010) show that such maps can be systematically
represented by feature clusters, with each of two minimally distant points diering
in precisely one feature. Ideally, the sets of features representing a map can be
analyzed in terms of typologically well-studied semantic features. This analysis
can also be taken as underpinning the view that meanings in use can be seen as sets
of semantic features.
Our approach relates to the semantic map approach and other cognitively-
oriented approaches such as Conceptual Semantics (e.g. Jackendo 1996) in the
assumption of cognitively realistic semantic features. It is still a task, however, to
dene how they combine into a logical expression that characterizes the truth-
conditional contribution of the combined features in terms of the truth-conditional
contribution of the individual features. For this purpose, it is useful to adopt
the view of (Barsalou 1992) that meanings in use should be characterized as
frames. Features typically set the value of attributes in a frame, unify attribute
values, or indicate that certain attributes have a value and that composition can be
modelled by unication. The truth-conditional interpretation of a set of attribute
value structures is the claim that the class of complex entities that meet all the
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constraints is non-empty. In contradistinction to the semantics provided for feature
structures modelling linguistic objects by, e.g., Johnson (1988), attributes for these
semantic uses must be understood as operations in the external world.2 The
object (e.g. an event of falling) would be related to whatever falls by the attribute
theme, interpreted as the operation that maps events to their themes. While in
this particular case it is not unreasonable to think that the theme in some sense
constitutes the event, the use of frames by itself does not commit one to this view.
In this respect, we see no distance between the current proposal and formal
semantics. There would be one if formal semantics were interpreted as committed
to the view that nothing could be said about the structure of meanings beyond
their contribution to truth-conditions, which would make it irrelevant for language
learning and cognition. The view defended here demands that basic features make
sense from the perspective of classical truth-conditional semantics. We forego
a discussion of the typical problems for a view of this kind: vagueness, taste
predicates, information structural features, and emotional expression.
As mentioned above, the proposal introduced here adopts a moderate form
of universalism towards linguistic lexical meanings, but it is the building blocks
of lexical meanings and not the lexical meanings themselves that are universal.
There is no assumption that any feature will play a role in all languages, nor that
any language uses all features. New semantic features may be introduced for the
description of a new lexicon if they correspond with a learnable classication.
We opt for this moderation rather than for absolute universalism on the basis
of evidence showing that speakers of one language are sensitive to semantic
dierences that speakers of other languages are not sensitive to. For example,
Korean has two variants of the English preposition in depending upon whether the
object is in a close-tting container (like a SIM card in a cell phone) or in a non-close-
tting container (like a pear in a bowl). McDonough et al. (2003) use preferential
looking tasks and a “which of these things is not like the others?” task to show that
while Korean and English infants are both sensitive to dierences in closeness
of t, as adults, only Korean speakers and not English speakers are sensitive to
this dierence. Thus, the distinction in close versus loose t as articulated in the
2 We here part company with those who like to maintain that semantics is merely in the brain. We take
the line that a proper semantics should also explain logical inference relations between natural
language utterances and thereby should have a model theory. This is the line also taken by Kamp
in DRT (Kamp & Reyle 1993). We also feel that many aspects of Conceptual Semantics allow a
model-theoretic treatment and that its proponents undersell their theory in this respect.
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Korean choice between prepositions is not present in the adult English lexicon
or in adult English cognition and should not be posited as an absolute universal.
In fact, it would be a Korean-particular extra feature in our formalisation that
has arisen through a grammaticalisation process under the inuence of a forced
choice between lexemes. Our moderate universalism leads to a decomposition
in terms of universal features (where typology and cognition supply the foundation
for the universal character) with a minimum number of additional idiosyncratic
features. We now turn to discussing previous accounts of word meanings based on
overspecication of meaning.
3 Overspecication of Meaning: The Hogeweg- Smolensky
Account
In his response to the criticism of connectionism in Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988),
(Smolensky 1991) oers an analysis in which the distributed representation of
coee can be derived by subtracting the representation of cup with coee from the
representation of cup without coee. In Smolensky’s analysis, the representation of
a cup with coee consists of a set of micro-features like ‘upright container’, ‘hot
liquid’, ‘porcelain curved surface’, ‘burnt odor’, ‘brown liquid contacting porcelain’,
‘nger sized handle’ and ‘brown liquid with curved sides at the bottom’. The
representation of cup without coee consists of the features ‘upright container’,
‘porcelain curved surface’ and ‘nger-sized handle’. If the representation of cup
without coee is subtracted from the representation of cup with coee, this yields a
representation of coee, consisting of the features ‘hot liquid’, ‘burnt odor’, and
‘brown liquid contacting porcelain’. Crucially, however, this is a representation of
coee in a particular context. In another context, other features of coee (like shrub,
red fruit, brown bean) would be activated. The features of coee that are activated
in a particular context are therefore a subset of the much larger set of features
potentially projected by coee.
Following Zwarts’s (2004) analysis of the preposition (a)round, (Hogeweg 2009)
turns this approach into an account of computing the right set of semantic fea-
tures in a context from a lexical (over-)specication using an OT grammar FIT
> STRENGTH. FIT demands that the output is consistent with the context, and
STRENGTH demands that the output set for the specication is maximal by ensur-
ing that any set larger than the output does not meet FIT.
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To illustrate the working of the two constraints, let us look briey at Hogeweg’s
analysis of the interpretation of the Dutch discourse particle wel. Like most
discourse particles, wel is highly polysemous. Hogeweg analyzes the dierent
senses of wel as ranging in strength depending upon how much information a
use presupposes. In Tableau 1, the possible interpretations are ordered according
to their strength. The strongest meaning is illustrated by the following small
conversation:
(1) a. Speaker A: Amsterdam is niet de hoofdstad van Nederland (Amsterdam is
not the capital of the Netherlands).
b. Speaker B: Amsterdam is wel de hoofdstad van Nederland (Amsterdam is
the capital of the Netherlands)
This discourse can be described as an instance of Speaker B’s correcting Speaker A.
An utterance containing wel expressing the proposition p requires that a statement
expressing the proposition¬pwas uttered. Implicit contrast, for example, is weaker
since it does not require that the proposition ¬p is expressed but just that it is
inferrable from the context. For example, in a context where a husband is putting
on his coat, his wife could utter: Je moet wel de afwas nog doen, ‘You have WEL to
do the dishes’. What is important here, however, is the interaction between the two
constraints STRENGTH and FIT. STRENGTH requires that all meaning aspects
are activated so that the word is interpreted with the strongest meaning, in this
case, a correction. A candidate violates this constraint as many times as there
are stronger interpretations available. FIT requires that the output is consistent
with the context. If wel p is uttered in a context where a statement expressing
¬p is not part of the common ground, interpreting wel as a correction violates
FIT. If there is information in the common ground from which ¬p could be inferred,
implicit contrast does not violate FIT. Note that the requirements put on the context
entail one another. (For example, if ¬p is uttered, it can also be inferred.) That
is why if an interpretation does not violate FIT, all the weaker interpretations
also meet the requirements set by this constraint.
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(2)
Context: Husband is putting on coat.
Je moet wel de afwas nog doen.
‘You still have to do the dishes.’
FIT STRENGTH
Correction *
Contrast * *
⇒ Implicit contrast **
Surprise ***
Modier ****
The account is quite successful in the application that Hogeweg provides. It has
also been successfully applied to other types of function words such as prepositions
Zwarts (2004). Nor is it dicult to come up with further applications. Another
advantage of the approach is that, while it was developed in OT, it does not require
OT-specic mechanisms that would limit its generalizability.
For example, one can interpret FIT as the maximization of prior probability
and STRENGTH as the maximization of the likelihood of the signal given the
input. The more features associated with the word that show up in the input, the
more likely the use of the word becomes, such that adding more features projected
to an interpretation hypothesis increases the likelihood of the signal. The most
probable interpretation is thus a set of features that is as large as possible and yet
still consistent with the context. The OT system thus reduces to a decomposition
into priors and likelihoods for nding the most probable interpretation.
Perhaps this is all that one needs to model functional lexemes.3 For lexical words,
however, it runs into problems. This stems from the fact that all features are treated
as equal, whereas certain kinds of phenomena bode against such equality. These
include absolute features, dependencies among features and forced choices between
features, exemplied below. In the next section, we illustrate these properties of
feature sets by an analysis of the verb fall. The verb fall in English, Dutch, French4,
Russian and modern German is non-volitional. This property survives in all of
3 The use of already observed by (Fong 2001) as an expression of the perfect in You eat already? in
Singapore English (British English informants also report this use in informal standard English) can
be used as an argument against this view. Arguably, already expresses both surprise (at the early start
of a state) and the fact that the state started. Surprise is removed when already expresses the perfect,
but there are no uses where the perfect is removed. This makes the perfect an absolute feature
and surprise, a default feature.
4 French is not yet integrated into the formal representation of fall discussed below.
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the derived meanings, which is what makes it an instance of an absolute feature.
That there are dependencies between features can be seen for example in that
a spatial source for a use of fall such as fall to the ground forces a spatial goal and a
spatial dimension which are interconnected. Fall also forces a choice between
dimensions, including the aforementioned spatial dimension as well as moral (He
resisted the temptation for a long time, but then he fell.), fortune (fall on hard times),
and grace (fall from grace), among others.
4 Lexical Entries as Stochastic Sets of Features
In the previous section we argued for a feature-based analysis of words senses.
In contrast with the previous approaches, we argue that a word is not related to a
set of features but to a stochastic set: a distribution over sets of features. Such
distributions can be learnt from experience by counting how often the various
feature combinations are expressed by a word. However, the distribution itself
cannot be used for explaining the intersubjective status of these stochastic feature
sets. The experience of the individual users will be dierent and therefore the
distribution that they learn. While learning a distribution is what constitutes a
speaker’s competence with respect to the semantics of the word, it cannot be what
the language or the language community associates with the word.
Intersubjective convergence can be modeled by considering equivalence classes
of such distributions: the distributions that agree on 0, 1 and <. Two competent
speakers will almost certainly have dierent frequencies and probabilities for the
same feature bundle b in an interpretation of a word w. By using equivalence
classes for≤, 0 and 1, we dene competence for w as the speakers always agreeing
that bundle b is less probable than bundle c in an interpretation ofw, or that bundle
b is always, or never, occurs in such interpretations.
Let F be the set of all features. Since p(∅) = 1 and p(F ) = 0, p and q will
give 0 and 1 to the same elements if they preserve ≤. So (3) is sucient.
(3) p ∼ q i ∀b, c (p(b) ≤ p(c))↔ (q(b) ≤ q(c))
While dierent language users build up dierent distributions, a small amount
of data suces to guarantee that language users have distributions in the same
equivalence class. For specifying such equivalence classes, the following operations
can be dened in (4). Speakers know the equivalence class by having learnt or
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converging to a distribution that belongs to it by being exposed to utterances in
language use. The equivalence class (and a particular distribution in it, almost
certainly dierent from the distribution of any user) can be attributed to language
use or to the language community producing language use.
(4) absolute features: p(b) = 1
excluded features: p(b) = 0 (not normally considered)
conditionally absolute features: p(b|c) = 1
conditionally excluded features: p(b|c) = 0
forced choice: p(b1 ∨ . . . ∨ bn) = 1 and p(bi ∧ bj) = 0 for i 6= j ≤ n
default in a forced choice: b1 . . . bn : a feature bi such that p(bi) > p(bj) for
j 6= i and 1 ≤ j ≤ n
In the following, we will illustrate how such operations enable us to give a repre-
sentation of the verb fall. We chose to exemplify this approach to the lexicon
with fall not only because the central concept expressed facilitates cross-linguistic
comparison, but also because fall and its cognates typically lend themselves to
extended uses, i.e. a large number of word senses, as mentioned above. Apart
from its most straightforward interpretation as a motion verb, fall is used with
various other interpretations, including non-spatial ones such as a fallen soldier or
a fallen woman. As such, it provides a suciently dicult modeling task to develop
a representation from which all the dierent uses could be specied in a context.
In the project database based on data extraction eorts from dictionaries and the
internet, we currently have 78 uses of “fall”. This reduces to a smaller, but not much
smaller number of uses for a particular language. Example (5) lists 18 of the 35 uses
that seem acceptable in English and is meant to illustrate the variation.
(5) John fell out of the tree.
The glass fell on the oor.
John fell (down).
The house fell.
The corporal fell
The rain fell.
The evening falls.
Christmas day falls on a Sunday this year.
He fell asleep.
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His eyes fell on the gem.
The cabinet falls.
The thaw fell over the elds.
The water fell.
Dark curls fell around her white neck.
It fell into oblivion.
The goblet fell to the bottom of the river.
The waves fell on the beach.
The curtains fall.
The path falls. (goes down)
Grief fell from our hearts.
Many of these examples can be seen as metaphorical extensions from a basic use. In
canonical views on metaphors, space and in particular the up-down opposition is an
important source for metaphorical extension. As Lakoff & Johnson (1980) argue,
most of our fundamental concepts are organized in one or more spatialization
metaphors. They provide many examples in which a more abstract concept is
expressed in terms of the opposition between up and down, among which health
and life (health and life are up, sickness and death are down), morality (virtue is up,
depravity is down) and quantity (more is up, less is down), many of which are
also applicable to fall. However, the aim in this paper is not to capture metaphor but
to find meanings in use. Dead metaphors are dead and the language user is stuck
with them even if the metaphorical extension could not have happened anymore.
Our strategy stands in competition with an approach which would want to predict
the metaphorical use from a more basic use. Maybe that is possible and would
lead to similar predictions. A reason to be skeptical about that, however, is that
what works in one language does not seem possible in another in many cases and
that general accounts of metaphor, even if tied to notions like natural metaphor
will fail to predict correctly when a particular metaphor is possible and when it
is not. In our case, the starting point is what has happened already and is recorded
in the lexicon. Interestingly, we then predict more possible interpretations than
were found in the lexicon and standardly correct ones. This can be interpreted as
metaphor formation, but so far nothing very much can be claimed for this method of
finding new meanings in use. It certainly does not seem to end up (yet?) as a serious
general theory of metaphor. The aim of our account should not be confused with
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the legitimate enterprise of explaining why certain metaphors are more natural
and acceptable than others. The project may supply interesting input to such an
enterprise since our data are suggestive of what is natural and not, but the enterprise
itself will not make any contribution to this essentially psychological question.
The problem for specication is the problem of dealing with all 78 uses from
one single representation. It follows from our moderate universalism that this
should be possible and—surprisingly, since this is a strong claim—it seems that this
is the case. As it turns out, again surprisingly, the language specic representations
are not really simpler than the cross-linguistic one.
We now outline the different components of the representation. We use a frame
formalism because it comes with a natural decomposition (unlike first order logic), has
a properly defined semantics (Johnson 1988, Ait-Kaci & Podelski 1993) and has been
claimed by many to be a natural format for the description of concepts. Barsalou
(1992), Loebner (2014), Petersen & Werning (2007), and Sag et al. (2003) all give
substantial empirical evidence for a frame-like structure of mental representations.
For us, having a natural decomposition is the most important advantage and while
we regard the current development as promising, we are no way committed to
sticking to this particular formalism in future developments of this material.
Though it is too early for a detailed formal proposal, semantic features are in-
terpreted as constraints on relationally restricted frame structures, giving both the
structure of the events or states denoted and the concept of these events and states.
Equivalence classes over distributions over these features are the lexical specifications.
The lexical specications have maximal consistent sets of constraints over
features allowed by the distribution. These determine classes of frames which
in turn determine what kind of objects they can denote.
The following are examples of the dierent frame constraints on fall. Relations
and sorts are written with lower case heads, variables appear in upper case.
(6) THEME := the frame has a path attribute with the variable THEME at its end
at(THEME,LOCATION) := THEME is at LOCATION
SOURCE:location(DIMENSION) := SOURCE has the sort of being one of the
objects in DIMENSION
nocontrol(THEME) := THEME has the sort ‘nocontrol’, i.e. the theme does not
control the continuation, path or speed of the movement denoted by the verb
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A frame is thereby a statement about the external world: the external world
should contain an object that is mapped by operations in the external world
interpreting the attributes to other objects. The objects should stand in the external
relations or have the external sorts that are imposed to them by the structure.
On top of this basic structure, there is information structure implemented by
assigning or not assigning a property new to a feature. The interpretation is that
features lacking this feature should be identied in the context (or accommodated),
while new features give properly new information.
Furthermore, semantic features may be annotated for properties of the distribution.
This is so already in the case of forced choices: a forced choice x ∈ {y1, . . . , yn}
is just the features x : y1, . . . , x : yn but in a situation in which x : yi and x : yj are
inconsistent for all different i, j ≤ n. Much the same applies to implications. Other
properties of that kind are absolute and default, which in this setting is understood
as a feature that is part of some meanings in use, but can be omitted by conflicts with
the context or in the case of competition between two or more incompatible features
as the feature which is probabilistically dominant. Annotations with new and of
this distributional kind are in small capitals. Below, we detail each one in turn.
First, there is a forced choice between the type of theme occurring with fall in any
given instance (where the ‘theme’ is that which falls). The fact that this is a forced
choice means that the verb obligatorily has a theme. In a given use, the theme will be
resolved and represented as, e.g. THEME:light for an instance like The light falls
on the table. ‘Concrete’ means that the theme is a concrete object such as a person.
(7) THEME ∈ { concrete, light, precipitation, task, date, judgment, proposal}
The next two statements make the theme a non-agent of a non-action:
(8) nocontrol(THEME)
nocause(THEME)
Falling is strongly correlated with a lack of intentionality with respect to its
direct cause, the movement and its path and for all contemporary languages
considered, these are absolute features. These are also background features, as
is the specication of the theme.
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We next propose a source and a position, each of which is dened with respect to
a dimension. The source can be understood as the point of departure for the falling,
and the position as the theme’s placement at the end of the falling act.
(9) SOURCE: location(DIMENSION)
POSITION: location(DIMENSION)
DIMENSION ∈ {space, posture, life, health, moral, quantity, level,
outcome(PROCESS)}
The inclusion of the dimension specification in our analysis is necessary to our
account and is motivated by its further necessity in the analyses of the functions
direction and down, among others (only down will be discussed in this particular
paper). Dimensions are sets of positions ordered by a natural ordering relation.
Here is what is meant by each of the types included above. Space is the set of spatial
positions close to the earth ordered by the direction of gravity. Posture would be the
set of body postures ordered by degree to which they are upright, and the same for
postures of other things like walls, houses, poles, dogs, etc. It is a good idea to
make posture a dependent sort (like outcome(PROCESS)), i.e. posture(X) where X
should be filled in by the type of the theme. This assigns to each X a special set of
postures. Life is a metaphorical transfer to the “postures” alive and dead where
the first one corresponds with uprightness. Health includes healthiness and degrees
of unhealthiness ordered from more to less healthy, morality is the set of moral
states ordered from more to less moral, and quantity is the set of quantities ordered
by the greater than relation. Level corresponds to the set of levels of something
again ordered by ‘greater than’ on some numerical scale (see Lakoff & Johnson
1980 for suggestions about the origins of these metaphorical extensions).
There are a number of dimensions that have degraded into a set of down locations
for an often not very clear source. Such cases are:
(10) The prize fell on Tim. (Tim won the prize.)
A cruel fate fell on those left behind. (Dutch: Those left behind suered a
cruel fate.)
Eating falls me dicult. (Dutch: I nd it hard to eat.)
Christmas falls on Wednesday.
The task falls on me. (Dutch, German: This happens to be one of my tasks.)
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Locations for prizes in races and lotteries are the winners, locations for fates the
people whose fate they are, locations of holidays are days in the year assigned
by the holiday denition (which may involve human decisions), tasks are one by
virtue of one’s oce or of the moral order. Activities of somebody moreover assign
a degree of diculty or painfulness in the experience of that somebody. What these
cases seem to have in common is a dimension that is just a set and a process or
non-subjective procedure that assigns locations from the dimension to the theme.
Provisionally, we take these dimensions to be parametrically dened as out-
come(PROCESS) where the identication of PROCESS is crucial for the identication
of the set making up the dimension. For this last type, sources may be missing
and be identied with the process itself.
One additional diculty that arises with SOURCE pertains to cases such as
Her hair falls (perfectly), where the hair itself is not changing position, but rather,
where two dierent parts of the hair are salient, and the ends of the hair ‘fall’
by comparison with the hair nearer to the crown of the head. In these cases, which
also include falling paths, falling valleys, etc., we dene the split relation where
PART1 and PART2 are the higher and lower parts of the THEME, respectively:
(11) SOURCE=PART1
split(PART1, PART2, THEME)
For meanings in use in which split is dened, the specication that SOURCE=PART1
is obligatory in the representation (i.e. it is an absolute feature).
The next component at relates two features such that at(x, y) can be paraphrased
as ‘the x is in/on y’. For example, at(John, lying_down) indicates that John is
lying down. At is a component that appears multiple times in each representation.
One of its instances is given information, and one is new information. The one that
is given is as follows, where down picks out the set of elements in the order given
by the dimension that are lower than the one named by the source:
(12) at(POSITION, down(SOURCE,DIMENSION))
For example, at(lying_down, down(standing, posture)) would mean that the
lying down is ‘down’ (lower on the order for the posture dimension) from standing.
Another way of saying this is that lying down is down from standing with respect
to posture. The next instance of at is new information:
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(13) at(THEME,POSITION)
This is like the example above, where at(John, lying_down) indicates that John is
lying down. Taken in combination with the given/presupposed use of at, we can see
that for an example like John fell, part of the given information is that lying down
is a lower posture position than standing, but the new information includes the fact
that John is in fact now in the lying down position. This is sometimes all that
is specied as new information, but there are other cases where a movement event
is also new information. These are the cases in which a source is either specied or
implicit. Continuing this example, the source would be specied as ‘standing’
(on the posture dimension), and thus we would have new information that there
was an event in which John moved from standing to lying down, following this
specication:
(14) movement(THEME,SOURCE,POSITION)
In cases where split is dened, having the new information be
at(THEME,POSITION) would be problematic, since it is not the entirety
of the theme that is in the lower-ordered position. Thus, in these cases, we have
the following absolute feature, which is analogous to the other but with PART2
replacing THEME:
(15) at(PART2, POSITION)
(16) recapitulates the above with the universal level labels and the bar indicating the
split between given and new. It also indicates that space is the default dimension
and that at(THEME,POSITION) is the default for new information.
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(16)
THEME ∈ {concrete,light,precipitation,task,date,judgment,proposal} Absolute
nocause(THEME)
nocontrol(THEME) Absolute
SOURCE: location(DIMENSION)
POSITION: location(DIMENSION)
DIMENSION ∈ { space:default, posture, life, health, moral, quantity,
level, outcome(PROCESS)} Absolute
SOURCE= PART1 If split Absolute
split(PART1, PART2, THEME)
at(POSITION, down(SOURCE,DIMENSION)) Absolute
at(THEME,POSITION) Default, New
at(PART2, POSITION) If split Absolute, New
movement(THEME,SOURCE) If at(THEME, SOURCE) Absolute New
We will now discuss our data with respect to this representation. First of all,
there were not many dierences between the languages we examined with respect
to these representations. The full list is discussed here.
A. The dimension outcome(PROCESS) is prominent, especially in Dutch, as in (17).
(17) De prijs viel op mij.
The prize fell on me.
‘I received the prize’.
B. Older German (Grimm 2011) includes an example where the person doing the
falling was causing an action as in (18).
(18) Er el in die Sachsen.
He fell into the Saxons
‘He wildly attacked the Saxons.’
This data point is the reason that nocause(THEME) is not listed as an absolute
feature above.
C. Finally, English allows a source without a destination/position (“Grief fell from
his heart”), unlike the other languages considered. There is one further important
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type of dierence among the languages, which will be discussed in Section 5 and
force a major revision.
These three dierences indicate that small adaptations must be made to obtain
the specication for particular languages. Dutch overuse of outcome(PROCESS)
and pre-modern German’s causality with fall are two cases where one predicts
failure of comprehension between languages. Beyond that, however, speakers
of one language should be able to make sense of all the uses of the other languages.
Languages that are less related than those under discussion may, however, dier
more greatly, which is something that we are examining in our continued research.
If information from the context of the word is taken into account, the formal
model proposed here makes sense of all the uses we collected on the basis of
the language-independent specication and perhaps surprisingly lends itself to
implementation. Particularly important is the type of the theme and of the source
or location which restricts the choice of the dimension and, thereby, the sort
of the unspecied source or location (if either of these is in fact unspecied).
Finding this information is easy using prepositions and parsing. It is harder to
use information that is not syntactically coded, but clearly often necessary: he
fell can mean many things given the right context. While the specication is
good at suggesting the right questions to ask the context, the answers cannot
always be supplied by a simple heuristic method dened over the context. Despite
this, trial implementations by Jonathan Mallinson and Jacob Verdegaal show that
good results are possible when the necessary contextual information is given
syntactically and lexically. It then works to the degree that the syntactic and
lexical analysis is correct. This would be the same in cases where one cannot
rely on lexical or syntactic information and identications between variables in the
lexical specication and elements in the interpreted linguistic context need to be
inferred. The dierence is that there are no good o-the-shelf systems for doing
these inferences.
We now proceed through a set of examples taken from our collection of dierent
uses of fall from Dutch, English, French, German, and Russian. The inferences
are generally trivial, but this partly reects the source of the examples, since
dictionaries often give examples in which it is not necessary to use further context
beyond the clause. The annotation new is replaced below by a double line: the new
features are below the double line.
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For the sentence given in (19), The glass fell on the oor, the space dimension is
the default and the oor is a location in that dimension. The glass is obviously
somewhere (on the table, in somebody’s hands), which may be given in the
linguistic context. Glass is moreover a concrete noun. Together, this selects
the specication in (19).
(19) ‘The glass fell on the oor.’
THEME:glass
glass:concrete
nocontrol(glass)
nocause(glass)
SOURCE:location(space)
at(oor,down(SOURCE,space))
at(glass,oor)
movement(glass,SOURCE)
Continuing with the example used to explain the representations above, in (20),
the context needs to put John in a “low” location (to prevent the spatial dimension)
and a “high” posture, e.g. standing. Whether one assumes that John falls to the oor,
in which case he is lying down at the end of the event, or falls into a chair, in which
case he is sitting at the end of the event is a question of what the default value is for
the individual hearer in the posture dimension below standing. Note that defaults
of this kind are not indicated in the abstract specication above and should be
inferred from the context.
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(20) ‘John fell’.
THEME:John
John:concrete
nocontrol(John)
nocause(John)
SOURCE: standing
POSITION: lying_down
lying_down:location(posture)
at(lying_down,down(standing,posture))
at(John,lying_down)
movement(John,standing)
(21) involves a further specialization of posture applied to houses.
(21) ‘The house fell.’
THEME:house
house:concrete
nocontrol(house)
nocause(house)
SOURCE:erect
POSITION:collapsed
collapsed:location(posture)
at(collapsed,down(erect,posture))
at(house,collapsed)
movement(house,erect)
(22) presents another specialization of dimension restricted to military people and
battles. This needs a special constraint in the specication of fall via the proposed
‘life’ dimension: If somebody military is the theme, the movement and its cause are
part of a battle, then the dimension can be life.
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(22) ‘The corporal fell.’
THEME:corporal
corporal:concrete
nocontrol(corporal)
nocause(corporal)
SOURCE:alive
POSITION:dead
dead:location(life)
at(dead,down(alive,life))
at(corporal,dead)
movement(corporal,alive)
(23) would be derivable through the theme type precipitation, which entails the
source to be the sky and the dimension to be space. Precipitation diers from
people, stones and houses by not being a spatio-temporal continuant.
(23) ‘The rain fell.’
THEME:rain
rain:precipitation
nocontrol(rain)
nocause(rain)
SOURCE:sky
POSITION:ground
ground:location(space)
at(ground,down(sky,space))
at(rain,ground)
movement(rain,sky)
Dates induce a stative use of fall and invoke the outcome(process) dimension on a
process called calendar.
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(24) ‘Christmas day falls on a Sunday this year.’
THEME:Christmas
Christmas: date
nocontrol(Christmas)
nocause(Christmas)
SOURCE: location(outcome(calendar))
POSITION: Sunday
at(Sunday,down(calendar,outcome(calendar)))
at(Christmas, Sunday)
A number of Dutch uses involve other kinds of processes that lead something to
be at some location. A Dutch use where the subject determines the process is
given in (25).
(25) De
the
taak
task
valt
fall
op
on
mij.
me
‘It is my task.’
nocontrol(task)
nocause(task)
ME:location(outcome(taskassignment))
at(ME,down(taskassignment,outcome(taskassignment))
at(task,ME)
This is not the place for overly long explanations of the formalism used above,
but some discussion is necessary to make at least some connections with truth-
conditional semantics. Dimensions would be modeled as ordered sets of various
kinds. The hardest is here the default setting, normal space; yet, here are by
now many formalisms to deal with space and a gravity based high-low ordering
over locations (See Aiello et al. 2007). The other dimensions are very limited in
comparison, they essentially are small nite partial orders: life and health have only
two elements, while the complexity of the outcome(process) dimension is mainly in
stating the range of possible outcome locations, e.g. dierent participants in a
lottery, dierent people who can be burdened by some task, success, ease, hardship
and failure for eating, etc.
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Notions like control, cause, theme and at seem to be proper universal semantic
features. The rst two are amenable to a treatment of cause like e.g. the one
pioneered by Pearl (2000) (control would be the ability to change the course of the
event or change the state if whatever has control would want to). The theme would
be a Dowty (1991)-style decomposition in similar semantic features. Finally, at
would be the relation between between objects and where they are, in space or in a
metaphorical extension.
These remarks are not meant as a truth-conditional treatment of the concepts
we develop, but are meant to take away worries in that respect: this subject as been
successfully addressed and there is no reason for thinking that a truth-conditional
account cannot be given. In fact, such accounts will considerably help learning
systems for the word-feature associations by providing a criterion of consistency
for feature bundles.
In this section we provided an overspecied lexical representation for the verb
fall which accounts for all occurrences we found in our data set. In the next section
we discuss, however, that this analysis runs into problems when we look at the
second verb we investigate in the project: run.
5 Observed Production Probabilities and Lexicalisation
The following problem emerges when we turn to run, the second verb in the project
sample after fall. While there is no significant conceptual distinction between English
run and Dutch and German rennen in their primary uses, there are nonetheless very
significant divergences between the verbs in their special uses. In English, machines
and noses run, while in German and Dutch these objects engage in lopen, for which
the best English equivalent is walking. The logic for deriving meanings in use from
the previous section, however, derives the English meaning in use for “De machine
rent”, “De neus rent”, “Der Machine rennt”, and “Die Nase rennt”.
It is just a brute fact that, in these cases, the Dutch and German verbs do not have
these meanings in use. The reason why is obvious: because another verb has won
in these cases as the preferred means of expressing the meaning in use. And the
formalism should be able to express this. It is, however, not easy to come up with
a natural method extending the equivalence classes of distributions over features in
which this can be directly stated.
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It is an overgeneration problem: more meanings in use are predicted than
are observed. Yet—at the same time—the logic and the over-determined lexical
specications seem on the right track.
The correct way to rule out unwanted meanings in use in a probabilistic setting
is to add production constraints in interpretation. It seems a correct observation
that Dutch and German speakers select lopen or laufen when confronted with the
meaning in use given by English: “the machine runs” or “the nose runs”. This
section recasts the previous proposal to incorporate this dependency on production.
There should be a part of the production mechanism which assigns words to
bundles of features with a certain probability: lexical selection. This process can
be captured as a function f that maps pairs made up from a bundle of semantic
features and a word to a probability. The function values will often be 0 for all
words for a certain bundle: the bundle is not a sensible meaning in use or it is
sensible but lexemes are missing. It will also very often be 0 for most words: those
words were never used to express this bundle. The function can be read o directly
from a corpus of word and meaning in use pairs as in (26). The function gives
the frequency of the word for the bundle divided by the frequency of the bundle.
Notice that the precise bundles of features count: a use of w to express a superset c
of b does not count as a use of w for b. We assume here that the corpus is given as a
set C of triples <index, bundle, word>.
(26) f(b)(w) = |{j:<j,b,w>∈C}||{j:∃w′<j,b,w′>∈C}|
The function counts the number of indices at which w expresses b and divides that
number by the number of indices at which b is expressed by any word whatsoever.
The function therefore measures the strength with which a bundle of features
keys a lexeme and can be seen as a component of what determines lexical choice.
The rule could be to choose that w for b for which f(b)(w) is maximal.
The function f—or the data from which it can be read o—can be equated
with the mental lexicon. The mental lexicon cannot be equated with the set of
distributions over semantic features keyed by specic lexical items as was assumed
in the last section, since that does not give a handle on production, which we
need to deal with our overgeneration problem, as will be shown below.
There are no problems with multi-word lexical items. In fact, it is natural to
assume that certain sets of features would correspond to groups of lexemes. All
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that one would need to do is to consider a generalization of the function in whichw
ranges over bags of words. There would then no longer be any principled division
between multi-word lexemes and groups of lexemes that jointly express the bundle,
and this is as it should be. The dierence would be in the possibility to regain
the probability of the bag for the bundle from the probabilities of its components
for parts of the bundle: do we get the same number or is the probability of the
combination higher? In the last case, it has become or is becoming an idiom. While
this denitely must be explored further, let’s ignore composition for the time being
and let w simply range over words. It would seem that the revision fares better as a
data structure that can be learned and represented by the brain as an association
and is better suited for multi-word expressions than the proposal from the last
section to equate the mental lexicon with probability distributions pw(b) over the
words w of the language. While we leave these issues open, it is still the case that
the competition we dene below, sometimes is between a word and a multi-word
expression or between multi-word expressions.
This new account of the mental lexicon can help with the problem at hand. If
a meaning in use is just expressed dierently, it cannot be the meaning in use
of the word for which it was hypothesized (cf. the use of lopen ‘walk’ rather than
rennen ‘run’). The earlier approach does not need to be given up, it merely needs
an amendment in which it is checked for an interpretation b that the production
probability f(b)(w) 6= 0 while for another word w′ f(b)(w′) > 0.
But then, what should be used for arriving at meanings in use? At rst sight this
seems problematic. The revision gives a criterion for having found the meaning in
use. The new data structure gives the likelihood p(w|b) of the word w for the
meaning in use b. If a prior p(b) for the set of features b is given, the most probable
interpretation is argmaxbp(b)f(b)(w), the feature bundle b for which the product
of the prior probability p(b) and the likelihood as given by f applied to b and
w is maximal.5 But how can it be guaranteed that that is indeed the maximal
bundle that ts in the context? p(b) will be bounded by p(b′) if b′ ⊂ b. And the
likelihood is learned from experience as f . It would seem that this does not give the
prediction that larger bundles are preferred. A second problem is that it gives
no results in case w has not been used for b before.
5 That this is the most probable interpretation follows by Bayes’ theorem. Models of interpretation in
which the most probable interpretation is computed by nding a maximum for p(b)p(w|b), the
product of the prior and the likelihood of the interpretation are standard in signal processing and
computer vision.
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The solution is not to give up on the earlier proposal but to use it as a model of
Bayesian interpretation. This can be done since f almost directly reconstructs
the distribution pw over semantic feature bundles keyed by a lexeme w. In (27),
pw(b) is dened, where b is a semantic feature bundle. To do this correctly, we need
to measure the frequency of b, m(b), in the corpus as its frequency divided by
the corpus size. F is the set of all features.
(27) pw(b) =
Σb⊆b′⊆Fm(b
′)f(b′)(w)
Σb′⊆Fm(b′)f(b′)(w)
pw(b) measures how often w is used for b within all uses of w.
While humans learn f automatically, it seems that linguists like ourselves are
better in discovering pw directly from lexical and internet data, with semantic
blocking occasionally oering a window on properties of f that cannot be recovered
from the functions pw .
Lexical interpretation is still computing argmaxbp(b)p(w|b), but there will be
more information in p(w|b) than directly follows from f . Any semantic feature
s ∈ b associated with w helps to increase the likelihood of w: p(w|b). But
simultaneously f(b)(w) is a lter on the result, blocking certain realisations, i.e. this
can make p(w|b) = 0. If there are f(b)(w′) with a high value, b has lexical means
of expression and using w for b will be unlikely if f(b)(w) = 0. So if f(b)(w) has a
high value while f(b)(w′) = 0, b is not a proper interpretation of w′.6 So the
new “mental lexicon” can continue as the base for the solution in Section 4.
Let us recapitulate these observations in some denitions:
(28) Lexical interpretation: b is a lexical interpretation of w i f(b)(w) >> 0.7
(29) Standard lexical choice: w is a lexical choice for b i f(b)(w) >> 0.
(30) Smolensky/Hogeweg interpretation: An optimal interpretation can be
dened by the following three constraints:
1.All variables are bound from the context, all forced selections are executed, all
absolute features projected, and the interpretation is closed under modus ponens
2. It is consistent with the context
3. It is maximal
6 This gives a simple intuitive solution for the “cause to die”-problem of (McCawley 1968). “Black Bill
caused the sheri to die” cannot “mean” under this rule that he caused him to die in some normal way.
“Cause-to-die” is blocked to mean that by the lexical expression “kill”.
7 We require a proper number of occurrences, beyond what could be attributed to error.
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In terms of OT, (1) gives conditions on candidate interpretations and makes these con-
ditions thereby absolute. (2) and (3) are identical with FIT and STRENGTH and can
be defeated: a new statement may correct the context, non-absolute features can be
dropped to gain consistency. (2) is entailed by prior maximisation in Bayesian inter-
pretation. (3) is part of likelihood maximisation. So for practical purposes and within
the enterprise of computing lexical meanings in use from abstract specifications,
it seems reasonable to equate Bayesian interpretation and Smolensky/Hogeweg.
(31) Proper lexical choice: w is a proper lexical choice for b in c if w is a lexical
choice for b and b is a proper interpretation of w in c
Many bs will not have a lexical choice: in that case w is a proper lexical choice for b
in c i b is a proper interpretation of w in c
(32) Proper interpretation: b is a proper interpretation ofw in c i b is computed
by Smolensky/Hogeweg for w in c unless there exists w′ 6= w where w′ is
a lexical choice for b while w is not a lexical choice.
The situation in which the interpretation b found forw cannot be lexically expressed
(no word has a non-zero observed probability for it) is interesting, because now it is
reasonable to stick with the hypothesis found by Bayesian interpretation, i.e. FIT>
STRENGTH that the meaning in use is b: a new meaning in use for the word w was
found. This would be an extension of the use observed so far.
The information in f is typically partially reecting ongoing learning. Every 0
may have the meaning that the use of w for b has not been observed so far. But
there are situations where the 0 can be taken seriously. The rst case would be
for inconsistent bundles. The second case would be the case where the bundle b has
been expressed often enough to be condent that w will not be used for the bundle.
In all other cases, one can learn that w is used for b by encountering a use and
inferring that b is its meaning in use. And one use is good enough.
Like (Hogeweg 2009), we assume that there is the beginning of an account of
metaphorical use of lexical items in this setup. The information in f can block or
select an hypothesis obtained by the reasoning that computes meanings in use from
lexical specications, the new version of FIT > MAX. It however does not block
unobserved hypotheses and it should not. These are—or are from the perspective of
the learning structure f—metaphorical extensions. Since learning f is also learning
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the distribution over semantic features pw , it follows that new hypotheses can also
be obtained by overriding zero’s in that distribution. The latter are new metaphors.
Now it is not easy, but possible to come up with new metaphors for fall. For
example, in the project we might perhaps say (speaking Dutch or Russian) that the
word rennen falls to Lotte, meaning that it is her task to collect uses of rennen. The
specication rules that out even for Dutch: words are not associated conventionally
with a process that assigns them to humans. But as a project member, Lotte can
be assigned tasks and in the project words are tasks: a new metaphor. It would
seem that one can deal with cases like this by shifting from a denition by listing of
process (necessary for Dutch: many processes work, but not all) to an intensional
characterisation (task or reward assigning process). A more proper exploration of
these limits and ways of overcoming them is for future work.
Accordingly, we nd ourselves siding with Giambattista Vico in claiming that
originally—at least in acquisition—language use is poetry in which everything
is interpreted metaphorically (Pompa 2002). Learning from use slowly leads to
prose, i.e. the semantic discipline brought by conventional means of expression
emerging from experience.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that the traditional view on the lexicon does not oer a way of
accounting for the selection of meanings in use, a task that humans seem to perform
routinely with high degrees of success. The proposals of Smolensky and Hogeweg
for dealing with selection by means of overspecication were then examined and
found to be wanting for the meaning of lexical words. We argue that decomposition
of word meanings and meanings in use in terms of moderately universal semantic
features is possible and consistent with truth-conditional semantics and typology.
But that more structure is needed over the features than just set membership.
The method can be made to work in a natural way, if rather than a set of semantic
features one uses equivalence classes over distributions over bundles of semantic
features expressed by the words. Such equivalence classes oer a natural inventory
of operations over semantic features and we show that with these operations, one
can arrive at a natural and eective representation for the verb fall that can be
used to model the interaction with the context that performs selection.
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The approach however overgenerates, since in many cases the interaction with
the context will yield feature bundles that should be expressed dierently in certain
languages. In order to remedy that we propose that lexical representation takes the
form of two functions: f that maps feature bundles and words to a probability
and m that maps feature bundles to the probability that they will be expressed.
It is now possible to dene the necessary semantic blocking as the requirement that
f should not give zero for the interpretation b and the word w, while giving a high
value to b and w′. At the same time, the distributions pw over semantic features
can be recovered from f and m and oer—like the Smolensky/Hogeweg proposal
does—the rst steps of an account of new metaphors.
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Russian predicates selecting remarkable
clauses: Corpus-based approach and
Gricean Perspective
Natalia Zevakhina & Alex Dainiak*
This paper reports upon the study of the lexico-grammatical distribution of Russian
matrix predicates selecting kakoj remarkable clauses (or so-called ‘embedded’ ex-
clamatives) in the Russian National Corpus, with some cross-linguistic parallels. It
reveals that Russian matrix predicates belong to four conceptual classes: perceptual,
mental, emotive, and speech. It shows that the phenomenon of ‘embedded’ excla-
matives is irregular because: (1) matrix predicates seem to be lexically idiosyncratic
and (2) the most frequent forms of matrix predicates (except for optatives) are
on the way to be grammaticalized. The paper also suggests accounting for the
observed distribution of predicates in terms of the Gricean maxims of conversation.
1 Introduction
To give an idea of the phenomenon under consideration, we present below some
examples of ‘embedded’ exclamatives.
(1) Look what’s happened to Rosemary’s baby! (1975 TV movie)
(2) I’m amazed how tall John is! (Grimshaw 1979, p. 282)
* We sincerely appreciate the organization of the workshop Bridging Formal and Conceptual Semantics
2014 and the immensely valuable comments given by its audience and by an anonymous reviewer. All
mistakes are solely ours. The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund
Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2015—2016
(grant No. 15-01-0026) and supported within the framework of a subsidy granted to the HSE by the
Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program.
Kata Balogh and Wiebke Petersen (eds.). 2017. Bridging Formal and Conceptual
Semantics. Selected papers of BRIDGE-14. Düsseldorf: dup.
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(3) You won’t believe who Ed has married! (Huddleston 1993, p. 175)
Two opposite approaches to whether the structures in (1)–(3) are embedded exclama-
tives or embedded interrogatives have been proposed, see (Elliott 1974, Grimshaw
1979, Zanuttini & Portner 2003) vs. (Huddleston 1993, Abels 2005) among many
others. There has been offered a number of arguments for and against each of these
two views. However, for the current purposes, this debate seems to be irrelevant:
both approaches are compatible with the view that we adhere in this paper. In
what follows, we refer to the constructions under consideration as subordinate
clauses with remarkable interpretation, or remarkable clauses.
Our goal in this paper is two-fold. The descriptive part reveals the lexical and
grammatical distribution of matrix predicates which select remarkable clauses
in the largest corpus collection of Russian texts, which is the Russian National
Corpus (RNC). In particular, we discuss the following questions: what predicates
select remarkable clauses as their complements; which semantic classes these
predicates belong to; what lexical and grammatical properties they expose. The
explanatory part accounts for the corpus ndings in terms of the Gricean maxims
of conversation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 goes back to formal semantics
studies which establish the taxonomy of English matrix predicates that embed
exclamatives (remarkable clauses in our terms) only, interrogatives only, both or
none. Section 3 presents cross-linguistic evidence for four conceptual classes of ma-
trix predicates selecting remarkable clauses and reveals some lexico-grammatical
peculiarities of such predicates. Section 4 discusses the lexico-grammatical distribu-
tion of kakoj ‘what’ (e.g., Kakoj krasivyj dom ‘What a beautiful house!’) remarkable
clauses in the RNC. Section 5 accounts for the collected data in terms of the Gricean
maxims of conversation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Exclamative-selecting vs. interrogative-selecting predicates
Studying exclamatives has commenced from studying so-called ‘embedded’ excla-
matives.1 To the best of our knowledge, the rst prominent papers that shed light
upon this issue were (Elliott 1974) and (Grimshaw 1979). The research question at
that time (and later in (Abels 2004a, 2004b) among others) concerned the semantic
1 In this section, we follow the authors’ terminology and call remarkable clauses embedded exclamatives.
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dierence between matrix predicates embedding interrogatives and matrix predi-
cates embedding exclamatives. Grimshaw (1979) pointed out that matrix predicates
are semantically specied in the lexicon for whether they take interrogatives,
exclamatives, both or none as their complements. In particular, she distinguished
between semantic E and Q features, corresponding to exclamations and questions2:
each predicate has zero, one or two of these features. Table 1, summarizing the data
from these four sources, gives evidence for the distribution of matrix predicates
embedding interrogatives and exclamatives. As we see, predicates like believe
select neither interrogatives nor exclamatives, whereas predicates like ask and
wonder allow for interrogatives but not for exclamatives. Emotive predicates take
only exclamatives as their complements. Finally, verbs like know, nd out and
realize select both sorts of embedded clauses.
Table 1: Distribution of interrogative-selecting and exclamative-selecting predicates
Embedded interrogative Embedded exclamative
believe #John believed how tall Mary is. #John believed how (very) tall Mary is.
ask, wonder John asked how tall Mary is. #John asked how (very) tall Mary is.
emotive predicates3 #John was amazed how tall Mary is. John was amazed how (very) tall Mary is.
know, find out, realize John knows how tall Mary is. John knows how (very) tall Mary is.
The explanation for the distribution proposed in (Elliott 1974) and (Grimshaw
1979) was that only factive predicates (originally introduced in (Kiparsky & Kiparsky
1970)) take exclamatives as their complements. This accounts for the fact that
exclamatives, being complements of factives, are presupposed. Indeed, the sentence
John was amazed how tall Mary is presupposes that Mary is tall. Moreover, factive
uses of non-factive predicates, like believe in the form of I can’t believe exemplied
in (4), also allow for exclamatives.
(4) I can’t believe how stupidly he’s behaving. (Grimshaw 1979, p. 319)
Another implication is that non-factive predicates which do not allow for a factive
reading (e.g., claim) do not select exclamatives, cf. (5).
(5) # I claim how very tall Bill is. (Elliott 1974, p. 239)
2 Exclamations and questions are utterances and typically (although not necessarily, at least in case of
exclamations) correspond to exclamatives and interrogatives, which are clauses.
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However, there are exceptions to this general rule. According to Grimshaw (1979)
and Elliott (1974) not every factive predicate takes an exclamative as its complement.
For instance, (6) illustrates infelicity of factive predicates concede and admit with
embedded exclamatives. In (7), the two factive verbs are used with presupposed
that-clause.
(6) # Bill will never concede/admit what a big salary he makes. (Grimshaw 1979, p. 323)
(7) Bill will never concede/admit that he makes a big salary. (ibid.)
Grimshaw (1979, pp. 323-324) adds other factive predicates to this list of exceptions:
be sucient, make sense, and count. As she points out, “it seems that while it
is possible to predict the ill-formedness of exclamations with non-factives, the
behavior of factives is to some extent idiosyncratic”.4
Furthermore, according to Grimshaw (1979) and Elliott (1974), not every form
of a factive exclamative-selecting predicate takes an exclamative as its complement.
On the one hand, the context of negated 1st person mental predicates called a
context of the speaker’s ignorance and exemplied in (8) does not allow for an
exclamative. Compare contexts of non-negated 1st person form in (9) and of 3rd
person form in (10) that take an exclamative.
(8) # I don’t know what a fool Bill is. (Grimshaw 1979, p. 283)
(9) I know what a fool Bill is. (ibid.)
(10) John doesn’t know what a fool Bill is. (ibid.)
On the other hand, as Elliott (1974) pointed out, impersonal negated forms of
emotive predicates illustrated in (11) do not select exclamatives either. See a
corresponding non-negated example (12) for comparison.
(11) # It is not amazing how beautiful this place is. (Elliott 1974, 241)
(12) It is amazing how beautiful this place is. (Googled)
4 Remarkably, literature sources show contradictory data with regard to some of the factive predicates.
To illustrate, Zanuttini & Portner (2003, p. 46, ft. 11) points out that “regret does not allow wh-
complements in general”, whereas Elliott (1974, p. 237) presents the same predicate with a wh-
complement, see (i).
(i) I regret how very much trouble I have caused you. (Elliott 1974, p. 237).
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As an interim conclusion, factivity can explain only some of the data.
Abels (2004a, 2004b) argues against Grimshaw’s semantic features E and Q
and suggests that embedded exclamatives are of the same semantic type as in-
terrogatives, that is of the type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉. In doing so, he focused mostly on the
distinction between emotive predicates embedding exclamatives (e.g., be surprised)
and predicates embedding interrogatives (e.g., wonder).
There are three questions left after reading his papers. To begin with, among
emotive exclamative-selecting predicates, only one of those (be surprised) is dis-
cussed throughout most of the paper, however, the conclusions are tentatively
drawn for all emotive exclamative-selecting predicates, or surprise-predicates, by
which the author meant all such predicates, see (Abels 2004b, p. 205), as well as for
all their grammatical forms. To put it dierently, exclamative-selecting predicates
are treated indistinguishably; the same goes for their forms. However, as we show
in Section 3, cross-linguistically, emotive predicates exhibit grammatical restric-
tions. To illustrate, (11) is infelicitous, whereas (12) is perfectly possible. Moreover,
according to the Russian corpus data studied in Section 4, emotive predicates are
diverse with respect to their lexico-grammatical distribution. Secondly, there is no
discussion of non-emotive predicates like know and nd out. Fortunately, we know
from (Grimshaw 1979) among others that such predicates are specied for both
interrogatives and exclamatives. Thirdly, who-exclamatives are mostly examined
(with a few examples of how-exclamatives), however, the former are impossible in
English main clause exclamatives: cf. (13).
(13) # Who Ed has married!5
To summarize, Abels (2004a, 2004b) mainly discusses surprise as a representative of
the emotive predicate class regardless of lexico-grammatical restrictions among
the predicates within this class, regardless of non-emotive exclamative-selecting
predicate classes and with a strong emphasis on only one type of exclamative,
who-exclamatives.
To conclude this section, factivity can only partly explain which predicates select
remarkable clauses since not all factive verbs and not all grammatical forms of
them allow for such clauses.
5 English allows only for the following exclamative constructions: what a + NP, how (very) + adjective
or adverb and how many/much + NP. Except for one example of how-exclamative briey mentioned in
Section 1, the rest of the exclamative constructions are not discussed at all by Abels.
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3 Classes of predicates selecting remarkable clauses:
Cross-linguistic perspective
To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive cross-linguistic study which would
determine the limits of variation among conceptual classes of matrix predicates
selecting remarkable clauses in natural languages has beem undertaken. Judging
by the data found in the literature, we tentatively distinguish among four such
classes: perceptual, emotive, mental, and speech. This suggests that the variety of
predicates selecting remarkable clauses is limited to these classes. Indeed, Ono
(2006) reports on emotive predicates (e.g., ‘be surprised’6 and ‘be amazed’), mental
(e.g., ‘think’) and speech (e.g., ‘say’) in Japanese; Lipták (2006) mentions Hungarian
emotive predicates; Potsdam (2011) gives evidence for Malagasy emotive predicates;
Visan (2000) discusses mental and perceptual predicates in Mandarin Chinese, and
De Urbana & Hualde (2003) exemplies the use of Basque emotive and perceptual
predicates, cf. (14) and (15).
(14) Basque
Arrituko
be.surprised.PROSP
zinake,
2SG.AUX.POT
ezer-en
any-GEN
indarr-ik
force-PART
gabe
without
eta
and
esku
hand
bat-ekin
one-COM
zer
what
gauza-k
thing-PL
egi-ten
do-IPF
ditu-en!
AUX.TR-COMPL
‘You would be surprised what things he can do without any force and with the
help of only one hand!’ (De Urbana & Hualde 2003, p. 565-566)
(15) Basque
Beha
look
za-zu
AUX.IMP-2SG.A
nola
how
ari
act
d-en!
AUX-COMPL
‘Look at the way he plays!’ (ibid.)
The emotive class seems to be the most frequently mentioned. According to
Michaelis (2001), emotive predicates are one of the cross-linguistic features of
exclamatives: they are witnessed, e.g., in Palestinian Arabic, Mandarin Chinese,
Croatian, French, Italian, Malay, Setswana, Turkish.
6 We give only English translations here and further.
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However, for the time being, it is hard to infer whether all the four classes of
predicates are necessarily present in a given language. It goes without saying that a
thorough cross-linguistic investigation is needed.
Moreover, the classes of predicates exhibit lexical variation: not all predicates
of a given class select remarkable clauses. To illustrate, Ono (2006) points out
that Japanese distinguishes between mental predicates like ‘think’ and like ‘know’:
the former are felicitous, whereas the latter are not, cf. (16) and (17).7
(16) Japanese
John
John
wa
TOP
Mary
Mary
ga
NOM
nante
what
takusan
many
no
GEN
hon
book
o
ACC
yon-da
read-PST
no
NML
da-roo
COP-PRSM
ka
Q
to
COMP
omotte-iru.
think-PROG
‘John thinks how many books Mary has read.’ (lit., Japanese corpus “Kotonoha”)
(17) Japanese
#John
John
wa
TOP
Mary
Mary
ga
NOM
nante
what
takusan
many
no
GEN
gakusee
student
ni
DAT
okotta
angry
no
NML
da-roo
COP-PRSM
koto
NML
to
COMP
sitte-iru.
know-PROG
‘John knows how very many students Mary got angry at.’ (Ono 2006, p. 51)
Also, Japanese distinguishes between speech predicates like ‘say’ and like ‘claim’:
again, the former are felicitous, in contrast to the latter.
Conceptual classes of predicates that select remarkable clauses are subject to not
only lexical but also grammatical variation. For instance, Castroviejo (2006) points
out that Catalan perceptual predicates are used only in the forms of imperatives,
yes-no interrogatives and future tense declaratives, cf. (18)–(20) respectively.
(18) Catalan
Mira
look.IMP
quin
what
home
man
tan
so
graciós
funny
que
COMP
surt
go.3SG
per
PREP
la
DF
tele!
television
‘Look, what a funny man is on TV!’ (Castroviejo 2006, p. 16)
7 Remarkably, in English, it is the other way round.
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(19) Catalan
Has
AUX.2SG
vist
see.PASS.PTCP
quin
what
noi
boy
tan
so
alt
tall
que
COMP
van
go.3SG
amb
PREP
bici?
bicycle
‘Have you seen what a tall boy is riding a bike?’ (ibid.)
(20) Catalan
Ja
already
veuràs
see.FUT.2SG
que
COMP
bé
good
que
COMP
ens
REFL.1PL
ho
this.ACC
passarem.
spend.FUT.1PL
‘You’ll see what a great time we’ll have.’ (ibid.)
Visan (2000) points out that Mandarin Chinese perceptual predicates solely allow
for imperatives.
To recapitulate, rstly, cross-linguistically, the semantic diversity of matrix
predicates that select remarkable clauses seems to be limited to four conceptual
classes: perceptual, emotive, mental, and speech. Secondly, the felicitousness of
lexical items that belong to these four classes and their grammatical forms is subject
to typological variation. In what follows, we regard frequency distributions of
lexemes of the four predicate classes and their forms in the RNC and explain their
behavior in terms of the Gricean maxims of conversation.
4 Russian predicates selecting remarkable clauses: Corpus
perspective
Russian allows for the following wh-words in main clause exclamatives: kakoj
‘what’ + NP (in an attributive position) and kakov ‘what’ (in a predicative position),
kak ‘how’, skol’ko ‘how many/much’, kto ‘who’, čto ‘what’ (in an argument position),
gde ‘where’ (location), kuda ‘where’ (direction), kogda ‘when’ and počemu ‘why’.8
Amongst this diversity, we limited our research to kakoj remarkable clauses and
leave the rest for future investigation.
We studied the predicates that select kakoj remarkable clauses in the Main
corpus of the RNC. The RNC is an open and constantly updated internet re-
source that contains a considerable collection of written and oral Russian texts
(http://www.ruscorpora.ru/en). The Main corpus consists of 230m tokens and
8 The latter two are possible in main clause exclamatives if they are somehow contextually supported:
e.g., with help of the particle nado že.
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includes written prose texts of various genres and styles from the mid-18th century
to the present.
The search query in the Main Corpus of the RNC was as follows. Since we
did not know which predicates select kakoj remarkable clauses and our goal was to
collect most, if not all, of them, we searched for a verb at a distance of 1 word before
kakoj that was at a distance from 1 to 20 words before an exclamation mark (it has a
special label “bexcl” in the RNC).
We found 1 213 contexts and browsed through all of them selecting manually
relevant contexts with a remarkable interpretation of kakoj. Afterwards, we
intended to examine other contexts of each found matrix verb; in that case, the
search query was identical to the previous one, except that the matrix predicate had
to be at a distance of 2–5 words to kakoj.
In both corpus search queries, we looked at the sentences with exclamation
marks. Generally, remarkable clauses do not require the use of an exclamation
mark per se.9 Also, they do not require the use of a dot either. The examples
of remarkable clauses in the literature do not follow the same pattern: some of
them end with a dot, whereas the others contain an exclamation mark (e.g., (3)
vs. (4) with quite similar forms of the same predicate in the very same language).
The advantage of considering solely sentences with an exclamation mark is that
it helped us narrow down the set of relevant constructions in the corpus. The
study of only such contexts does not seem to skew the results. To illustrate, the
search query with an exclamation mark revealed a relatively small number of
emotives (unexpected for the general theory of exclamatives), with udivitel’no
as the most frequent item. However, their behaviour does not considerably dier in
case of a dot at the end of a sentence: again, udivitel’no was the the most frequently
occurring item in the corpus search (cf. Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix). In
other words, contexts with an exclamation mark reveal general tendencies of item
frequencies that become more salient in dot-contexts. This certainly does not
exclude studying dot-contexts. We only predict that such a study will not reveal
an entirely new picture of the lexico-grammatical distribution of predicates. A
more general research goal is to reveal (prosodic) conditions of which punctuation
mark to use.
Having supplemented our collection of relevant contexts, we calculated instances
per million (IPMs) for each witnessed grammatical form of each matrix lexeme
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
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using the following formula:
number of the item instances in the search
number of tokens in the corpus
In what follows, we present the results of our corpus study. We successively
discuss the lexico-grammatical distribution of the predicates which belong to the
four conceptual classes: perceptual, mental, emotive, and speech.
4.1 Perceptual predicates
The data (IPM rates) for perceptuals exemplied in (21) and (22) selecting kakoj-
remarkable clauses as their complements are in Figure 1 in Appendix.
(21) Russian
Smotrite,
look.IMP.2PL
kakie
what.NOM.PL
u
PREP
menja
1SG.GEN
v
in
etom
this.DAT.SG
godu
year.DAT.SG
tykvy
pumpkin.NOM.PL
vymaxali!
grow.PST.PL
‘Look what pumpkins grew in my garden!’ (RNC)
(22) Russian
Vidiš,
see.PRS.2SG
kakuju
what.ACC.SG
xorošuju
good.ACC.SG
kvartiru
appartment.ACC.SG
nam
1PL.DAT
Serjožen’ka
Serjožen’ka.NOM
našol!
nd.PST.SG
‘Do you see what a good apartment Serjožen’ka has found us!’ (RNC)
As can be seen from Figure 1, the most frequent grammatical forms of perceptual
predicates are as follows: imperatives (smotri (IPF) / posmotri (PF) ‘look!’, slušaj (IPF) /
poslušaj (PF) ‘listen!’), optatives in the form of subjunctive mood (esli by ty videl
/ videl by ty ‘if you had seen!’), 2nd person interrogative (vidiš? ‘can you see?’).10
The most frequent lexical items are verbs of vision and hearing, namely smotret’
(IPF) / posmotret’ (PF) ‘look’, videt’ ‘see’ (but not its perfective counterpart). They
are stylistically neutral and very frequent in everyday discourse.
10 Here we give examples in singular forms. However, plural forms are also felicitous.
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4.2 Mental predicates
Figure 2 in Appendix graphically displays IPM rates for mentals and kakoj remark-
able clauses exemplied in (23)–(26).
(23) Russian
Vy
2PL.NOM
ne
NEG
predstavljaete
imagine.PRS.2PL
sebe,
self
kakoe
what.NOM.SG
zrelišče
spectacle.NOM.SG
predstalo
appear.PST.SG
pered
in.front
nami!
1PL.INSTR
‘You can’t imagine what appeared in front of us!’ (RNC)
(24) Russian
Predstavljaju,
imagine.PRS.1SG
kakie
what.NOM.PL
budut
be.FUT.PL
probki!
trac.jams.NOM.PL
‘Imagine what the trac will be like!’ (Newspaper “Arguments and Facts”,
2001)
(25) Russian
Znaeš,
know.PRS.2SG
kakaja
what.NOM.SG
očered’
queue.NOM.SG
byla!
be.PST.SG
‘Can you imagine what a queue there was!’ (RNC)
(26) Russian
Esli
if
by
SUBJ
vy
2PL.NOM
znali,
know.PST.PL
kakie
what
my
1PL.NOM
s
with
nim
3SG.INSTR
druz’ja!
friend.NOM.PL
‘If only you knew what close friends we are!’ (RNC)
As Figure 2 clearly shows, the most frequent grammatical forms are optatives (esli
by ty znal / znal by ty ‘if you knew!’), 1st person positive and negative declaratives
(predstavljaju ‘I can imagine’, ne predstavljaju ‘I can’t imagine’), 2nd person negative
declaratives (ne predstavljaeš ‘you can’t imagine’), 2nd person interrogatives (znaeš?
‘do you know?’, ponimaeš? ‘do you realize?’).11
11 Here we give examples in singular forms. However, plural forms are also felicitous.
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The most frequent lexical items are predstavljat’ (IPF) / predstavit’ (PF) ‘imagine’,
znat’ (IPF) ‘know’ (but not its perfective counterpart uznat’ ‘nd out’) and podumat’
(PF) ‘think’ (but not its imperfective counterpart dumat’ ‘think’).
Comparing perceptual and mental predicates, we can conclude that they behave
dierently: perceptuals primarily occur in imperatives, whilst mentals principally
take the forms of optatives, 2nd person interrogatives and 2nd person or 1st person
declaratives. Notably, the perceptual verb videt’ ‘see’ semantically behaves like a
mental predicate since it mostly occurs in optatives and 2nd person interrogatives. A
possible explanation can be that this verb, denoting perception, implies information
processing in the receiver’s mind.
4.3 Emotive predicates
The next class is emotives illustrated in (27) and (28). The data (IPM rates) for
them with kakoj remarkable clauses are given in Figures 3 and 4.
(27) Russian
Udivljajus’,
surprise.PRS.1SG
s
with
kakoj
what.INSTR.SG
ostrotoj
sharpness.INSTR.SG
i
and
kak
how
polno
fully
pronjos
carry.PST.SG
čerez
through
žizn’
life.ACC.SG
vsjo
all.ACC.SG
bogatstvo
richness.ACC.SG
svoix
3.GEN.PL
detskix
child.GEN.PL
vpečatlenij!
experience.GEN.PL
‘I am surprised of the sharpness and integrity that he carried his childhood
experience through his whole life with.’ (RNC)
(28) Russian
Udivitel’no,
surprising
kakoe
what.NOM.SG
u
PREP
nego
3SG.GEN
tončajšee
subtle.NOM.SG
vosprijatie
perception.NOM.SG
intonacii,
intonation.GEN.SG
vyraženija
expression.GEN.SG
lica,
face.GEN.SG
žestov!
gesture.GEN.PL
‘It’s surprising how ne his perception of intonation, mimic and gestures
is.’ (RNC)
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Initially, we calculated IPM rates for emotives in exclamation mark contexts. The
fact that they were relatively few was unexpected for the theory of exclamatives
since it predicts that embedding under emotives is a characteristic of exclamatives
(cf. Michaelis (2001), among others). Therefore, we calculated IPM rates for
emotives in dot contexts. Interestingly, their frequencies did not considerably
change and generally they are still lower than those of perceptuals and mentals.
Moreover, both sorts of contexts (and Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that) reveal
the same pattern: the most frequent emotive embedding remarkable clauses is
udivitel’no ‘it’s surprising’.12
4.4 Speech predicates
Finally, let us look at speech predicates embedding kakoj remarkable clauses
illustrated in (29). It is important to note that remarkable clauses do not encode
direct speech. Figure 5 presents IPM rates for each speech predicate.
(29) Russian
Nado
necessary
li
Q
govorit’,
say.INF
v
in
kakom
what.DAT.SG
nastroenii
mood.DAT.SG
ja
1SG.NOM
pela
sing.PST.SG
spektakl’
performance.ACC.SG
dal’še...?!
further
‘Do I need to say in what kind of mood I was singing in the rest of the
performance...?!’ (RNC)
Figure 5 shows that speech predicates occur in contexts of remarkable clauses,
however, they are the least frequent items among all of the studied predicate classes.
4.5 Towards grammaticalization of predicates
As stated, the most frequent grammatical forms of predicates are as follows:
imperatives smotri (IPF) / posmotri (PF) ‘look!’, slušaj (IPF) / poslušaj (PF) ‘listen!’,
2nd person declaratives podumaeš ‘you think’, 2nd person interrogatives vidiš? ‘do
you see?’, znaeš? ‘do you know?’, ponimaeš? ‘do you understand?’, 1st person
12 Morphologically, this predicate is an adjective (short form, neutral gender), like some other items
from Figures 3 and 3 that have “it’s” component in their English translations (e.g., neverojatno ‘it’s
unbelievable’, porazitel’no ‘it’s astonishing’). Therefore, for such predicates, the forms 1st and 2nd
person are non-applicable.
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positive and negative declaratives (predstavljaju ‘I can imagine’, ne predstavljaju
‘I can’t imagine’), 2nd person negative declaratives (ne predstavljaeš ‘you can’t
imagine’), optatives esli by ty znal/ znal by ty ‘if only you knew!’, esli by ty videl /
videl by ty ‘if you had seen!’, udivitel’no ‘it’s surprising’.
We assume that most of them (probably except for optatives) are on the way
to be grammaticalized for 5 reasons. First, their grammatical variation seems to be
limited to the listed forms (both singular and plural), except for podumaeš, which is
grammaticalized to a higher degree than the rest (it allows only a singular form),
and udivitel’no, which morphologically does not have a plural form. Second, their
semantics is not transparent; e.g., the questions expressed by interrogatives can be
answered neither positively nor negatively. Third, they are used without personal
pronouns. Fourth, their position just before a remarkable clause seems to be the
most natural (positions inside or after a clause are less felicitous).13
Cross-linguistically, a similar phenomenon is witnessed in Archi and Agul (<
East-Caucasian). According to Kalinina (2011), in these languages, verbal predicates
‘look’ and ‘see’ function as discourse markers,14 cf. Archi example (30) for ‘look’.
Notably, in contexts of remarkable clauses, ‘look’ always has the imperative form
and ‘see’ always has the past (aorist) form.
(30) Archi
Wajo,
INTERJ
os
once
sa<r>k:e,
F.look.IMP
godo-w
this-M
lo
child
Xab-kul
fast-NML
uw-na
M-do-PF-CONV.IRR
he#ršur-t:u!
run.IPF-ATTR.M
‘Oh, just look, the boy is running so fast!’ (Kalinina 2011, p. 162)
5 Russian data
through the prism of the Gricean maxims of conversation
This section describes the conceptual semantics and lexico-grammatical frequencies
of Russian matrix predicates in terms of the Gricean maxims of conversation.
13 On the contrary, optatives still seem to be semantically transparent; personal pronouns are obligatory
in their case; they are used not only in the forms of the 2nd person (singular and plural) but also in the
forms of the 3rd person, although the 2nd person forms are much more frequent than the 3rd person.
14 Although (Kalinina 2011) describes this phenomenon dierently, we still think it is quite similar
to ours.
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For both main clause exclamatives and their subordinate counterparts, we
introduce a speaker-dependent pair of mappings (gexpected, greal), each of which
assigns a degree on a scale shared by these mappings. gexpected stands for the
speaker’s expectation of the degree of the gradable feature of object x, whereas
greal denotes the speaker’s evaluation of the degree. The exclamative utterance
meaning can be modelled by the relation greal(x) gexpected(x).15
To illustrate, consider the sentence What a tall man I saw yesterday!. The real
value of tallness of x (x is a member of some ontological category and this category
implies particular norms of the expressed gradable feature – in the example, this
is the particular man the speaker saw yesterday) is greater than the expected norm
for this category.
By gradable feature we mean not merely a predicate that has to be gradable but
also any implicit gradable aspect of a situation. For example, if a language allows
for predicate-elliptical constructions like What a man I saw yesterday!, relying
on the context of utterance, the hearer has to decode the particular feature of a
person under consideration: cleverness, braveness, tallness, etc.
From the point of view of pragmatics, we employ the expressive illocutionary
force operator introduced in (Rett 2008), (Rett 2011) which was originally dened in
terms of gradable predicates and can be reformulated in our terms as follows:
(31) E-Force(p), for proposition p uttered by a speaker, is appropriate in a given
context C if inequality greal(x) gexpected(x) holds for the speaker’s expected
degree of a given gradable feature of x in C and the speaker’s evaluation
of the real degree of x’s feature.
Furthermore, for remarkable clauses, the presence of the E-Force operator is a
necessary condition. It means that speaker’s surprise always holds, even when the
grammatical subject of a given sentence with an embedded remarkable clause is 2nd
or 3rd person. In other words, we might say that the speaker somehow assigns
her belief to the hearer or to the person being talked about. To illustrate, whilst
15 gexpected is not always what can be called a speaker’s direct expectation, but rather a representation of
common knowledge shared between the speaker and the hearer. E.g., in Look how high John can jump!
we would say that gexpected can reect speaker’s direct expectation if the speaker is unaware of John’s
ability, but we cannot consider so if the speaker is John’s close friend who has seen this kind of
jumping many times before and only made his utterance to attract hearer’s attention to the dierence
between John’s ability and that of an ordinary man. In the latter case, expected in g’s subscript
actually refers to speaker’s expectation of the hearer’s state of knowledge.
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uttering sentences You won’t believe what a tall man I saw yesterday! or She won’t
believe what a tall man I saw yesterday!, the speaker is surprised at some degree and
shares, or perhaps better to say, aligns her knowledge with the hearer’s or with the
3rd person’s.
Moreover, we might think of the Gricean maxims as regulators of the tendency
of the predicate class use. In what follows, we only discuss the use of those
grammatical forms which reect (in)direct speaker-hearer interaction, namely the
use of imperatives, optatives, 2nd person interrogatives and 2nd person negative
declaratives. Hence, we do not account for the speaker’s own beliefs expressed
by virtue of 1st person declaratives and for speaker-hearer established mutual
knowledge conveyed with help of positive 2nd person declaratives.
We argue that the frequency distribution of forms of mental and perceptual
predicates depends on the possibility of witnessing in a given context. By the
possibility of witnessing we mean that at the moment of the utterance the hearer
can witness the degree of object’s feature. E.g., in Look how tall my house is!, there
is the presupposition of the hearer’s possibility of seeing the house, whereas in
If you only knew how tall my house is!, it is presupposed that the hearer cannot
witness the height of the house at the moment of utterance.
The following analysis is based upon the assumption that the speaker’s primary
goal of using a remarkable clause is to change the hearer’s mental state and upon
the scheme “actions cause−→ mental states” (that is, the speaker’s belief that some
hearer’s actions imply a change in the hearer’s mental state). Moreover, we assume
that the probability that the hearer will change her mental state is higher if she
witnesses the object herself.
As the Brevity submaxim (of the Manner maxim) states not to be verbose, it
is sucient for the speaker only to prompt the hearer’s action (in a witnessing-
possibility situation), and the most common way is to use imperative. To give
an example, if the speaker exclaims Look how funny she is! or Listen how beautifully
she is singing!, she induces the hearer to perceptually evaluate the given situation
and, consequently, encourages the hearer to share her attitude towards that. This
accounts for why there is a high frequency in the corpus for using imperatives
in case of perceptual predicates. The exception is videt’ ‘see’ that is used in the
form of optatives and interrogatives rather than in the form of imperatives. This
is partially explained by the fact that in the studied sentences, videt’ functions
as a mental rather than perceptual predicate (‘see’ ≈ ‘understand’).
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In witnessing-impossibility situations, the speaker cannot provide a witness for
her belief but, nonetheless, wishes the hearer to align her mental state with that of
the speaker’s, which correlates with using optatives. As a direct perceptual action
in such a context is impossible, the use of perceptual predicates is ruled out. In this
case, the scheme “actions cause−→ mental states” lacks the rst element and the most
natural way of conveying mental states is using mental predicates. Consequently,
we are left with mental predicates in optative forms. Mental predicates also
exist in two other forms, which are 2nd person interrogatives and 2nd person
negative declaratives; however, their total frequency rate is much lower than that
of optatives.16
Emotive predicates17 violate the Brevity submaxim (of the Manner maxim) since
the speaker-hearer alignment of information involves duplicate communication
of expressive content in the case of emotive predicates (i.e., main clause predicates).
Hence, the use of emotive predicates seems to be redundant.
Finally, we hypothesize that main clause exclamatives do not necessarily imply
the hearer (i.e., they can be uttered in case of the hearer’s absence). However,
subordinate remarkable clauses always involve the hearer, with whom the speaker
wants to share her emotion. This can serve as a plausible explanation for why
the 2nd person sentences in the forms of imperatives, optatives, declaratives,
interrogatives are much more frequently employed than the 3rd person sentences
(1st person sentences do occur but not as frequently as the 2nd person ones).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, rstly, we show that the existing formal semantic accounts can
only partially explain the distribution of matrix predicates embedding remarkable
clauses. Relying on cross-linguistic data, we tentatively suggest distinguishing
among four conceptual classes of matrix predicates — perceptual, mental, emotive,
and speech.
Secondly, on the basis of corpus data from the RNC, we study lexico-grammatical
distribution of Russian matrix predicates selecting remarkable clauses. The most
16 However, there is an exception to this general trend. It concerns the imperative predstav’ ‘imagine’
that directly stimulates the hearer to obtain a particular mental state. This can be explained by the
fact that almost anything can be imagined directly without any help from the senses. So imagining
something can be thought of as a direct mental action.
17 We do not account for speech predicates in this paper since their semantics is mostly idiosyncratic.
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frequent grammatical forms (except for the optatives of znat’ ‘know’ and videt’
’see’) have started losing the status of matrix predicates and are on the way
to be grammaticalized, with podumaeš being at the nal stage of this process.
Generally, the phenomenon of ‘embedded’ exclamatives is irregular (compared
to, e.g., embedded interrogatives): matrix predicates that select exclamatives
demonstrate lexical and grammatical idiosyncrasy and low corpus frequencies.
Thirdly, we argue that the conceptual semantics and lexico-grammatical pecu-
liarities of matrix predicates can be accounted for in terms of the Gricean maxims
of conversation.
Abbreviations
2 — 2nd person, 3 — 3rd person, A — Agent, ACC — Accusative case, ATTR —
Attributive, AUX — auxiliary verb, COM — comitative ax, COMP — complemen-
tizer, COMPL — marker of subordinate clause, CONV — Converb, COP — copula,
DAT — Dative case, DF — Denite, FUT — Futurum, GEN — Genitive case, IMP —
Imperative mood, INF — Innitive, INSTR — Instrumentalis, INTERJ — Interjection,
IPF — Imperfective, IRR — Irrealis, M — Masculine gender, NEG — Negation, NML
— Nominalizer, NOM — Nominative case, PASS.PTCP — Passive Participle, PF —
Perfective, PL — Plural, POT — Potential mood, PREP — Preposition, PROG —
Progressive aspect, PROSP — Prospective tense, PRS — Praesens, PRSM — Presump-
tive, PST — Past, REFL — reexive marker, SG — Singular, SUBJ — Subjunctive, TOP
— Topicalizer, TR — Transitive marker.
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Appendix
Figure 1: kakoj remarkable clauses with perceptual predicates (sentences ending
with exclamation mark)
Figure 2: kakoj remarkable clauses with mental predicates (sentences ending with
exclamation mark)
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Figure 3: kakoj remarkable clauses with emotive predicates (sentences ending with
exclamation mark)
Figure 4: kakoj remarkable clauses with emotive predicates (sentences ending with
dot)
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Figure 5: kakoj remarkable clauses with speech predicates (sentences ending with
exclamation mark)
Authors
Natalia Zevakhina
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Moscow
nzevakhina@hse.ru
Alex Dainiak
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
dainiak@phystech.edu
208


